Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION

["Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>]

On 9/18/19 5:05 AM, Dandan Bi wrote:
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
> 
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
> the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> 
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for the caller in PlatformDriOverrideDxe which don't have the policy to
> defer the execution of the image.
> 
> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> ---
>  .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c       | 11 ++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> index 2d3736b468..f91f038b7a 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
>  /** @file
>    Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverride mapping.
>  
> -  Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +  Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
>    SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>  
>  **/
>  
>  #include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h"
> @@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping (
>                                     );
>                  ASSERT (DriverBinding != NULL);
>                  DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = ImageHandle;
>                }
>              } else {
> +              //
> +              // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
> +              // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> +              // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
> +              // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +              //
> +              if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +                gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +              }
>                DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable = TRUE;
>                DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = NULL;
>              }
>            }
>          }
> 

Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>