public inbox for devel@edk2.groups.io
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Gao, Zhichao" <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
To: "devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
	"'philmd@redhat.com'" <philmd@redhat.com>,
	"Bi, Dandan" <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: "Wang, Jian J" <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
	"Wu, Hao A" <hao.a.wu@intel.com>, "Ni, Ray" <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	"Gao, Liming" <liming.gao@intel.com>,
	"Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 13:42:14 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3CE959C139B4C44DBEA1810E3AA6F9000B83D7DF@SHSMSX101.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <82949612-609a-27cf-2800-04ce8033ab9d@redhat.com>

Nice catch. Moving the check into the if conditional section would avoid the additional check when the status is EFI_SUCCESS.

Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>

Thanks,
Zhichao

> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io [mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io] On Behalf Of
> Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
> Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2019 9:22 PM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Bi, Dandan <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> Cc: Wang, Jian J <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; Wu, Hao A <hao.a.wu@intel.com>;
> Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com>; Gao, Zhichao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>; Gao,
> Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>; Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager:
> Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> 
> On 9/24/19 3:16 PM, Dandan Bi wrote:
> > For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> > the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> > EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right
> now.
> > This follows UEFI Spec.
> >
> > But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the
> > execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like
> > any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> >
> > This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> > explicitly for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the
> > policy to defer the execution of the image.
> >
> > Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> > Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
> > Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> > Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
> > Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> > Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
> > REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> > Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> > ---
> > V3: Enahnce the error handling logic in BmLoadOption.c and BmMisc.c.
> >  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c   |  9 +++++++++
> >  .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c      | 14 ++++++++++++--
> >  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c   | 14
> ++++++++++++--
> >  3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> > index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644
> > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> > @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
> >      if (FilePath != NULL) {
> >        FreePool (FilePath);
> >      }
> >
> >      if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +      //
> > +      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> > +      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> > +      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> > +      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> > +      //
> > +      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> > +        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> > +      }
> >        //
> >        // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure
> to load boot option
> >        //
> >        BmReportLoadFailure
> (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status);
> >        BootOption->Status = Status;
> > diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> > index 07592f8ebd..89372b3b97 100644
> > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> >  /** @file
> >    Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing
> load options.
> >
> > -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights
> > reserved.<BR>
> > +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights
> > +reserved.<BR>
> >  (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
> >  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> >
> >  **/
> >
> > @@ -1409,11 +1409,21 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
> >                      FileSize,
> >                      &ImageHandle
> >                      );
> >      FreePool (FileBuffer);
> >
> > -    if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +      //
> > +      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> > +      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> > +      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> > +      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> > +      //
> > +      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> > +        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> > +      }
> > +    } else {
> 
> Thanks for changing this Dandan!
> 
> >        Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle,
> &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
> >        ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
> >
> >        ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize;
> >        ImageInfo->LoadOptions = LoadOption->OptionalData; diff --git
> > a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> > index 6b8fb4d924..89595747af 100644
> > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> >  /** @file
> >    Misc library functions.
> >
> > -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights
> > reserved.<BR>
> > +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights
> > +reserved.<BR>
> >  (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
> >  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> >
> >  **/
> >
> > @@ -491,11 +491,21 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
> >          ImageDevicePath,
> >          NULL,
> >          0,
> >          &ImageHandle
> >        );
> > -      if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +      if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +        //
> > +        // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and
> an ImageHandle was created
> > +        // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can
> not be started right now.
> > +        // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> > +        // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> > +        //
> > +        if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> > +          gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> > +        }
> > +      } else {
> 
> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
> 
> >          LoadCount++;
> >          //
> >          // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for
> >          // a 5 Minute period
> >          //
> >
> 
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-24 13:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-24 13:16 [patch v3 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 13:16 ` [patch v3 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 13:16 ` [patch v3 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 13:16 ` [patch v3 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 13:21   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-24 13:42     ` Gao, Zhichao [this message]
2019-09-24 13:16 ` [patch v3 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 13:16 ` [patch v3 5/5] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-list from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=3CE959C139B4C44DBEA1810E3AA6F9000B83D7DF@SHSMSX101.ccr.corp.intel.com \
    --to=devel@edk2.groups.io \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox