* [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature
@ 2019-06-10 18:35 Wang, Jian J
2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification Wang, Jian J
` (3 more replies)
0 siblings, 4 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-10 18:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: devel; +Cc: Chao Zhang, Jiewen Yao, Hernandez Beltran, Jorge, Harry Han
>V2: fix parameter description error found by ECC
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>
Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com>
Jian J Wang (3):
SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification
SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter
SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation
SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c | 418 ++++++++++++++++++
SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h | 121 +++++
SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf | 57 +++
SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni | 14 +
.../FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni | 12 +
.../Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h | 61 +++
SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 9 +
SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc | 5 +
8 files changed, 697 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h
--
2.17.1.windows.2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 1/3] SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification 2019-06-10 18:35 [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-10 18:35 ` Wang, Jian J 2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter Wang, Jian J ` (2 subsequent siblings) 3 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-10 18:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: devel; +Cc: Chao Zhang, Jiewen Yao https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid should be installed by platform to pass FV hash information to the common FV verify/report driver, in which the hash value will be calculated again based on the information fed in and then verified. The information passed in this PPI include: - FVs location in flash and length - Hash values for different boot mode The hash value must be calculated in following way (if 3 FVs to calc): FV1 -> Hash1 FV2 -> Hash2 FV3 -> Hash3 Hash1 + Hash2 + Hash3 -> HashAll Only HashAll is stored in this PPI. The purposes for this algorithm are two: 1. To report each FV's hash to TCG driver and verify HashAll at the same time without the burden to calculate the hash twice; 2. To save hash value storage due to potential hardware limitation Different boot mode may have its own hash value so that each mode can decide which FV will be verified. For example, for the sake of performance, S3 may choose to skip some FVs verification and normal boot will verify all FVs it concerns. So in this PPI, each FV information has flag to indicate which boot mode it will be taken into hash calculation. And if multiple hash values passed in this PPI, each has a flag to indicate which boot mode it's used for. Note one hash value supports more than one boot modes if they're just the same. PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass and PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail are introduced to report status back to platform, and platform can choose how to act upon verification success and failure. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> --- .../Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++++ SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 9 +++ 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+) create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h b/SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..71d10728c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/** @file +PPI to describe stored hash digest for FVs. + +Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +**/ + +#ifndef __PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_H__ +#define __PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_H__ + +#include <Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFV.h> + +// {7F5E4E31-81B1-47E5-9E21-1E4B5BC2F61D} +#define EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI_GUID \ + {0x7f5e4e31, 0x81b1, 0x47e5, {0x9e, 0x21, 0x1e, 0x4b, 0x5b, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x1d}} + +// +// Hashed FV flags. +// +#define HASHED_FV_FLAG_REPORT_FV_INFO_PPI 0x0000000000000001 +#define HASHED_FV_FLAG_REPORT_FV_HOB 0x0000000000000002 +#define HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT 0x0000000000000010 +#define HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT 0x0000000000000020 +#define HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_ALL 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFF00 +#define HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (0x100, (Mode)) + +#define HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER 10 + +#define FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (1, (Mode)) + +typedef struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI + EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI; + +typedef struct _HASHED_FV_INFO { + UINT32 Base; + UINT32 Length; + UINT64 Flag; +} HASHED_FV_INFO; + +typedef struct _FV_HASH_INFO { + UINT64 HashFlag; + UINT16 HashAlgoId; + UINT16 HashSize; + UINT8 Hash[64]; +} FV_HASH_INFO; + +// +// PPI used to convey FVs and hash information of a specific platform. +// +struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { + UINTN FvNumber; + HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER]; + UINTN HashNumber; + FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo[1]; +}; + +extern EFI_GUID gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid; + +#endif + diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec index 3314f1854b..f0c0581b17 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec +++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec @@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFV.h gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid = { 0x3ce1e631, 0x7008, 0x477c, { 0xad, 0xa7, 0x5d, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x4b } } + + ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h + gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid = {0x7f5e4e31, 0x81b1, 0x47e5, { 0x9e, 0x21, 0x1e, 0x4b, 0x5b, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x1d } } # # [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid] @@ -257,6 +260,12 @@ # @ValidList 0x80000003 | 0x010D0000 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007 + ## Progress Code for FV verification result.