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From: "James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>, "Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: "devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
	"Xu, Min M" <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	"Justen, Jordan L" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Aktas, Erdem" <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH V3 5/9] OvmfPkg/IntelTdx: Measure Td HobList and Configuration FV
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 10:25:23 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56d4a5fab3cda814d1d33a6e3f6987a0313129f5.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220420081656.nl4sykhnwzugynm5@sirius.home.kraxel.org>

On Wed, 2022-04-20 at 10:16 +0200, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
>   Hi,
> 
> > > Yes for validation (aka sanity-checking the fields, etc).
> > > But for measurement I don't see why the ordering matters.
> > > Whenever you do that before or after consuming the TdHob
> > > should not make a difference.
> > 
> > [Jiewen] I disagree. The order matters from security perspective.
> > If you use it, there is risk that the buggy code will compromise
> > the system before you have chance to measure it.
> 
> Measurement will only record hashes for verification later on.
> It will not prevent running possibly buggy/compromised code.

This is true, but this is also the design of measured boot: it's for
proof of correctness (or not) after the fact.  Secure boot is more the
technology that can prevent boot.

> So, no matter what the order is, you'll figure the system got
> compromised after the fact, when checking the hashes later, and in
> turn take actions like refusing to hand out secrets to the
> compromised system.

Not if the code falsifies the measurement both in the log and to the
TPM.  That's why the requirement of measured boot is you start with a
small rom based root of trust, which can't be updated because it's in
rom.  It measures the next stage (usually PEI) before executing it so
that the measurement in the TPM would change if the next stage (which
is often in flash) got compromised, so any tampering is certain to be
detected and if the compromised code tries to falsify the log, the log
now wouldn't match the TPM, so it can't evade detection.

The requirement from the TCG is that the trusted code measures the
untrusted code through the TPM before executing it to get this
proveable detection of tampering.  The TCG allows you to be elastic
about when you record the measurements in the log as long as you
measure through the TPM at the correct points.

The above applies equally to TPM substitutes like the TDX msrs.

James



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-04-20 14:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-17 23:59 [PATCH V3 0/9] Enable RTMR based measurement and measure boot for Td guest Min Xu
2022-04-17 23:59 ` [PATCH V3 1/9] Security: Add HashLibTdx Min Xu
2022-04-17 23:59 ` [PATCH V3 2/9] CryptoPkg: Add SecCryptLib Min Xu
2022-04-18 15:31   ` [edk2-devel] " Michael D Kinney
2022-04-19 11:45     ` Min Xu
2022-04-17 23:59 ` [PATCH V3 3/9] SecurityPkg: Add definition of EFI_CC_EVENT_HOB_GUID Min Xu
2022-04-17 23:59 ` [PATCH V3 4/9] OvmfPkg: Introduce SecMeasurementLib Min Xu
2022-04-17 23:59 ` [PATCH V3 5/9] OvmfPkg/IntelTdx: Measure Td HobList and Configuration FV Min Xu
2022-04-19  6:58   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-04-19 11:12     ` Min Xu
2022-04-19 12:49       ` [edk2-devel] " Gerd Hoffmann
2022-04-19 14:06         ` Yao, Jiewen
2022-04-20  8:16           ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-04-20  9:46             ` Yao, Jiewen
2022-04-20 16:05               ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-04-20 14:25             ` James Bottomley [this message]
2022-04-20 16:29               ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-04-20 22:29                 ` Yao, Jiewen
2022-04-21  9:14                   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-04-21  9:24                     ` Yao, Jiewen
2022-04-17 23:59 ` [PATCH V3 6/9] OvmfPkg: Add PCDs for LAML/LASA field in CC EVENTLOG ACPI table Min Xu
2022-04-17 23:59 ` [PATCH V3 7/9] MdePkg: Define CC Measure EventLog ACPI Table Min Xu
2022-04-18  1:23   ` Yao, Jiewen
2022-04-18  2:02     ` Min Xu
2022-04-17 23:59 ` [PATCH V3 8/9] OvmfPkg/IntelTdx: Add TdTcg2Dxe Min Xu
2022-04-18  0:00 ` [PATCH V3 9/9] OvmfPkg/IntelTdx: Enable RTMR based measurement and measure boot Min Xu
2022-04-18  1:43 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH V3 0/9] Enable RTMR based measurement and measure boot for Td guest Yao, Jiewen

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