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From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
	devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 05/22] OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 14:26:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6c1d0c68-0537-9b58-ada4-ec9deb1a7c9d@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210526231118.12946-6-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On 05/27/21 01:11, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
> 
> When AMD SEV is enabled in the guest VM, a hypervisor need to insert a
> secrets page.

For pure SEV?

> 
> When SEV-SNP is enabled, the secrets page contains the VM platform
> communication keys. The guest BIOS and OS can use this key to communicate
> with the SEV firmware to get attesation report. See the SEV-SNP firmware
> spec for more details for the content of the secrets page.
> 
> When SEV and SEV-ES is enabled, the secrets page contains the information
> provided by the guest owner after the attestation. See the SEV
> LAUNCH_SECRET command for more details.
> 
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                 |  2 ++
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                 |  5 +++++
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf |  1 +
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c   | 15 ++++++++++++++-
>  4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

How is all of the above related to the "OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc"
platform, where remote attestation is not a goal?

What you describe makes sense to me, but only for the remote-attested
"OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc" platform. (Which already includes
SecretPei and SecretDxe, and sets the necessary PCDs.)

Then, even if we limit this patch only to the "OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei"
module, the commit message does not explain sufficiently why the secrets
page must be reserved for good. The "SEV-SNP firmware spec" reference is
vague at best; I'm permanently lost between the dozen PDF files I have
downloaded locally from the AMD website. Please include a specific
document number, revision number, and chapter/section identifier.

Honestly I'm getting a *rushed* vibe on this whole series. Why is that?

Assume that I'm dumb. You won't be far from the truth. Then hold my hand
through all this?

Laszlo


> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> index 999738dc39cd..ea08e1fabc65 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> @@ -716,6 +716,7 @@ [Components]
>    OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.inf
>  !endif
>    UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
> +  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>  
>  !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE
>    OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf
> @@ -966,6 +967,7 @@ [Components]
>    OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
>    OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
>    OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf
> +  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
>  
>  !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
>    OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccess2Dxe.inf
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
> index d6be798fcadd..9126b8eb5014 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
> @@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ [FD.MEMFD]
>  0x00C000|0x001000
>  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
>  
> +0x00D000|0x001000
> +gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
> +
>  0x010000|0x010000
>  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
>  
> @@ -179,6 +182,7 @@ [FV.PEIFV]
>  INF  SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf
>  INF  SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf
>  !endif
> +INF  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>  
>  ################################################################################
>  
> @@ -314,6 +318,7 @@ [FV.DXEFV]
>  INF  ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf
>  
>  INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf
> +INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
>  
>  #
>  # Network modules
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> index 08be156c4bc0..9265f8adee12 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ [LibraryClasses]
>    HobLib
>    PeimEntryPoint
>    PcdLib
> +  MemEncryptSevLib
>  
>  [FixedPcd]
>    gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
> index ad491515dd5d..51eb094555aa 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
>  #include <PiPei.h>
>  #include <Library/HobLib.h>
>  #include <Library/PcdLib.h>
> +#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
>  
>  EFI_STATUS
>  EFIAPI
> @@ -15,10 +16,22 @@ InitializeSecretPei (
>    IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES     **PeiServices
>    )
>  {
> +  UINTN   Type;
> +
> +  //
> +  // The location of the secret page should be marked reserved so that guest OS
> +  // does not treated as a system RAM.
> +  //
> +  if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
> +    Type = EfiReservedMemoryType;
> +  } else {
> +    Type = EfiBootServicesData;
> +  }
> +
>    BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
>      PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase),
>      PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize),
> -    EfiBootServicesData
> +    Type
>      );
>  
>    return EFI_SUCCESS;
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-07 12:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-26 23:10 [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 01/22] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03  8:15   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 12:16     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:07       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 13:38   ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 02/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:43   ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 03/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 14:15   ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 11:20     ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:00       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08  8:17         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 13:51           ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 16:42             ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 04/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 11:54   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:37     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08  8:49       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 14:50         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 21:36         ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-09 10:50           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 05/22] OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 12:26   ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2021-06-07 12:48     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 17:33       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08  9:22         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 15:58     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08  9:20       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 15:43         ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 18:01           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 18:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 06/22] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 07/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 08/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 09/22] OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 10/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 11/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 12/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 13/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 14/22] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 15/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 16/22] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 17/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 18/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 19/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 20/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 21/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 22/22] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:08   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08  1:17     ` 回复: " gaoliming
2021-05-27  9:42 ` [edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-02 17:09   ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04  9:32 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04 11:50   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:09     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:04       ` Laszlo Ersek

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