<BR><BR> + # (EFI_SOFTWARE_PEI_MODULE | EFI_SUBCLASS_SPECIFIC | XXX) + # @Prompt Status Code for FV verification result + gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass|0x0303100A|UINT32|0x00010030 + gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail|0x0303100B|UINT32|0x00010031 + [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx] ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR> # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR> -- 2.17.1.windows.2 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 2/3] SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter 2019-06-10 18:35 [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature Wang, Jian J 2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-10 18:35 ` Wang, Jian J 2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation Wang, Jian J 2019-06-12 4:48 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature Yao, Jiewen 3 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-10 18:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: devel; +Cc: Chao Zhang, Jiewen Yao >v2: correct parameter and return value description for GetHashInfo() https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 This driver implements a common checker, verifier and reporter which is independent of hardware based root-of-trust. Usually the hardware based root-of-trust will not verify all BIOS but part of it. For example, Boot Guard will only verify IBB segment. The IBB needs to verify other part of BIOS, i.e. other FVs to transfer control to from IBB. This driver plays the role in IBB to verify FVs not covered by hardware root-of-trust to make sure integrity of the chain of trust. To be hardware/platform independent, PPI gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid is introduced for platform to pass digest information to this driver. This PPI should include all information needed to verify required FVs in required boot mode. struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { UINTN FvNumber; HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER]; UINTN HashNumber; FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo[1]; }; To avoid TOCTOU issue, all FVs to be verified will be copied to memory before hash calculation. That also means this driver has to be run after permanent memory has been discovered. For a measured boot, this driver will install gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid to report digest of each FV to TCG driver. For a verified boot, this driver will verify the final hash value (calculated from the concatenation of each FV's hash) for indicated FVs against the hash got from platform/hardware. If pass, it will build EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV (consumed by DXE core) and/or install gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPpiGuid (consumed by PEI core), and then report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass. If fail, it just report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail and go to dead loop if status report returns. The platform can register customized handler to process pass and fail cases differently. Currently, this driver only supports hash (sha256/384/512) verification for the performance consideration. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> --- SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c | 418 ++++++++++++++++++ SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h | 121 +++++ SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf | 57 +++ SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni | 14 + .../FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni | 12 + 5 files changed, 622 insertions(+) create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni diff --git a/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..07855774b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c @@ -0,0 +1,418 @@ +/** @file + This driver verifies and reports OBB FVs. + +Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +**/ + +#include "FvReportPei.h" + +STATIC CONST HASH_ALG_INFO mHashAlgInfo[] = { + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0000 TPM_ALG_ERROR + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0001 TPM_ALG_FIRST + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0002 + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0003 + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0004 TPM_ALG_SHA1 + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0005 + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0006 TPM_ALG_AES + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0007 + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0008 TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0009 + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000A + {SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final, Sha256HashAll}, // 000B TPM_ALG_SHA256 + {SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final, Sha384HashAll}, // 000C TPM_ALG_SHA384 + {SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final, Sha512HashAll}, // 000D TPM_ALG_SHA512 + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000E + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000F + {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0010 TPM_ALG_NULL +//{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0011 +//{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0012 TPM_ALG_SM3_256 +}; + +/** + Install a EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_PREHASHED_FV_PPI instance so that + TCG driver may use to extend PCRs. + + @param[in] FvBuffer Buffer containing the whole FV. + @param[in] FvLength Length of the FV. + @param[in] HashAlgoId Hash algorithm type id. + @param[in] HashSize Hash size. + @param[in] HashValue Hash value buffer. +**/ +STATIC +VOID +InstallPreHashFvPpi ( + IN VOID *FvBuffer, + IN UINTN FvLength, + IN UINT16 HashAlgoId, + IN UINT16 HashSize, + IN UINT8 *HashValue + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR *FvInfoPpiDescriptor; + EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_PREHASHED_FV_PPI *PreHashedFvPpi; + UINTN PpiSize; + HASH_INFO *HashInfo; + + PpiSize = sizeof (EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_PREHASHED_FV_PPI) + + sizeof (sizeof (HASH_INFO)) + + HashSize; + + PreHashedFvPpi = AllocatePool (PpiSize); + ASSERT (PreHashedFvPpi != NULL); + + PreHashedFvPpi->FvBase = (UINT32)(UINTN)FvBuffer; + PreHashedFvPpi->FvLength = (UINT32)FvLength; + PreHashedFvPpi->Count = 1; + + HashInfo = HASH_INFO_PTR (PreHashedFvPpi); + HashInfo->HashAlgoId = HashAlgoId; + HashInfo->HashSize = HashSize; + CopyMem (HASH_VALUE_PTR (HashInfo), HashValue, HashSize); + + FvInfoPpiDescriptor = AllocatePool (sizeof (EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR)); + ASSERT (FvInfoPpiDescriptor != NULL); + + FvInfoPpiDescriptor->Guid = &gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid; + FvInfoPpiDescriptor->Flags = EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST; + FvInfoPpiDescriptor->Ppi = (VOID *) PreHashedFvPpi; + + Status = PeiServicesInstallPpi (FvInfoPpiDescriptor); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); +} + +/** + Calculate and verify hash value for given FV. + + @param[in] HashInfo Hash information of the FV. + @param[in] FvInfo Information of FV used for verification. + @param[in] FvNumber Length of the FV. + @param[in] BootMode Length of the FV. