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From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: devel@edk2.groups.io, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>, Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2021 11:32:04 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4aa01f68-e76c-65a7-192b-f65ca62517f1@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210526231118.12946-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Hi Brijesh,

On 05/27/21 01:10, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> (I missed adding devel@edk2.groups.io, resending the series)
>
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
>
> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
> integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based
> attacks like data replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to
> create an isolated memory encryption environment.
>
> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the
> SEV-SNP VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced
> by the SEV-SNP such as interrupt protection.
>
> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to
> SEV-SNP VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a
> page to the guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This
> transitions the page to guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the
> page using the new PVALIDATE instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the
> new "Page State Change Request NAE" defined in the GHCB specification
> to ask hypervisor to add or remove page from the RMP table.
>
> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or
> unvalidated, as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP
> entry. There are two approaches that can be taken for the page
> validation: Pre-validation and Lazy Validation.
>
> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And
> under lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An
> access to a unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time
> the exception handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires
> careful tracking of the validated pages to avoid validating the same
> GPA more than once. The recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type
> can be used to communicate the unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest
> OS.
>
> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the
> available system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the
> memory is validated before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
>
> This series does not implements the following SEV-SNP features yet:
>
> * CPUID filtering
> * Lazy validation
> * Interrupt security
>
> The series builds on SNP pre-patch posted here: https://tinyurl.com/pu6admks

That series ("[PATCH v3 00/13] Add GHCBv2 macro and helpers") has been
merged at this point, as commit range dbc22a178546..adfa3327d4fc. [*]

>
> Additional resources
> ---------------------
> SEV-SNP whitepaper
> https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
>
> APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)
>
> The complete source is available at
> https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/sev-snp-rfc-2

So, I'm having trouble applying this series. I attempted to apply it in
preparation for reviewing patch#2 with a larger context, but I failed,
as follows:

- When I try applying the series with git-am, upon current master
  (c410ad4da4b7), patch#21 ("UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP
  Creation NAE event to launch APs") does not apply.

  AFAICT, that's because your modification of GetApResetVectorSize() did
  not (could not) take into account Tom's commit dbc22a178546
  ("UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Allocate a separate SEV-ES AP reset stack
  area", 2021-05-29).

- Your remote branch (with HEAD @ 2dbd79823402) is based on upstream
  commit 01c0ab90beb3 ("AzurePipelines: Add support for ArmPlatformPkg",
  2021-04-28). If I try to rebase the branch from there to current
  master (c410ad4da4b7), I get the following rebase action list:

   1  pick 570829c5a0d6 MdePkg: Expand the SEV MSR to include the SNP definition
   2  pick b9247f69bdfe MdePkg: Define the GHCB Hypervisor features
   3  pick d09ed6d44ffd MdePkg: Define the Page State Change VMGEXIT structures
   4  pick 7148b2684f87 MdePkg: Add AsmPvalidate() support
   5  pick d6a2c2a0d625 OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask()
   6  pick 9b1037d0d9ac OvmfPkg: Use MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear EncMask from Mmio
   7  pick 556e8fc40179 OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Remove CacheFlush parameter
   8  pick 03e27af79c61 OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Allow PMBASE register access in Dxe phase
   9  pick a81925eeb1c6 OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
  10  pick 3d443240f91c OvmfPkg: Reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
  11  pick 94dad29970b0 OvmfPkg: Reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest
  12  pick b3e3faa12b0f OvmfPkg: Validate the data pages used in the Reset vector and SEC phase
  13  pick 62290e03c79a UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs
  14  pick c04e71dabf63 OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field
  15  pick 76072671f367 OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Extend Es Workarea to include hv features
  16  pick 2bf0eaf2beea OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Invalidate the GHCB page
  17  pick 2f050b2a1033 OvmfPkg: Add a library to support registering GHCB GPA
  18  pick b2681bdfbebc OvmfPkg: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
  19  pick d9f1abb1ff35 UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled
  20  pick 814084815108 OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate system RAM
  21  pick ec34893c46ab OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Skip the pre-validated system RAM
  22  pick 37af54f86c3a OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase
  23  pick 25891f51499e OvmfPkg/SecMain: Pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
  24  pick f2f55135b562 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate the system RAM when SNP is active
  25  pick a28b66462eae OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table
  26  pick b10c0e61913b OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table
  27  pick 2dbd79823402 MdePkg/GHCB: Increase the GHCB protocol max version

This is 27 patches, while your series contains 22 patches. It *seems*
like some of these 27 patches have been merged via [*] already, but it's
not easy to say which ones. In particular, I can't just drop a
contiguous *prefix* of this rebase action list, because your *posted*
patch#1 is "UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs", but
on your topic branch, that's patch#13! And if I dropped the 12 patches
before that, then we'd be left with 27-12=15 patches, which obviously
doesn't match your posted series consisting of 22 patches. I assume some
of the patches may have been reordered, but I wouldn't like to guess.

