From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 05/22] OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 14:48:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <55475e6f-d2fa-b33f-57a1-f82a1ea3fc2f@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6c1d0c68-0537-9b58-ada4-ec9deb1a7c9d@redhat.com>
On 06/07/21 14:26, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> On 05/27/21 01:11, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
>>
>> When AMD SEV is enabled in the guest VM, a hypervisor need to insert a
>> secrets page.
>
> For pure SEV?
>
>>
>> When SEV-SNP is enabled, the secrets page contains the VM platform
>> communication keys. The guest BIOS and OS can use this key to communicate
>> with the SEV firmware to get attesation report. See the SEV-SNP firmware
>> spec for more details for the content of the secrets page.
>>
>> When SEV and SEV-ES is enabled, the secrets page contains the information
>> provided by the guest owner after the attestation. See the SEV
>> LAUNCH_SECRET command for more details.
>>
>> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
>> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
>> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
>> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
>> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 2 ++
>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 5 +++++
>> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf | 1 +
>> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
>> 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> How is all of the above related to the "OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc"
> platform, where remote attestation is not a goal?
>
> What you describe makes sense to me, but only for the remote-attested
> "OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc" platform. (Which already includes
> SecretPei and SecretDxe, and sets the necessary PCDs.)
>
> Then, even if we limit this patch only to the "OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei"
> module, the commit message does not explain sufficiently why the secrets
> page must be reserved for good. The "SEV-SNP firmware spec" reference is
> vague at best; I'm permanently lost between the dozen PDF files I have
> downloaded locally from the AMD website. Please include a specific
> document number, revision number, and chapter/section identifier.
>
> Honestly I'm getting a *rushed* vibe on this whole series. Why is that?
>
> Assume that I'm dumb. You won't be far from the truth. Then hold my hand
> through all this?
Here's the v2 discussion:
- http://mid.mail-archive.com/9804ecb5-8afd-c56e-4982-d1a6ebad3de8@redhat.com
- https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/74797
- https://listman.redhat.com/archives/edk2-devel-archive/2021-May/msg00112.html
That discussion refers to a different use case, raised by Dov. That use
case might justify reserving the area even for plain SEV. It's out of
scope for now, AIUI.
(
And even for that separate use case, James showed down-thread that *not*
reserving the page forever in the firmware is more flexible.
- http://mid.mail-archive.com/aed7d3490fe6edee74440ed8e4cd5364fb2ba4af.camel@linux.ibm.com
- https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/74801
- https://listman.redhat.com/archives/edk2-devel-archive/2021-May/msg00116.html
)
AFAICT, the only effect of the v2 sub-thread on the patch has been that
we now use the Reserved memory type rather than AcpiNVS (when SEV-SNP is
in use). I have two comments on that:
- It's good that we're not mixing in the other use case raised by Dov
(i.e., enabling the guest-kernel to read secrets from the injected
page even under plain SEV).
- It's still unclear to me why the reservation needs to be permanent
under SEV-SNP.
Thanks
Laszlo
>>
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
>> index 999738dc39cd..ea08e1fabc65 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
>> @@ -716,6 +716,7 @@ [Components]
>> OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.inf
>> !endif
>> UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
>> + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>>
>> !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE
>> OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf
>> @@ -966,6 +967,7 @@ [Components]
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
>> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
>> OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf
>> + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
>>
>> !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
>> OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccess2Dxe.inf
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
>> index d6be798fcadd..9126b8eb5014 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
>> @@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ [FD.MEMFD]
>> 0x00C000|0x001000
>> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
>>
>> +0x00D000|0x001000
>> +gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
>> +
>> 0x010000|0x010000
>> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
>>
>> @@ -179,6 +182,7 @@ [FV.PEIFV]
>> INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf
>> INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf
>> !endif
>> +INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>>
>> ################################################################################
>>
>> @@ -314,6 +318,7 @@ [FV.DXEFV]
>> INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf
>>
>> INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf
>> +INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
>>
>> #
>> # Network modules
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>> index 08be156c4bc0..9265f8adee12 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ [LibraryClasses]
>> HobLib
>> PeimEntryPoint
>> PcdLib
>> + MemEncryptSevLib
>>
>> [FixedPcd]
>> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
>> index ad491515dd5d..51eb094555aa 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
>> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
>> #include <PiPei.h>
>> #include <Library/HobLib.h>
>> #include <Library/PcdLib.h>
>> +#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
>>
>> EFI_STATUS
>> EFIAPI
>> @@ -15,10 +16,22 @@ InitializeSecretPei (
>> IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices
>> )
>> {
>> + UINTN Type;
>> +
>> + //
>> + // The location of the secret page should be marked reserved so that guest OS
>> + // does not treated as a system RAM.
>> + //
>> + if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
>> + Type = EfiReservedMemoryType;
>> + } else {
>> + Type = EfiBootServicesData;
>> + }
>> +
>> BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
>> PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase),
>> PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize),
>> - EfiBootServicesData
>> + Type
>> );
>>
>> return EFI_SUCCESS;
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-07 12:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-26 23:10 [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 01/22] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 8:15 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 12:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:07 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 13:38 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 02/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:43 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 03/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 14:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 11:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 8:17 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 16:42 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 04/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 11:54 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 8:49 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 14:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 21:36 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-09 10:50 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 05/22] OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 12:26 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:48 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2021-06-07 17:33 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 9:22 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 15:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 9:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 15:43 ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 18:01 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 06/22] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 07/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 08/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 09/22] OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 10/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 11/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 12/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 13/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 14/22] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 15/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 16/22] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 17/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 18/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 19/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 20/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 21/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 22/22] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:08 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 1:17 ` 回复: " gaoliming
2021-05-27 9:42 ` [edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-02 17:09 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04 9:32 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04 11:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:09 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:04 ` Laszlo Ersek
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