From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124])
 by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web10.19632.1680162659752863091
 for <devel@edk2.groups.io>;
 Thu, 30 Mar 2023 00:50:59 -0700
Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io;
 dkim=pass header.i=@redhat.com header.s=mimecast20190719 header.b=XuNbANvj;
 spf=pass (domain: redhat.com, ip: 170.10.133.124, mailfrom: kraxel@redhat.com)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com;
	s=mimecast20190719; t=1680162658;
	h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id:
	 to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type:
	 in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references;
	bh=hjuPU3UYx8nriDru0uJJ8222LPU02nZ3HVknQFojMyY=;
	b=XuNbANvjSVmZR6vpO93/qHWReWuwRbtsdFXAoctc9FS3wlNjDoyZIuDVzwKr4/ZGP/iPgV
	c1BxMot+lZ2p2igpBlDhSZjKsoVo4lYeETFJxOV/StcIOq3Q+Na8blsBrSAtNAUSPy5BtM
	dMfVtWhyDU/nMpUbYoslNpWY1RzxPh8=
Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast-mx02.redhat.com
 [66.187.233.88]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS
 (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id
 us-mta-530-UWmnqFe7OgGpa1ThKD-Zuw-1; Thu, 30 Mar 2023 03:50:55 -0400
X-MC-Unique: UWmnqFe7OgGpa1ThKD-Zuw-1
Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.8])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 149C885A5A3;
	Thu, 30 Mar 2023 07:50:55 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from sirius.home.kraxel.org (unknown [10.39.193.49])
	by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C4BBEC15BA0;
	Thu, 30 Mar 2023 07:50:54 +0000 (UTC)
Received: by sirius.home.kraxel.org (Postfix, from userid 1000)
	id 71908180061B; Thu, 30 Mar 2023 09:50:53 +0200 (CEST)
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2023 09:50:53 +0200
From: "Gerd Hoffmann" <kraxel@redhat.com>
To: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: devel@edk2.groups.io, Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>, 
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>, 
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V1 1/1] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Skip PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore in SEV guest
Message-ID: <4tmi32c3kevecoc3y7mb6jlv7d7ygmctt6bgwflvjybqwphjqk@gnnertcj5kz2>
References: <20230329052310.27-1-min.m.xu@intel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <20230329052310.27-1-min.m.xu@intel.com>
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.8
X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0
X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline

On Wed, Mar 29, 2023 at 01:23:10PM +0800, Min Xu wrote:
> From: Min M Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
> 
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4379
> 
> PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore is called to initialize the
> EmuVariableNvStore with the content pointed by
> PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageVariableBase. This is because when OVMF is launched
> with -bios parameter, UEFI variables will be partially emulated, and
> non-volatile variables may lose their contents after a reboot. This makes
> the secure boot feature not working.
> 
> But in SEV guest, this design doesn't work. Because at this point the
> variable store mapping is still private/encrypted, OVMF will see
> ciphertext. So we skip the call of PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore in
> SEV guest.

I'd suggest to simply build without -D SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE instead.
Without initializing the emu var store you will not get a functional
secure boot setup anyway.

take care,
  Gerd