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS The given FV is integrate. + @retval EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED The given FV is corrupted (hash mismatch). + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The hash algorithm is not supported. + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER FvInfo is NULL or FvNumber is zero. +**/ +STATIC +EFI_STATUS +VerifyHashedFv ( + IN FV_HASH_INFO *HashInfo, + IN HASHED_FV_INFO *FvInfo, + IN UINTN FvNumber, + IN EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode + ) +{ + UINTN FvIndex; + CONST HASH_ALG_INFO *AlgInfo; + UINT8 *HashValue; + UINT8 *FvHashValue; + VOID *FvBuffer; + EFI_STATUS Status; + + if (HashInfo == NULL || + HashInfo->HashSize == 0 || + HashInfo->HashAlgoId == TPM_ALG_NULL) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Bypass FV hash verification\r\n")); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + if (FvInfo == NULL || FvNumber == 0 ) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + if (HashInfo->HashAlgoId >= ARRAY_SIZE (mHashAlgInfo) || + mHashAlgInfo[HashInfo->HashAlgoId].HashSize != HashInfo->HashSize) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported or wrong hash algorithm: %04X (size=%d)\r\n", + HashInfo->HashAlgoId, HashInfo->HashSize)); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + AlgInfo = &mHashAlgInfo[HashInfo->HashAlgoId]; + + // + // We need a hash value for each FV as well as one for all FVs. + // + HashValue = AllocateZeroPool (AlgInfo->HashSize * (FvNumber + 1)); + ASSERT (HashValue != NULL); + + // + // Calcuate hash value for each FV first. + // + FvHashValue = HashValue; + for (FvIndex = 0; FvIndex < FvNumber; ++FvIndex) { + // + // Skip any FV not meant for verified boot and measured boot. + // + if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT) == 0 && + (FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT) == 0) { + continue; + } + + // + // Skip any FV not meant for current boot mode. + // + if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) { + continue; + } + + DEBUG (( + DEBUG_INFO, + "Pre-hashed[alg=%04X,size=%d,flag=%016lX] FV: 0x%08X (%X) (Flag=%016lX)\r\n", + HashInfo->HashAlgoId, + HashInfo->HashSize, + HashInfo->HashFlag, + FvInfo[FvIndex].Base, + FvInfo[FvIndex].Length, + FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag + )); + + // + // Copy FV to permanent memory to avoid potential TOC/TOU. + // + FvBuffer = AllocatePages (EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES(FvInfo[FvIndex].Length)); + ASSERT (FvBuffer != NULL); + CopyMem (FvBuffer, (CONST VOID *)(UINTN)FvInfo[FvIndex].Base, FvInfo[FvIndex].Length); + + if (AlgInfo->HashAll (FvBuffer, FvInfo[FvIndex].Length, FvHashValue) == FALSE) { + Status = EFI_ABORTED; + goto Done; + } + + // + // Report the FV measurement. + // + if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT) != 0) { + InstallPreHashFvPpi ( + FvBuffer, + FvInfo[FvIndex].Length, + HashInfo->HashAlgoId, + HashInfo->HashSize, + FvHashValue + ); + } + + // + // Don't keep the hash value of current FV if we don't need to verify it. + // + if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT) != 0) { + FvHashValue += AlgInfo->HashSize; + } + + // + // Use memory copy of the FV from now on. + // + FvInfo[FvIndex].Base = (UINT32)(UINTN)FvBuffer; + } + + // + // Check final hash for all FVs. + // + if (FvHashValue == HashValue || + (AlgInfo->HashAll (HashValue, FvHashValue - HashValue, FvHashValue) && + CompareMem (HashInfo->Hash, FvHashValue, AlgInfo->HashSize) == 0)) { + Status = EFI_SUCCESS; + } else { + Status = EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED; + } + +Done: + FreePool (HashValue); + return Status; +} + +/** + Report FV to PEI and/or DXE core for dispatch. + + @param[in] FvInfo Information of a FV. + +**/ +STATIC +VOID +ReportHashedFv ( + IN HASHED_FV_INFO *FvInfo + ) +{ + CONST EFI_GUID *FvFormat; + + if ((FvInfo->Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_REPORT_FV_HOB) != 0) { + // + // Require DXE core to process this FV. + // + BuildFvHob ( + (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)FvInfo->Base, + (UINT64)FvInfo->Length + ); + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Reported FV HOB: %08X (%X)\r\n", FvInfo->Base, FvInfo->Length)); + } + + if ((FvInfo->Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_REPORT_FV_INFO_PPI) != 0) { + // + // Require PEI core to process this FV. + // + FvFormat = &((EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *)(UINTN)FvInfo->Base)->FileSystemGuid; + PeiServicesInstallFvInfoPpi ( + FvFormat, + (VOID *)(UINTN)FvInfo->Base, + FvInfo->Length, + NULL, + NULL + ); + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Reported FV PPI: %08X (%X)\r\n", FvInfo->Base, FvInfo->Length)); + } +} + +/** + Verify and report pre-hashed FVs. + + Doing this must be at post-memory to make sure there's enough memory to hold + all FVs to be verified. This is necessary for mitigating TOCTOU issue. + + This function will never return if the verification is failed. + + @param[in] StoredHashFvPpi Pointer to PPI containing hash information. + @param[in] BootMode Current boot mode. + + @retval Pointer to structure containning valid hash information for current boot mode. + @retval NULL if there's no hash associated with current boot mode. +**/ +STATIC +FV_HASH_INFO * +GetHashInfo ( + IN EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI *StoredHashFvPpi, + IN EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode + ) +{ + FV_HASH_INFO *HashInfo; + UINTN HashIndex; + + for (HashIndex = 0, HashInfo = NULL; + HashIndex < StoredHashFvPpi->HashNumber && HashInfo == NULL; + ++HashIndex) { + + if ((StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex].HashFlag + & FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) { + HashInfo = &StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex]; + break; + } + + } + + return HashInfo; +} + +/** + Verify and report pre-hashed FVs. + + Doing this must be at post-memory to make sure there's enough memory to hold + all FVs to be verified. This is necessary for mitigating TOCTOU issue. + + This function will never return if the verification is failed. + + @param[in] PeiServices General purpose services available to every PEIM. + @param[in] BootMode Current boot mode. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully. +**/ +STATIC +EFI_STATUS +CheckStoredHashFv ( + IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices, + IN EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT32 Instance; + EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI *StoredHashFvPpi; + FV_HASH_INFO *HashInfo; + UINTN FvIndex; + + // + // Check pre-hashed FV list + // + Instance = 0; + StoredHashFvPpi = NULL; + do { + Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi ( + &gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid, + Instance, + NULL, + (VOID**)&StoredHashFvPpi + ); + if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && StoredHashFvPpi != NULL && StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber > 0) { + + HashInfo = GetHashInfo(StoredHashFvPpi, BootMode); + Status = VerifyHashedFv (HashInfo, StoredHashFvPpi->FvInfo, + StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber, BootMode); + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // Report the FVs to PEI core and/or DXE core. + // + for (FvIndex = 0; FvIndex < StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber; ++FvIndex) { + if ((StoredHashFvPpi->FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag + & HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) == 0) { + ReportHashedFv (&StoredHashFvPpi->FvInfo[FvIndex]); + } + } + + } else { + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ERROR: Failed to verify OBB FVs (%r)\r\n", Status)); + + REPORT_STATUS_CODE_EX ( + EFI_PROGRESS_CODE, + PcdGet32 (PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail), + Instance, + NULL, + &gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid, + StoredHashFvPpi, + sizeof (*StoredHashFvPpi) + ); + + ASSERT (FALSE); + CpuDeadLoop (); + + } + } + + Instance++; + + } while (!EFI_ERROR(Status)); + + REPORT_STATUS_CODE ( + EFI_PROGRESS_CODE, + PcdGet32 (PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass) + ); + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Main entry for FvReport PEIM. + + @param[in] FileHandle Handle of the file being invoked. + @param[in] PeiServices Pointer to PEI Services table. