Re: [PATCH v6 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support

["Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>]

Thank you so much Yao for reviewing the patches. Based on some comments 
from Gerd I may update code around the reset vector area (mainly use the 
metadata format etc). For your comments regarding the introducing a new 
PcdConfidentialComputingCategory I will look to see what I can come up 
with and in UefiCpuPkg I will try to move all the SEV specific functions 
in new files (where applicable).

thanks
Brijesh

On 9/6/21 9:36 PM, Yao, Jiewen wrote:
> Thank you Brijesh
> It took me a while to review this series. Here is my feedback.
> I am not sure what you prefer, to put all comment together? Or reply 29 email separately?
> Let me put them together in this version. If you prefer a different way, please let me know.
> 
> My strategy is same as previous. I will focus on common part and review as detail as possible.
> For SEV specific thing, I will ACK and let AMD people make decision unless I have big concern on the design.
> You can add my A-B and R-B in next version.
> 
> 
> 0001-OvmfPkg-reserve-SNP-secrets-page
> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0002-OvmfPkg-reserve-CPUID-page-for-SEV-SNP
> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0003-OvmfPkg-ResetVector-introduce-SEV-SNP-boot-block-GUID
> I am still thinking if it is possible to move all SEV define GUID blob to a standalone file, and TDX define GUID blob to another file.
> Anyway, that can be done later.
> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0004-OvmfPkg-ResetVector-invalidate-the-GHCB-page
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0005-OvmfPkg-ResetVector-check-the-vmpl-level
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0006-OvmfPkg-ResetVector-pre-validate-the-data-pages-used-in-SEC-phase
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0007-OvmfPkg-ResetVector-use-SEV-SNP-validated-CPUID-values
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0008-UefiCpuPkg-Define-the-SEV-SNP-specific-dynamic-PCDs
> I really don't like the idea to use BOOL PcdSevEsIsEnabled and PcdSevSnpIsEnabled.
> Can we define *one* PCD - such as PcdConfidentialComputingCategory?
> We can assign range 0x0000~0xFFFF to AMD SEV, 0x10000~0x1FFFF to Intel TDX.
> Then SEV=0x0000, SEV-ES=0x0001, SEV-SNP=0x0002, and TDX=0x10000 later.
> I really don't want to keep adding PCD endlessly in the future, like PcdSevXXXIsEnabled, PcdSevYYYIsEnabled, PcdTdxIsEnabled, PcdTdx20Enabled, PcdTdx30Enabled, ......
> 
> 
> 0009-OvmfPkg-MemEncryptSevLib-add-MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
> I am not sure since we have PCD in 0008, why we need to expose the function - MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled() and MemEncryptSevEsIsEnabled()?
> Should we always use PCD anywhere else?
> Anyway, Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0010-OvmfPkg-SecMain-move-SEV-specific-routines-in-AmdSev.c
> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0011-OvmfPkg-SecMain-register-GHCB-gpa-for-the-SEV-SNP-guest
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0012-OvmfPkg-VmgExitLib-use-SEV-SNP-validated-CPUID-values
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0013-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-register-GHCB-gpa-for-the-SEV-SNP-guest
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0014-OvmfPkg-AmdSevDxe-do-not-use-extended-PCI-config-space
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0015-OvmfPkg-MemEncryptSevLib-add-support-to-validate-system-RAM
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0016-OvmfPkg-BaseMemEncryptSevLib-skip-the-pre-validated-system-RAM
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0017-OvmfPkg-MemEncryptSevLib-add-support-to-validate-4GB-memory-in-PEI-phase
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0018-OvmfPkg-SecMain-pre-validate-the-memory-used-for-decompressing-Fv
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0019-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-validate-the-system-RAM-when-SNP-is-active
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0020-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-set-the-SEV-SNP-enabled-PCD
> See 0008
> 
> 0021-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-set-the-Hypervisor-Features-PCD
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0022-MdePkg-GHCB-increase-the-GHCB-protocol-max-version
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0023-UefiCpuPkg-MpLib-add-support-to-register-GHCB-GPA-when-SEV-SNP-is-enabled
> 1) See 0008.
> 2) For MpFuncs.nasm, I recommend to move AmdSev specific initialization to a standalone file, such as Sev.nasm
> 
> 0024-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-use-BSP-to-do-extended-topology-check
> See 0023
> 
> 0025-OvmfPkg-MemEncryptSevLib-change-the-page-state-in-the-RMP-table
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0026-OvmfPkg-MemEncryptSevLib-skip-page-state-change-for-Mmio-address
> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> 
> 0027-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-mark-cpuid-and-secrets-memory-reserved-in-EFI-map
> Would you please move SEV specific init to another Sev.c?
> Also I found MemEncryptSevEsIsEnabled() and MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled() are there.
> I suggest just use one API
> MemEncryptSevEsIsEnabled() {
>      DoSevInitializeRamRegions()
> }
> Then you can check more in DoSevInitializeRamRegions().
> DoSevInitializeRamRegions() {
>    MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled() {
>    }
> }
> 
> 0028-OvmfPkg-AmdSev-expose-the-SNP-reserved-pages-through-configuration-table
> I am not convinced to include SEV specific data structure in a generic structure in ConfidentialComputingSecret.h.
> I recommend moving it to SEV specific file.
> 
> 0029-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-Use-SEV-SNP-AP-Creation-NAE-event-to-launch-APs
> See 0008, 0023.
> I recommend to move SevSnpCreateSaveArea() to Sev.c.
> 
> Thank you
> Yao Jiewen
> 
> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> Sent: Thursday, September 2, 2021 12:16 AM
>> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
>> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M <min.m.xu@intel.com>;
>> Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky
>> <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>;
>> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas
>> <erdemaktas@google.com>; Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>; Gerd
>> Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>; Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> Subject: [PATCH v6 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
>>
>> BZ: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.tianocore.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D3275&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C33df27781053475362e208d971a85cee%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637665791405981353%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=8vfBxVawRoEeDCR0DHJhfhTgPr66704twMGZ8%2BY%2BLGI%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>
>> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
>> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
>> integrity
>> protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
>> replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
>> encryption environment.
>>
>> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP
>> VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP
>> such as interrupt protection.
>>
>> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
>> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP
>> VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the
>> guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to
>> guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE
>> instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request
>> NAE"
>> defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page
>> from the RMP table.
>>
>> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated,
>> as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two
>> approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and
>> Lazy Validation.
>>
>> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under
>> lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a
>> unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception
>> handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of
>> the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The
>> recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate
>> the
>> unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS.
>>
>> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the available
>> system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated
>> before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
>>
>> Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP
>> guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the
>> SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted.
>>
>> Additional resources
>> ---------------------
>> SEV-SNP whitepaper
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2FSEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C33df27781053475362e208d971a85cee%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637665791405981353%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=tobk2zHk1ziA6nZ9bvwNrohRuIN7bTEh5ZXFNzwTTX0%3D&amp;reserved=0
>> isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
>>
