From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com,
"edk2-devel@lists.01.org" <edk2-devel@lists.01.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v1 0/3] Add VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM support
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 15:55:41 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6517a7f8-5564-35e1-dc27-1b85a23c815e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c5c3c3cc-d0c1-4227-306c-da19f2e43203@amd.com>
On 07/27/2017 02:00 PM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>> This distribution of operations seems wrong. The key point is that
>>> AllocateBuffer() *need not* result in a buffer that is immediately
>>> usable, and that client code is required to call Map()
>>> *unconditionally*, even if BusMasterCommonBuffer is the desired
>>> operation. Therefore, the right distribution of operations is:
>>>
>>> - IoMmuAllocateBuffer() allocates pages and does not touch the
>>> encryption mask..
>>>
>>> - IoMmuFreeBuffer() deallocates pages and does not touch the encryption
>>> mask.
>>>
>
> Actually one of main reason why we cleared and restored the memory encryption mask
> during allocate/free is because we also consume the IOMMU protocol in QemuFwCfgLib
> as a method to allocate and free a DMA buffer. I am certainly open to suggestions.
>
> [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/OvmfPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgDxe.c#L159
> [2] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/OvmfPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgDxe.c#L197
>
>>> - IoMmuMap() does not allocate pages when BusMasterCommonBuffer is
>>> requested, and it allocates pages (bounce buffer) otherwise.
>>>
>
> I am trying to wrap my head around how we can support BusMasterCommonBuffer
> when buffer was not allocated by us. Changing the memory encryption mask in
> a page table will not update the contents. Also since the memory encryption
> mask works on PAGE_SIZE hence changing the encryption mask on not our allocated
> buffer could mess things up (e.g if NumberOfBytes is not PAGE_SIZE aligned).
>
I may be missing something in my understanding. Here is a flow I have in my
mind, please correct me.
OvmfPkg/VirtIoBlk.c:
VirtioBlkInit()
....
....
VirtioRingInit
Virtio->AllocateSharedPages(RingSize, &Ring->Base)
PciIo->AllocatePages(RingSize, &RingAddress)
Virtio->MapSharedPages(...,BusMasterCommonBuffer, Ring->Base, RingSize, &RingDeviceAddress)
.....
.....
This case is straight forward and we can easily maps. No need for bounce buffering.
VirtioBlkReadBlocks(..., BufferSize, Buffer,)
......
......
SynchronousRequest(..., BufferSize, Buffer)
....
Virtio->MapSharedPages(..., BusMasterCommonBuffer, Buffer, BufferSize, &DeviceAddress)
VirtioAppendDesc(DeviceAddress, BufferSize, ...)
VirtioFlush (...)
In the above case, "Buffer" was not allocated by us hence we will not able to change the
memory encryption attributes. Am I missing something in the flow ?
>>> *Regardless* of BusMaster operation, the following actions are carried
>>> out unconditionally:
>>>
>>> . the memory encryption mask is cleared in this function (and in this
>>> function only),
>>>
>>> . An attempt is made to grab a MAP_INFO structure from an internal
>>> free list (to be introduced!). The head of the list is a new static
>>> variable. If the free list is empty, then a MAP_INFO structure is
>>> allocated with AllocatePool(). The NO_MAPPING macro becomes unused
>>> and can be deleted from the source code.
>>>
>>> - IoMmuUnmap() clears the encryption mask unconditionally. (For this, it
>>> has to consult the MAP_INFO structure that is being passed in from the
>>> caller.) In addition:
>>>
>>> . If MapInfo->Operation is BusMasterCommonBuffer, then we know the
>>> allocation was done separately in AllocateBuffer, so we do not
>>> release the pages. Otherwise, we do release the pages.
>>>
>>> . MapInfo is linked back on the internal free list (see above). It is
>>> *never* released with FreePool().
>>>
>>> This approach guarantees that IoMmuUnmap() can de-program the IOMMU (=
>>> re-set the memory encryption mask) without changing the UEFI memory
>>> map. (I trust that MemEncryptSevSetPageEncMask() will not split page
>>> tables internally when it *re*sets the encryption mask -- is that
>>> correct?)
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-27 20:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-19 22:09 [RFC v1 0/3] Add VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-19 22:09 ` [RFC v1 1/3] OvmfPkg/Include/Virtio10: Define VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM feature bit Brijesh Singh
2017-07-19 22:09 ` [RFC v1 2/3] OvmfPkg/VirtioLib: Add IOMMU_PLATFORM support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-19 22:09 ` [RFC v1 3/3] OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe: Add VIRITO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM support Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <62320c1a-0cec-947c-8c63-5eb0416e4e33@redhat.com>
2017-07-21 11:17 ` [RFC v1 0/3] Add VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM support Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170722024318-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
2017-07-24 8:25 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2017-07-25 18:17 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-25 23:42 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <904dae9f-e515-01ba-e16f-6561616c78af@redhat.com>
2017-07-26 15:30 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-27 14:21 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 17:16 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-27 17:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-07-27 19:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 20:55 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-07-27 21:31 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-07-27 21:38 ` Andrew Fish
2017-07-27 22:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 22:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 8:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-07-28 15:27 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-28 13:38 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-28 16:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 16:16 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-28 19:21 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-28 19:59 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-29 0:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-29 1:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31 18:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
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