I believe we have two problems here: (1) the patch set does not apply to
current master, (2) the posted patch set doesn't even match your remote
topic branch.

Problem (1) is somewhat expected (the master branch is expected to
diverge over time), but problem (2) should never occur. Please never do
this. If you provide a fetch URL + branch reference in your cover
letter, then that remote topic branch must match the posted patches
*forver*. It effectively becomes read only, same as your posted emails
are read-only. If you need to modify the branch, please create a brand
new topic branch (possibly with a new version number in the name), and
rebase that branch.

(It's also possible that you modified your local branch just before
posting, without pushing it to the <https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf>
repository afterwards, but that's quite disruptive too.)

So... what do you want me to do?

- Are at least patches 01 through 20 (as posted to the list)
  authoritative? Should I review those?

- Or would you like to rebase and repost the entire series (this time
  keeping the posted version and the fetchable topic branch in sync)?

Thanks,
Laszlo

>
> GHCB spec:
> https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
>
> SEV-SNP firmware specification:
> https://developer.amd.com/sev/
>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
>
> Changes since v2:
>  * Add support for the AP creation.
>  * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI reads.
>  * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
>  *
> Changes since v1:
>  * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
>  * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
>  * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is supported.
>  * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from MMIO ranges.
>  * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
>  * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location through
>    EFI configuration table.
>
> Brijesh Singh (21):
>   UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs
>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled
>     field
>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features
>   OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
>   OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest
>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase
>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page
>   OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA
>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>   UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
>     enabled
>   OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
>   OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
>     phase
>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table
>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
>   OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
>     table
>   MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
>
> Tom Lendacky (1):
>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
>
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |  21 ++
>  UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec                     |  11 +
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc                  |   5 +-
>  OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc                    |   5 +-
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc                       |   2 +
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc                    |   7 +-
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |   8 +-
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc                           |   5 +-
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                        |  17 +-
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf        |   4 +
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf        |   1 +
>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   7 +
>  .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>  .../GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.inf       |  33 +++
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf           |   5 +
>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf           |   4 +
>  OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf                       |   3 +
>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf |   4 +
>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf |   4 +
>  MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h            |   2 +-
>  .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h        |  18 ++
>  OvmfPkg/Include/Library/GhcbRegisterLib.h     |  27 ++
>  OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h    |  31 +-
>  .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h                  |  31 ++
>  .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h  |  19 ++
>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h          |  19 ++
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c          |  22 ++
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c          |  15 +-
>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>  .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c                   |  17 ++
>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>  .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  19 ++
>  .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  40 +++
>  .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c                 | 167 ++++++++++-
>  .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c             | 126 ++++++++
>  .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  36 +++
>  .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c          | 230 +++++++++++++++
>  .../Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.c |  97 +++++++
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c                  |  81 ++++++
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c               |  12 +
>  OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c                         | 106 +++++++
>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c       |  11 +-
>  .../MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c  |  31 ++
>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c          | 274 ++++++++++++++++--
>  .../MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c   |  44 +++
>  OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc       |   5 +
>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm  |  23 ++
>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm     | 227 +++++++++++++++
>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb         |   6 +
>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc        |   1 +
>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm |  51 ++++
>  52 files changed, 1956 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.inf
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/GhcbRegisterLib.h
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.c
>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
>


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-04  9:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-26 23:10 [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 01/22] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03  8:15   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 12:16     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:07       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 13:38   ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 02/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:43   ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 03/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 14:15   ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 11:20     ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:00       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08  8:17         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 13:51           ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 16:42             ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 04/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 11:54   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:37     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08  8:49       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 14:50         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 21:36         ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-09 10:50           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 05/22] OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 12:26   ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:48     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 17:33       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08  9:22         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 15:58     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08  9:20       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 15:43         ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 18:01           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 18:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 06/22] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 07/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 08/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 09/22] OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 10/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 11/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 12/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 13/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 14/22] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 15/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 16/22] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 17/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 18/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 19/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 20/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 21/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 22/22] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:08   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08  1:17     ` 回复: " gaoliming
2021-05-27  9:42 ` [edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-02 17:09   ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04  9:32 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2021-06-04 11:50   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:09     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:04       ` Laszlo Ersek

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