>> APM 2: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F24593.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C33df27781053475362e208d971a85cee%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637665791405981353%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=%2FDTzbh8F6CtvvC263r7xJGX6WAQ8yCAuKLkPM7GwBvQ%3D&amp;reserved=0 (section 15.36)
>>
>> The complete source is available at
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsev-snp-rfc-5&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C33df27781053475362e208d971a85cee%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637665791405981353%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=6lvmuqOQbvNoXG50qK5QGYG6XEdojJ%2BHlkKrODZRAHY%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>
>> GHCB spec:
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeveloper.amd.com%2Fwp-content%2Fresources%2F56421.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C33df27781053475362e208d971a85cee%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637665791405981353%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=Q1oa5gB3CthKPkentzFJE3B3LfBpZq%2B4y8EzPTlPzl8%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>
>> SEV-SNP firmware specification:
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F56860.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C33df27781053475362e208d971a85cee%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637665791405981353%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=7cLoMR52WAvMe%2Fr4rKGGYx2wadopvXKnSGi%2FghyEdJA%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>
>> Change since v5:
>>   * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page
>>   * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c
>>   * Rebase to the latest code
>>   * Add the review feedback from Yao.
>>
>> Change since v4:
>>   * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS
>>   * Add VMPL-0 check
>>
>> Change since v3:
>>   * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to
>> keep
>>     the code readable.
>>   * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state.
>>   * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB GPA.
>>   * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the
>>     AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it.
>>   * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets.
>>
>> Changes since v2:
>>   * Add support for the AP creation.
>>   * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI
>> reads.
>>   * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
>>   *
>> Changes since v1:
>>   * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
>>   * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
>>   * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is
>> supported.
>>   * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from
>> MMIO ranges.
>>   * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
>>   * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location
>> through
>>     EFI configuration table.
>>
>> Brijesh Singh (25):
>>    OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page
>>    OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for SEV-SNP
>>    OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV-SNP boot block GUID
>>    OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page
>>    OvmfPkg/ResetVector: check the vmpl level
>>    OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase
>>    UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs
>>    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
>>    OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
>>    OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>>    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>>    OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
>>    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
>>    OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
>>    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
>>      phase
>>    OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
>>    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
>>    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the SEV-SNP enabled PCD
>>    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD
>>    MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
>>    UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
>>      enabled
>>    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table
>>    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
>>    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
>>    OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
>>      table
>>
>> Michael Roth (3):
>>    OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
>>    OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
>>    UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check
>>
>> Tom Lendacky (1):
>>    UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
>>
>>   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |  23 +
>>   UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec                     |  11 +
>>   OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc                  |   5 +-
>>   OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc                    |   5 +-
>>   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc                       |   1 +
>>   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc                    |   6 +-
>>   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |   5 +-
>>   OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc                           |   5 +-
>>   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                        |  12 +-
>>   OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf               |   7 +
>>   .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>>   .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   7 +
>>   .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>>   OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf  |   2 +
>>   OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf     |   3 +
>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf           |  10 +
>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf           |   6 +
>>   OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf                       |   4 +
>>   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf |   4 +
>>   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf |   4 +
>>   MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h            |   2 +-
>>   .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h        |  18 +
>>   OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h    |  26 +
>>   .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h                  |  31 ++
>>   .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h  |  19 +
>>   OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h                          |  95 ++++
>>   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h          |  20 +
>>   OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c                 |  23 +
>>   .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>>   .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c                   |  17 +
>>   .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>>   .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  19 +
>>   .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  40 ++
>>   .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c                 | 167 ++++++-
>>   .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c             | 126 +++++
>>   .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  36 ++
>>   .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c          | 295 ++++++++++++
>>   OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444 ++++++++++++++++--
>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c                  | 192 ++++++++
>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c               |  21 +
>>   OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c                          | 267 +++++++++++
>>   OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c                         | 160 +------
>>   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c       |  11 +-
>>   .../MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c  |  31 ++
>>   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c          | 286 ++++++++++-
>>   .../MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c   |  44 ++
>>   OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc       |   5 +
>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm  |  28 ++
>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm           | 307 +++++++++++-
>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb         |   6 +
>>   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc        |   2 +
>>   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm |  78 +++
>>   52 files changed, 2771 insertions(+), 225 deletions(-)
>>   create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
>>   create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
>>   create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>   create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>   create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>   create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
>>   create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
>>   create mode 100644
>> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
>>   create mode 100644
>> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
>>
>> --
>> 2.17.1
>