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From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, edk2-devel@lists.01.org
Cc: Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com, leo.duran@amd.com,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v4 02/13] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Set C-bit when building initial page table
Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 13:40:28 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <49bb6112-a0a9-d072-1007-c447efb19fec@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1494454162-9940-3-git-send-email-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On 05/11/17 00:09, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> SEV guest VMs have the concept of private and shared memory. Private
> memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared memory
> may be encrypted with hypervisor key. Certain types of memory (namely
> instruction pages and guest page tables) are always treated as private
> memory by the hardware. The C-bit in PTE indicate whether the page is
> private or shared. The C-bit position for the PTE can be obtained from
> CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX].
> 
> When SEV is active, the BIOS is encrypted by the Qemu launch sequence,
> we must set the C-bit when building the page table.
> 
> 
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm | 70 +++++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
> index 6201cad1f5dc..3d4b04844cdf 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
> @@ -37,9 +37,60 @@ BITS    32
>                         PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
>                         PAGE_PRESENT)
>  
> +; Check if Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature is enabled
> +;
> +; If SEV is enabled then EAX will be at least 32
> +; If SEV is disabled then EAX will be zero.
> +;
> +CheckSevFeature:
> +    ; CPUID will clobber EBX, ECX, EDX, save these registers
> +    push  ebx
> +    push  ecx
> +    push  edx
> +
> +    ; Check if we have a valid (0x8000_001F) CPUID leaf
> +    mov       eax, 0x80000000
> +    cpuid
> +
> +    ; This check should fail on Intel or Non SEV AMD CPUs and in future if
> +    ; Intel CPUs supports this CPUID leaf then we are guranteed to have exact
> +    ; same bit definition.
> +    cmp       eax, 0x8000001f
> +    jl        NoSev
> +
> +    ; Check for memory encryption feature:
> +    ;  CPUID  Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 1
> +    ;
> +    mov       eax,  0x8000001f
> +    cpuid
> +    bt        eax, 1
> +    jnc       NoSev
> +
> +    ; Check if memory encryption is enabled
> +    ;  MSR_0xC0010131 - Bit 0 (SEV enabled)
> +    mov       ecx, 0xc0010131
> +    rdmsr
> +    bt        eax, 0
> +    jnc       NoSev
> +
> +    ; Get pte bit position to enable memory encryption
> +    ; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
> +    ;
> +    mov       eax, ebx
> +    and       eax, 0x3f
> +    jmp       SevExit
> +
> +NoSev:
> +    xor       eax, eax
> +
> +SevExit:
> +    pop       edx
> +    pop       ecx
> +    pop       ebx
> +    OneTimeCallRet CheckSevFeature
>  
>  ;
> -; Modified:  EAX, ECX
> +; Modified:  EAX, ECX, EDX
>  ;
>  SetCr3ForPageTables64:
>  
> @@ -60,18 +111,34 @@ clearPageTablesMemoryLoop:
>      mov     dword[ecx * 4 + PT_ADDR (0) - 4], eax
>      loop    clearPageTablesMemoryLoop
>  
> +    OneTimeCall   CheckSevFeature
> +    xor     edx, edx
> +    test    eax, eax
> +    jz      SevNotActive
> +
> +    ; If SEV is enabled, Memory encryption bit is always above 31
> +    sub     eax, 32
> +    bts     edx, eax
> +
> +SevNotActive:
> +
>      ;
>      ; Top level Page Directory Pointers (1 * 512GB entry)
>      ;
>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0)], PT_ADDR (0x1000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (4)], edx
>  
>      ;
>      ; Next level Page Directory Pointers (4 * 1GB entries => 4GB)
>      ;
>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1000)], PT_ADDR (0x2000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1004)], edx
>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1008)], PT_ADDR (0x3000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x100C)], edx
>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1010)], PT_ADDR (0x4000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1014)], edx
>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1018)], PT_ADDR (0x5000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x101C)], edx
>  
>      ;
>      ; Page Table Entries (2048 * 2MB entries => 4GB)
> @@ -83,6 +150,7 @@ pageTableEntriesLoop:
>      shl     eax, 21
>      add     eax, PAGE_2M_PDE_ATTR
>      mov     [ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000 - 8)], eax
> +    mov     [(ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000 - 8)) + 4], edx
>      loop    pageTableEntriesLoop
>  
>      ;
> 

Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>


  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-11 11:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-10 22:09 [RFC v4 00/13] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 01/13] UefiCpuPkg: Define AMD Memory Encryption specific CPUID and MSR Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11  0:30   ` Fan, Jeff
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 02/13] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Set C-bit when building initial page table Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 11:40   ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 03/13] OvmfPkg: Update dsc to use IoLib from BaseIoLibIntrinsicSev.inf Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 11:46   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 04/13] OvmfPkg/BaseMemcryptSevLib: Add SEV helper library Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 14:04   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-11 18:03     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 05/13] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Set memory encryption PCD when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 14:37   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-11 18:04     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 06/13] OvmfPkg:AmdSevDxe: add AmdSevDxe driver Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11  0:56   ` Yao, Jiewen
2017-05-11 15:19   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-11 15:53     ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-11 17:43       ` Jordan Justen
2017-05-11 18:01         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-15 17:47           ` Jordan Justen
2017-05-16 12:04             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-16 17:56               ` Jordan Justen
2017-05-16 20:25                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-18  8:50                   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-11 20:14         ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-11 18:12     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 07/13] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Provide Pei and Dxe specific library Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 15:40   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-11 18:16     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 08/13] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Prepare for SEV support Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 15:57   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 09/13] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Implement SEV internal function for SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 16:24   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-11 18:21     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 10/13] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Implement SEV internal functions for PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 16:38   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 11/13] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Implement SEV internal function for Dxe phase Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 17:07   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 12/13] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Add option to dynamic alloc FW_CFG_DMA Access Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 17:10   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-10 22:09 ` [RFC v4 13/13] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Add SEV support Brijesh Singh
2017-05-11 17:44   ` Laszlo Ersek

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