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From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Mario Smarduch <mario.smarduch@amd.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [RESEND] [PATCH v2 2/2] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Exclude SEV launch secrets page from pre-validation
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 08:44:23 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <67f06585-b9e6-a450-04fe-ad6b1105d3b6@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230220084942.1292756-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

On 2/20/23 02:49, Dov Murik wrote:
> In order to allow the VMM (such as QEMU) to add a page with hashes of
> kernel/initrd/cmdline for measured direct boot on SNP, this page must
> not be part of the SNP metadata list reported to the VMM.
> 
> Check if that page is defined; if it is, skip it in the metadata list.
> In such case, VMM should fill the page with the hashes content, or
> explicitly update it as a zero page (if kernel hashes are not used).

Would it be better to define a new section type (similar to what I did in 
the SVSM PoC)? This way, it remains listed in the metadata and allows the 
VMM to detect it and decide how to handle it.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> Note that for SNP, the launch secret part of the page (lower 3KB) are
> not relevant and will stay zero.  The last 1KB is used for the hashes.
> 
> This should have no effect on OvmfPkgX64 targets (which don't define
> PcdSevLaunchSecretBase).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 14 +++++++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
> index 94fbb0a87b37..16f3daf49d82 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
> @@ -75,7 +75,19 @@
>   ;
>   %define SNP_SEC_MEM_BASE_DESC_2       (GHCB_BASE + 0x1000)
>   %define SNP_SEC_MEM_SIZE_DESC_2       (SEV_SNP_SECRETS_BASE - SNP_SEC_MEM_BASE_DESC_2)
> -%define SNP_SEC_MEM_BASE_DESC_3       (CPUID_BASE + CPUID_SIZE)
> +%if (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase) > 0)
> +  ; There's a reserved page for SEV secrets and hashes; the VMM will fill and
> +  ; validate the page, or mark it as a zero page.
> +  %define EXPECTED_END_OF_LAUNCH_SECRET_PAGE (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase) + \
> +                                              FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize) + \
> +                                              FixedPcdGet32 (PcdQemuHashTableSize))
> +  %if (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase) != EXPECTED_END_OF_LAUNCH_SECRET_PAGE)
> +    %error "PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase must start directly after the SEV Launch Secret page"
> +  %endif
> +  %define SNP_SEC_MEM_BASE_DESC_3     (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase))
> +%else
> +  %define SNP_SEC_MEM_BASE_DESC_3     (CPUID_BASE + CPUID_SIZE)
> +%endif
>   %define SNP_SEC_MEM_SIZE_DESC_3       (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase) - SNP_SEC_MEM_BASE_DESC_3)
>   
>   %ifdef ARCH_X64

  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-20 14:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-20  8:49 [RESEND] [PATCH v2 0/2] OvmfPkg: Enable measured direct boot on AMD SEV-SNP Dov Murik
2023-02-20  8:49 ` [RESEND] [PATCH v2 1/2] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Reorder MEMFD pages to match the order in OvmfPkgX64.fdf Dov Murik
2023-02-20  8:49 ` [RESEND] [PATCH v2 2/2] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Exclude SEV launch secrets page from pre-validation Dov Murik
2023-02-20 14:44   ` Lendacky, Thomas [this message]
2023-02-21  9:38     ` Gerd Hoffmann
2023-02-23 14:58       ` Dov Murik
2023-02-23 15:04         ` Dov Murik
2023-02-27 18:50           ` Lendacky, Thomas

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