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS If all FVs reported by StoredHashFvPpi are verified. + +**/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +FvReportEntryPoint ( + IN EFI_PEI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle, + IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode; + + Status = PeiServicesGetBootMode (&BootMode); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + Status = CheckStoredHashFv (PeiServices, BootMode); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + return Status; +} diff --git a/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fb7d205f73 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/** @file + Definitions for OBB FVs verification. + +Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +**/ + +#ifndef __FV_REPORT_PEI_H__ +#define __FV_REPORT_PEI_H__ + +#include <PiPei.h> + +#include <IndustryStandard/Tpm20.h> + +#include <Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h> + +#include <Library/PeiServicesLib.h> +#include <Library/PcdLib.h> +#include <Library/HobLib.h> +#include <Library/DebugLib.h> +#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h> +#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h> +#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h> +#include <Library/ReportStatusCodeLib.h> + +#define HASH_INFO_PTR(PreHashedFvPpi) \ + (HASH_INFO *)((UINT8 *)(PreHashedFvPpi) + sizeof (EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_PREHASHED_FV_PPI)) + +#define HASH_VALUE_PTR(HashInfo) \ + (VOID *)((UINT8 *)(HashInfo) + sizeof (HASH_INFO)) + +/** + Computes the message digest of a input data buffer. + + This function performs message digest of a given data buffer, and places + the digest value into the specified memory. + + If this interface is not supported, then return FALSE. + + @param[in] Data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed. + @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer in bytes. + @param[out] HashValue Pointer to a buffer that receives digest value. + + @retval TRUE The digest computation succeeded. + @retval FALSE The digest computation failed. + +**/ +typedef +BOOLEAN +(EFIAPI *HASH_ALL_METHOD) ( + IN CONST VOID *Data, + IN UINTN DataSize, + OUT UINT8 *HashValue + ); + +/** + Initializes user-supplied memory as hash context for subsequent use. + + @param[out] HashContext Pointer to hash context being initialized. + + @retval TRUE Hash context initialization succeeded. + @retval FALSE Hash context initialization failed. + @retval FALSE This interface is not supported. + +**/ +typedef +BOOLEAN +(EFIAPI *HASH_INIT_METHOD) ( + OUT VOID *HashContext + ); + +/** + Digests the input data and updates hash context. + + @param[in, out] HashContext Pointer to the hash context. + @param[in] Data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed. + @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer in bytes. + + @retval TRUE Hash data digest succeeded. + @retval FALSE Hash data digest failed. + @retval FALSE This interface is not supported. + +**/ +typedef +BOOLEAN +(EFIAPI *HASH_UPDATE_METHOD) ( + IN OUT VOID *HashContext, + IN CONST VOID *Data, + IN UINTN DataSize + ); + +/** + Completes computation of the hash digest value. + + @param[in, out] HashContext Pointer to the hash context. + @param[out] HashValue Pointer to a buffer that receives the hash digest + value. + + @retval TRUE Hash digest computation succeeded. + @retval FALSE Hash digest computation failed. + @retval FALSE This interface is not supported. + +**/ +typedef +BOOLEAN +(EFIAPI *HASH_FINAL_METHOD) ( + IN OUT VOID *HashContext, + OUT UINT8 *HashValue + ); + +typedef struct { + UINTN HashSize; + HASH_INIT_METHOD HashInit; + HASH_UPDATE_METHOD HashUpdate; + HASH_FINAL_METHOD HashFinal; + HASH_ALL_METHOD HashAll; +} HASH_ALG_INFO; + +#endif //__FV_REPORT_PEI_H__ + diff --git a/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f1188509b --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +## @file +# FV Report/Verify PEI Driver. +# +# Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +# +## + +[Defines] + INF_VERSION = 0x00010005 + BASE_NAME = FvReportPei + MODULE_UNI_FILE = FvReportPei.uni + FILE_GUID = 72405B40-38DA-4ABA-9283-CA8321C23E63 + MODULE_TYPE = PEIM + VERSION_STRING = 1.0 + ENTRY_POINT = FvReportEntryPoint + +# +# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools. +# +# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 +# + +[Sources] + FvReportPei.c + +[Packages] + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec + MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec + CryptoPkg/CryptoPkg.dec + SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec + +[LibraryClasses] + PeimEntryPoint + PeiServicesLib + BaseLib + DebugLib + BaseMemoryLib + PcdLib + HobLib + MemoryAllocationLib + BaseCryptLib + ReportStatusCodeLib + +[Ppis] + gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid ## PRODUCES + gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid ## CONSUMES + +[Pcd] + gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass + gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail + +[Depex] + gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid AND gEfiPeiMemoryDiscoveredPpiGuid + +[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"] + FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni diff --git a/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bad43403c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +// /** @file +// FV Verify/Report PEI Driver. +// +// Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +// +// **/ + + +#string STR_MODULE_ABSTRACT #language en-US "This module verifies and reports FVs." + +#string STR_MODULE_DESCRIPTION #language en-US "This module verifies FVs' digest passed through gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid, " + "and installs gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid, gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPpiGuid and/or FV HOB if passed." + diff --git a/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6214bbdaa9 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// /** @file +// FV Verify/Report PEI Driver. +// +// Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +// +// **/ + +#string STR_PROPERTIES_MODULE_NAME +#language en-US "FV Verify/Report PEI Driver" + + -- 2.17.1.windows.2 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 3/3] SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation 2019-06-10 18:35 [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature Wang, Jian J 2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification Wang, Jian J 2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-10 18:35 ` Wang, Jian J 2019-06-12 4:48 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature Yao, Jiewen 3 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-10 18:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: devel; +Cc: Chao Zhang, Jiewen Yao https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> --- SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc index a2ee0528f0..4451bd1271 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc +++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc @@ -287,6 +287,11 @@ SecurityPkg/HddPassword/HddPasswordDxe.inf SecurityPkg/HddPassword/HddPasswordPei.inf + # + # Common FV checker/verifier/reporter + # + SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf + [BuildOptions] MSFT:*_*_IA32_DLINK_FLAGS = /ALIGN:256 INTEL:*_*_IA32_DLINK_FLAGS = /ALIGN:256 -- 2.17.1.windows.2 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature 2019-06-10 18:35 [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature Wang, Jian J ` (2 preceding siblings ...) 