From: "Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
To: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
edk2-devel-groups-io <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: "Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage()
Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2020 10:15:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3a51e349-44f8-617c-6782-9a56413f2c6e@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200605235242.32442-1-lersek@redhat.com>
On 6/6/20 1:52 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> When an image fails Secure Boot validation, LoadImage() returns
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION if the platform policy is
> DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
>
> If the platform policy is DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION, then
> LoadImage() returns EFI_ACCESS_DENIED (and the image does not remain
> loaded).
>
> (Before <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129>, this
> difference would be masked, as DxeImageVerificationLib would incorrectly
> return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION for DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION as
> well.)
>
> In X86QemuLoadImageLib, proceed to the legacy Linux/x86 Boot Protocol upon
> seeing EFI_ACCESS_DENIED too.
>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2785
> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
> ---
>
> Notes:
> Repo: https://pagure.io/lersek/edk2.git
> Branch: x86_qlil_access_denied
>
> OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c | 14 ++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> index ef753be7ea90..931553c0c1fb 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> @@ -319,13 +319,19 @@ QemuLoadKernelImage (
> return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
>
> case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
> + //
> + // Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload it before proceeding
> + // to the EFI_ACCESS_DENIED case below.
> + //
> + gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
> + //
> + // Fall through
> + //
> + case EFI_ACCESS_DENIED:
> //
> // We are running with UEFI secure boot enabled, and the image failed to
> // authenticate. For compatibility reasons, we fall back to the legacy
> - // loader in this case. Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload
> - // it before proceeding
> - //
> - gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
> + // loader in this case.
> //
> // Fall through
> //
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-08 8:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-05 23:52 [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage() Laszlo Ersek
2020-06-07 22:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-08 8:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2020-06-09 20:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
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