From: "Dov Murik" <dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 27/28] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table
Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 10:10:59 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <54944028-2676-7bf9-25ee-b4d162fead43@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210430115148.22267-28-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Hi Brijesh,
On 30/04/2021 14:51, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
>
> Now that both the secrets and cpuid pages are reserved in the HOB,
> extract the location details through fixed PCD and make it available
> to the guest OS through the configuration table.
>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf | 4 ++++
> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h | 17 ++++++++++++++++
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c
> index 308022b5b2..08b6d9bddf 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c
> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
> **/
> #include <PiDxe.h>
> #include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
> +#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
> #include <Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h>
>
> STATIC CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_LOCATION mSecretDxeTable = {
> @@ -13,6 +14,15 @@ STATIC CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_LOCATION mSecretDxeTable = {
> FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize),
> };
>
> +STATIC CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_BLOB_LOCATION mSnpBootDxeTable = {
> + 0x414d4445, // AMDE
(nit: I believe this UINT32 will appear in memory as the string "EDMA".)
> + 1,
Not sure what's the official stance regarding a version field here. Maybe it's better to generate a new GUID whenever there's a struct change.
-Dov
> + (UINT64)(UINTN) FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase),
> + FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize),
> + (UINT64)(UINTN) FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase),
> + FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize),
> +};
> +
> EFI_STATUS
> EFIAPI
> InitializeSecretDxe(
> @@ -20,6 +30,17 @@ InitializeSecretDxe(
> IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
> )
> {
> + //
> + // If its SEV-SNP active guest then install the CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_BLOB.
> + // It contains the location for both the Secrets and CPUID page.
> + //
> + if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
> + return gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (
> + &gConfidentialComputingBlobGuid,
> + &mSnpBootDxeTable
> + );
> + }
> +
> return gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (
> &gConfidentialComputingSecretGuid,
> &mSecretDxeTable
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
> index 40bda7ff84..d15194b368 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
> @@ -23,13 +23,17 @@
> MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
>
> [LibraryClasses]
> + MemEncryptSevLib
> UefiBootServicesTableLib
> UefiDriverEntryPoint
>
> [Guids]
> gConfidentialComputingSecretGuid
> + gConfidentialComputingBlobGuid
>
> [FixedPcd]
> + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase
> + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
>
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h b/OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h
> index 7026fc5b08..0d7f1b8818 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h
> @@ -18,11 +18,28 @@
> { 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47 }, \
> }
>
> +#define CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_BLOB_GUID \
> + { 0x067b1f5f, \
> + 0xcf26, \
> + 0x44c5, \
> + { 0x85, 0x54, 0x93, 0xd7, 0x77, 0x91, 0x2d, 0x42 }, \
> + }
> +
> typedef struct {
> UINT64 Base;
> UINT64 Size;
> } CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_LOCATION;
>
> +typedef struct {
> + UINT32 Header;
> + UINT16 Version;
> + UINT64 SecretsPhysicalAddress;
> + UINT32 SecretsSize;
> + UINT64 CpuidPhysicalAddress;
> + UINT32 CpuidLSize;
> +} CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_BLOB_LOCATION;
> +
> extern EFI_GUID gConfidentialComputingSecretGuid;
> +extern EFI_GUID gConfidentialComputingBlobGuid;
>
> #endif // SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET_H_
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
> index d1bfe49731..f38c5e476a 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
> @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@
> gQemuKernelLoaderFsMediaGuid = {0x1428f772, 0xb64a, 0x441e, {0xb8, 0xc3, 0x9e, 0xbd, 0xd7, 0xf8, 0x93, 0xc7}}
> gGrubFileGuid = {0xb5ae312c, 0xbc8a, 0x43b1, {0x9c, 0x62, 0xeb, 0xb8, 0x26, 0xdd, 0x5d, 0x07}}
> gConfidentialComputingSecretGuid = {0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, {0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47}}
> + gConfidentialComputingBlobGuid = {0x067b1f5f, 0xcf26, 0x44c5, {0x85, 0x54, 0x93, 0xd7, 0x77, 0x91, 0x2d, 0x42}}
>
> [Ppis]
> # PPI whose presence in the PPI database signals that the TPM base address
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-05 9:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-30 11:51 [PATCH RFC v2 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 01/28] MdePkg: Expand the SEV MSR to include the SNP definition Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 8:39 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 11:42 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 02/28] MdePkg: Define the GHCB Hypervisor features Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 10:10 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:40 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 03/28] MdePkg: Define the GHCB GPA structure Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 10:24 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:19 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:50 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 13:55 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 04/28] MdePkg: Define the Page State Change VMGEXIT structures Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 12:33 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 13:59 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 14:48 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-05-04 18:07 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 18:53 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 18:24 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-05 19:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 05/28] MdePkg: Add AsmPvalidate() support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 13:58 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 14:09 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 18:56 ` Laszlo Ersek
[not found] ` <167BF2A01FA60569.6407@groups.io>
2021-05-04 19:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:10 ` Laszlo Ersek
[not found] ` <167BF53DA09B327E.22277@groups.io>
2021-05-04 20:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 23:03 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:19 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-05 19:17 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 06/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 10:39 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 19:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 07/28] OvmfPkg: Use MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear EncMask from Mmio Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 10:50 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 19:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 08/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Remove CacheFlush parameter Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 11:08 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 09/28] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Allow PMBASE register access in Dxe phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 14:08 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 14:12 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-07 13:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-07 15:10 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-07 15:19 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-07 15:47 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 10/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 11/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 6:42 ` [edk2-devel] " Dov Murik
2021-05-05 13:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:33 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 10:57 ` Dov Murik
2021-05-06 15:06 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 16:12 ` James Bottomley
2021-05-06 16:02 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 12/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 13/28] OvmfPkg: Validate the data pages used in the Reset vector and SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 14/28] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 15/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 16/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 17/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:05 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-05-03 14:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 18/28] OvmfPkg: Add a library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 19/28] OvmfPkg: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 20/28] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 21/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 14:04 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-05-03 18:56 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 22/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 23/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 24/28] OvmfPkg/SecMain: Pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 25/28] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 26/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 27/28] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 7:10 ` Dov Murik [this message]
2021-05-05 19:37 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 28/28] MdePkg/GHCB: Increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 16:49 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
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