2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-12 4:48 ` Yao, Jiewen 2019-06-14 0:29 ` Wang, Jian J [not found] ` <15A7E930E191F486.2329@groups.io> 3 siblings, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Yao, Jiewen @ 2019-06-12 4:48 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Wang, Jian J, devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Zhang, Chao B, Hernandez Beltran, Jorge, Han, Harry Thanks Jian. Some comment below: 0) Please add what unit test has been done. 1) Can we use UINT64 for Base and Length? typedef struct _HASHED_FV_INFO { UINT32 Base; UINT32 Length; UINT64 Flag; } HASHED_FV_INFO; 2) Can we remove the hard code HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER and use more flexible way? #define HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER 10 struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { UINTN FvNumber; HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER]; UINTN HashNumber; FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo[1]; }; 3) can we use better way to organize the table? It is weird to have so many zero. Why not just use TPM_ALG_xxx as the first field and search? STATIC CONST HASH_ALG_INFO mHashAlgInfo[] = { {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0000 TPM_ALG_ERROR {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0001 TPM_ALG_FIRST {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0002 {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0003 {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0004 TPM_ALG_SHA1 {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0005 {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0006 TPM_ALG_AES {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0007 {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0008 TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0009 {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000A {SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final, Sha256HashAll}, // 000B TPM_ALG_SHA256 {SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final, Sha384HashAll}, // 000C TPM_ALG_SHA384 {SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final, Sha512HashAll}, // 000D TPM_ALG_SHA512 {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000E {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000F {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0010 TPM_ALG_NULL //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0011 //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0012 TPM_ALG_SM3_256 }; 4) Why not just add one bit say: skip in S3 ? Why need such complexity? #define HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (0x100, (Mode)) #define FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (1, (Mode)) I am not sure how that works. Is boot mode bit start from BIT0 or BIT8 ? I am confused. if ((StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex].HashFlag & FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) { HashInfo = &StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex]; break; } 5) Why the producer want skip both verified boot and measured boot? Is that legal or illegal? If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSER() to tell people. if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT) == 0 && (FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT) == 0) { continue; } 6) I recommend to add one debug message to tell people this is skipped. // // Skip any FV not meant for current boot mode. // if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) { continue; } 7) Would you please clarify why and when a platform need report multiple StartedHashFv ? do { Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi ( &gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid, Instance, NULL, (VOID**)&StoredHashFvPpi ); if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && StoredHashFvPpi != NULL && StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber > 0) { It will be better, if you can those description in StoredHashFvPpi.h file 8) Same code above, would you please clarify if it is legal or illegal that StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber == 0 ? If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSERT() Thank you Yao Jiewen > -----Original Message----- > From: Wang, Jian J > Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2019 2:36 AM > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Yao, Jiewen > <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > Subject: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > >V2: fix parameter description error found by ECC > > https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 > > Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> > Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> > Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com> > Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com> > > Jian J Wang (3): > SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter > SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c | 418 > ++++++++++++++++++ > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h | 121 +++++ > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf | 57 +++ > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni | 14 + > .../FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni | 12 + > .../Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h | 61 +++ > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 9 + > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc | 5 + > 8 files changed, 697 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni > create mode 100644 > SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h > > -- > 2.17.1.windows.2 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature 2019-06-12 4:48 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature Yao, Jiewen @ 2019-06-14 0:29 ` Wang, Jian J 2019-06-14 10:41 ` Yao, Jiewen [not found] ` <15A7E930E191F486.2329@groups.io> 1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-14 0:29 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Yao, Jiewen, devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Zhang, Chao B, Hernandez Beltran, Jorge, Han, Harry Jiewen, > -----Original Message----- > From: Yao, Jiewen > Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2019 12:49 PM > To: Wang, Jian J <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > Thanks Jian. Some comment below: > > 0) Please add what unit test has been done. > > 1) Can we use UINT64 for Base and Length? > typedef struct _HASHED_FV_INFO { > UINT32 Base; > UINT32 Length; > UINT64 Flag; > } HASHED_FV_INFO; > Yes, we can. But is it necessary? Isn't the flash address always below 4G? > 2) Can we remove the hard code HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER and use more > flexible way? > #define HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER 10 > struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { > UINTN FvNumber; > HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER]; > UINTN HashNumber; > FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo[1]; > }; > Yes. I thought we need more than one hash value here. I went through the whole