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From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 08/15] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Clear encryption bit on PCIe MMCONFIG range
Date: Thu,  7 Jan 2021 12:48:18 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <711ae2dcb6cb29e4c60862c18330cff627269b81.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108

The PCIe MMCONFIG range should be treated as an MMIO range. However,
there is a comment in the code explaining why AddIoMemoryBaseSizeHob()
is not called. The AmdSevDxe walks the GCD map looking for MemoryMappedIo
or NonExistent type memory and will clear the encryption bit for these
ranges.

Since the MMCONFIG range does not have one of these types, the encryption
bit is not cleared for this range. Add support to detect the presence of
the MMCONFIG range and clear the encryption bit. This will be needed for
follow-on support that will validate that MMIO is not being performed to
an encrypted address range under SEV-ES.

Even though the encryption bit was set for this range, this still worked
under both SEV and SEV-ES because the address range is marked by the
hypervisor as MMIO in the nested page tables:
- For SEV, access to this address range triggers a nested page fault (NPF)
  and the hardware supplies the guest physical address (GPA) in the VMCB's
  EXITINFO2 field as part of the exit information. However, the encryption
  bit is not set in the GPA, so the hypervisor can process the request
  without any issues.
- For SEV-ES, access to this address range triggers a #VC. Since OVMF runs
  identity mapped (VA == PA), the virtual address is used to avoid the
  lookup of the physical address. The virtual address does not have the
  encryption bit set, so the hypervisor can process the request without
  any issues.

Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf |  8 +++++++-
 OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c   | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
index dd9ecc789a20..0676fcc5b6a4 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #
 #  Driver clears the encryption attribute from MMIO regions when SEV is enabled
 #
-#  Copyright (c) 2017, AMD Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
+#  Copyright (c) 2017 - 2020, AMD Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
 #
 #  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
 #
@@ -39,3 +39,9 @@ [Depex]
 
 [FeaturePcd]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmmSmramRequire
+
+[FixedPcd]
+  gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress
+
+[Pcd]
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfHostBridgePciDevId
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c
index 595586617882..689bfb376d03 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c
@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@
   in APRIORI. It clears C-bit from MMIO and NonExistent Memory space when SEV
   is enabled.
 
-  Copyright (c) 2017, AMD Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
+  Copyright (c) 2017 - 2020, AMD Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
 
   SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
 
 **/
 
+#include <IndustryStandard/Q35MchIch9.h>
 #include <Library/BaseLib.h>
 #include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
 #include <Library/DebugLib.h>
@@ -65,6 +66,23 @@ AmdSevDxeEntryPoint (
     FreePool (AllDescMap);
   }
 
+  //
+  // If PCI Express is enabled, the MMCONFIG area has been reserved, rather
+  // than marked as MMIO, and so the C-bit won't be cleared by the above walk
+  // through the GCD map. Check for the MMCONFIG area and clear the C-bit for
+  // the range.
+  //
+  if (PcdGet16 (PcdOvmfHostBridgePciDevId) == INTEL_Q35_MCH_DEVICE_ID) {
+    Status = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask (
+               0,
+               FixedPcdGet64 (PcdPciExpressBaseAddress),
+               EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (SIZE_256MB),
+               FALSE
+               );
+
+    ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+  }
+
   //
   // When SMM is enabled, clear the C-bit from SMM Saved State Area
   //
-- 
2.30.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-07 18:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-07 18:48 [PATCH v3 00/15] SEV-ES security mitigations Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 01/15] Ovmf/ResetVector: Simplify and consolidate the SEV features checks Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 02/15] OvmfPkg/Sec: Move SEV-ES SEC workarea definition to common header file Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 03/15] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Validate the encryption bit position for SEV/SEV-ES Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 04/15] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Perform a simple SEV-ES sanity check Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 05/15] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Save the encryption mask at boot time Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 06/15] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add an interface to retrieve the encryption mask Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 07/15] OvmfPkg: Obtain SEV encryption mask with the new MemEncryptSevLib API Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` Lendacky, Thomas [this message]
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 09/15] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Check for an explicit DR7 cached value Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 10/15] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Coding style fixes in prep for SEC library Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 11/15] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Make the MemEncryptSevLib available for SEC Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 19:08   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 12/15] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Address range encryption state interface Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 13/15] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Support nested #VCs Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 14/15] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Reserve GHCB backup pages if S3 is supported Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 15/15] OvfmPkg/VmgExitLib: Validate #VC MMIO is to un-encrypted memory Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 19:41 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v3 00/15] SEV-ES security mitigations Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-07 19:50   ` Lendacky, Thomas

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