logic here. Maybe one hash value is enough (no need to pass the hash value not meant for current boot mode). So we can put the FvInfo at the end of structure and remove the hard-coded fv number. > 3) can we use better way to organize the table? It is weird to have so many zero. > Why not just use TPM_ALG_xxx as the first field and search? > STATIC CONST HASH_ALG_INFO mHashAlgInfo[] = { > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0000 TPM_ALG_ERROR > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0001 TPM_ALG_FIRST > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0002 > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0003 > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0004 TPM_ALG_SHA1 > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0005 > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0006 TPM_ALG_AES > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0007 > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0008 TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0009 > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000A > {SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final, > Sha256HashAll}, // 000B TPM_ALG_SHA256 > {SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final, > Sha384HashAll}, // 000C TPM_ALG_SHA384 > {SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final, > Sha512HashAll}, // 000D TPM_ALG_SHA512 > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000E > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000F > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0010 TPM_ALG_NULL > //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0011 > //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0012 TPM_ALG_SM3_256 > }; > I prefer the code directly index the algorithm info/methods as array. It makes code quite simpler. > 4) Why not just add one bit say: skip in S3 ? Why need such complexity? > #define HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (0x100, > (Mode)) > #define FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (1, (Mode)) > > I am not sure how that works. Is boot mode bit start from BIT0 or BIT8 ? I am > confused. > > if ((StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex].HashFlag > & FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) { > HashInfo = &StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex]; > break; > } > Boot mode is just a const number less than 64. So 64 bits can hold all different boot mode. Using this way is just to keep the flexibility to avoid code change if we want to support more boot modes besides S3. But if there's never such possibility at all, you're right that one bit is enough. > 5) Why the producer want skip both verified boot and measured boot? Is that > legal or illegal? If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSER() to tell people. > if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT) == 0 && > (FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT) == 0) { > continue; > } Suppose there's a use case, most likely for developers, which need to disable security feature temporarily. The BIOS still need to boot. The developers don't need to remove this driver in order to do it. I think it's legacl. > > 6) I recommend to add one debug message to tell people this is skipped. > // > // Skip any FV not meant for current boot mode. > // > if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE > (BootMode)) != 0) { > continue; > } > Right. I'll add one. > 7) Would you please clarify why and when a platform need report multiple > StartedHashFv ? > do { > Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi ( > &gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid, > Instance, > NULL, > (VOID**)&StoredHashFvPpi > ); > if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && StoredHashFvPpi != NULL && StoredHashFvPpi- > >FvNumber > 0) { > > It will be better, if you can those description in StoredHashFvPpi.h file > I don't know if there's such necessity. It's just trying to keep a certain of flexibility. > 8) Same code above, would you please clarify if it is legal or illegal that > StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber == 0 ? > If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSERT() > Let's call it illegal in case of skipping. Regards, Jian > Thank you > Yao Jiewen > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Wang, Jian J > > Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2019 2:36 AM > > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Yao, Jiewen > > <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > > Subject: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > > > >V2: fix parameter description error found by ECC > > > > https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 > > > > Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> > > Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> > > Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com> > > Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com> > > > > Jian J Wang (3): > > SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter > > SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation > > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c | 418 > > ++++++++++++++++++ > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h | 121 +++++ > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf | 57 +++ > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni | 14 + > > .../FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni | 12 + > > .../Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h | 61 +++ > > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 9 + > > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc | 5 + > > 8 files changed, 697 insertions(+) > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni > > create mode 100644 > > SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h > > > > -- > > 2.17.1.windows.2 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature 2019-06-14 0:29 ` Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-14 10:41 ` Yao, Jiewen 2019-06-14 16:53 ` Wang, Jian J 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Yao, Jiewen @ 2019-06-14 10:41 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Wang, Jian J, devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Zhang, Chao B, Hernandez Beltran, Jorge, Han, Harry Thanks. Comment below: > -----Original Message----- > From: Wang, Jian J > Sent: Friday, June 14, 2019 8:30 AM > To: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > Jiewen, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Yao, Jiewen > > Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2019 12:49 PM > > To: Wang, Jian J <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io > > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > > Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > > > Thanks Jian. Some comment below: > > > > 0) Please add what unit test has been done. > > > > 1) Can we use UINT64 for Base and Length? > > typedef struct _HASHED_FV_INFO { > > UINT32 Base; > > UINT32 Length; > > UINT64 Flag; > > } HASHED_FV_INFO; > > > > Yes, we can. But is it necessary? Isn't the flash address always below 4G? [Jiewen] We have other PCD use UINT64 for flash address. Also, it might happen in emulation environment. > > > 2) Can we remove the hard code HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER and use > more > > flexible way? > > #define HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER 10 > > struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { > > UINTN FvNumber; > > HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER]; > > UINTN HashNumber; > > FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo[1]; > > }; > > > > Yes. I thought we need more than one hash value here. I went through the > whole > logic here. Maybe one hash value is enough (no need to pass the hash value > not > meant for current boot mode). So we can put the FvInfo at the end of > structure > and remove the hard-coded fv number. [Jiewen] May I know how you support multiple hash algorithms? > > > 3) can we use better way to organize the table? It is weird to have so many > zero. > > Why not just use TPM_ALG_xxx as the first field and search? > > STATIC CONST HASH_ALG_INFO mHashAlgInfo[] = { > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0000 > TPM_ALG_ERROR > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0001 > TPM_ALG_FIRST > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0002 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0003 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0004 > TPM_ALG_SHA1 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0005 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0006 > TPM_ALG_AES > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0007 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0008 > TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0009 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000A > > {SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final, > > Sha256HashAll}, // 000B TPM_ALG_SHA256 > > {SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final, > > Sha384HashAll}, // 000C TPM_ALG_SHA384 > > {SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final, > > Sha512HashAll}, // 000D TPM_ALG_SHA512 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000E > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000F > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0010 > TPM_ALG_NULL > > //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0011 > > //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0012 > TPM_ALG_SM3_256 > > }; > > > > I prefer the code directly index the algorithm info/methods as array. It > makes code quite simpler. [Jiewen] What happen if a new algo ID is assigned with a very big number? Then you need many zero entry. I don't think it is necessary. I prefer to use direct compare instead of index. Index can be used when the number is architecture defined. Here we just need 4 entries, but totally 18 entries present. > > > 4) Why not just add one bit say: skip in S3 ? Why need such complexity? > > #define HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 > (0x100, > > (Mode)) > > #define FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (1, > (Mode)) > > > > I am not sure how that works. Is boot mode bit start from BIT0 or BIT8 ? I > am > > confused. > > > > if ((StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex].HashFlag > > & FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) { > > HashInfo = &StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex]; > > break; > > } > > > > Boot mode is just a const number less than 64. So 64 bits can hold all > different > boot mode. Using this way is just to keep the flexibility to avoid code change > if > we want to support more boot modes besides S3. But if there's never such > possibility at all, you're right that one bit is enough. [Jiewen] But you already defined lowest 4 bits. I don't know the usage of below 2 MACRO. Why one skip 8 bit, and other does not? Too confusing. #define HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (0x100, (Mode)) #define FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (1, (Mode)) > > > 5) Why the producer want skip both verified boot and measured boot? Is > that > > legal or illegal? If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSER() to tell people. > > if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT) == 0 > && > > (FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT) > == 0) { > > continue; > > } > > Suppose there's a use case, most likely for developers, which need to disable > security feature temporarily. The BIOS still need to boot. The developers > don't > need to remove this driver in order to do it. I think it's legal. [Jiewen] I disagree. I believe it is illegal for production. If we need disable both, this driver should NOT be included. It saves flash size. > > > > > 6) I recommend to add one debug message to tell people this is skipped. > > // > > // Skip any FV not meant for current boot mode. > > // > > if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE > > (BootMode)) != 0) { > > continue; > > } > > > > Right. I'll add one. [Jiewen] Thank you. > > > 7) Would you please clarify why and when a platform need report multiple > > StartedHashFv ? > > do { > > Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi ( > > &gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid, > > Instance, > > NULL, > > (VOID**)&StoredHashFvPpi > > ); > > if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && StoredHashFvPpi != NULL && > StoredHashFvPpi- > > >FvNumber > 0) { > > > > It will be better, if you can those description in StoredHashFvPpi.h file > > > > I don't know if there's such necessity. It's just trying to keep a certain of > flexibility. [Jiewen] I prefer NOT. If we cannot find usage, please don't add such feature. It adds the complexity of code, and adds the validation effort. No matter you choose single PPI or multiple PPI, please describe this supported case in PPI. > > > 8) Same code above, would you please clarify if it is legal or illegal that > > StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber == 0 ? > > If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSERT() > > > > Let's call it illegal in case of skipping. [Jiewen] Thanks. Please add ASSERT. > > Regards, > Jian > > > Thank you > > Yao Jiewen > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Wang, Jian J > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2019 2:36 AM > > > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > > > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Yao, Jiewen > > > <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > > > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry > <harry.han@intel.com> > > > Subject: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > > > > > >V2: fix parameter description error found by ECC > > > > > > https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 > > > > > > Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> > > > Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> > > > Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com> > > > Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com> > > > > > > Jian J Wang (3): > > > SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and > reporter > > > SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation > > > > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c | 418 > > > ++++++++++++++++++ > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h | 121 +++++ > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf | 57 +++ > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni | 14 + > > > .../FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni | 12 + > > > .../Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h | 61 +++ > > > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 9 + > > > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc | 5 + > > > 8 files changed, 697 insertions(+) > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni > > > create mode 100644 > > > SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h > > > > > > -- > > > 2.17.1.windows.2 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature 2019-06-14 10:41 ` Yao, Jiewen @ 2019-06-14 16:53 ` Wang, Jian J 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-14 16:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Yao, Jiewen, devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Zhang, Chao B, Hernandez Beltran, Jorge, Han, Harry Jiewen, See my comments below. > -----Original Message----- > From: Yao, Jiewen > Sent: Friday, June 14, 2019 6:41 PM > To: Wang, Jian J <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > Thanks. > Comment below: > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Wang, Jian J > > Sent: Friday, June 14, 2019 8:30 AM > > To: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io > > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > > Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > > > Jiewen, > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Yao, Jiewen > > > Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2019 12:49 PM > > > To: Wang, Jian J <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io > > > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > > > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > > > Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > > > > > Thanks Jian. Some comment below: > > > > > > 0) Please add what unit test has been done. > > > > > > 1) Can we use UINT64 for Base and Length? > > > typedef struct _HASHED_FV_INFO { > > > UINT32 Base; > > > UINT32 Length; > > > UINT64 Flag; > > > } HASHED_FV_INFO; > > > > > > > Yes, we can. But is it necessary? Isn't the flash address always below 4G? > [Jiewen] We have other PCD use UINT64 for flash address. > Also, it might happen in emulation environment. > If so, I'll change it. > > > > > 2) Can we remove the hard code HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER and use > > more > > > flexible way? > > > #define HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER 10 > > > struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { > > > UINTN FvNumber; > > > HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER]; > > > UINTN HashNumber; > > > FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo[1]; > > > }; > > > > > > > Yes. I thought we need more than one hash value here. I went through the > > whole > > logic here. Maybe one hash value is enough (no need to pass the hash value > > not > > meant for current boot mode). So we can put the FvInfo at the end of > > structure > > and remove the hard-coded fv number. > [Jiewen] May I know how you support multiple hash algorithms? > Do you mean supporting multiple hash algo in the same build/boot? I didn't see such requirement. Please clarify if this is required. > > > > > > 3) can we use better way to organize the table? It is weird to have so many > > zero. > > > Why not just use TPM_ALG_xxx as the first field and search? > > > STATIC CONST HASH_ALG_INFO mHashAlgInfo[] = { > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0000 > > TPM_ALG_ERROR > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0001 > > TPM_ALG_FIRST > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0002 > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0003 > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0004 > > TPM_ALG_SHA1 > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0005 > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0006 > > TPM_ALG_AES > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0007 > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0008 > > TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0009 > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000A > > > {SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final, > > > Sha256HashAll}, // 000B TPM_ALG_SHA256 > > > {SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final, > > > Sha384HashAll}, // 000C TPM_ALG_SHA384 > > > {SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final, > > > Sha512HashAll}, // 000D TPM_ALG_SHA512 > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000E > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000F > > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0010 > > TPM_ALG_NULL > > > //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0011 > > > //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0012 > > TPM_ALG_SM3_256 > > > }; > > > > > > > I prefer the code directly index the algorithm info/methods as array. It > > makes code quite simpler. > [Jiewen] What happen if a new algo ID is assigned with a very big number? > Then you need many zero entry. I don't think it is necessary. > I prefer to use direct compare instead of index. Index can be used when the > number is architecture defined. > Here we just need 4 entries, but totally 18 entries present. > I don't have strong opinion. Let's update code with your way. > > > > > 4) Why not just add one bit say: skip in S3 ? Why need such complexity? > > > #define HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 > > (0x100, > > > (Mode)) > > > #define FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (1, > > (Mode)) > > > > > > I am not sure how that works. Is boot mode bit start from BIT0 or BIT8 ? I > > am > > > confused. > > > > > > if ((StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex].HashFlag > > > & FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) { > > > HashInfo = &StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex]; > > > break; > > > } > > > > > > > Boot mode is just a const number less than 64. So 64 bits can hold all > > different > > boot mode. Using this way is just to keep the flexibility to avoid code change > > if > > we want to support more boot modes besides S3. But if there's never such > > possibility at all, you're right that one bit is enough. > [Jiewen] But you already defined lowest 4 bits. I don't know the usage of below > 2 MACRO. > Why one skip 8 bit, and other does not? Too confusing. > > #define HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (0x100, > (Mode)) > #define FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (1, (Mode)) > They're different flags, one for FV and one for hash value. Lower 8 bit is left room for FV flags of report method, HOB, FV_INFO_PPI or potential others. Hash flags have no such needs. > > > > > > 5) Why the producer want skip both verified boot and measured boot? Is > > that > > > legal or illegal? If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSER() to tell people. > > > if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT) == 0 > > && > > > (FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT) > > == 0) { > > > continue; > > > } > > > > Suppose there's a use case, most likely for developers, which need to disable > > security feature temporarily. The BIOS still need to boot. The developers > > don't > > need to remove this driver in order to do it. I think it's legal. > > [Jiewen] I disagree. I believe it is illegal for production. > If we need disable both, this driver should NOT be included. It saves flash size. > No strong opinion. Let's add ASSERT(). But if it's real illegal case, I think there should be a dead loop here besides ASSERT(), right (the same as below ASSERT)? > > > > > > > > 6) I recommend to add one debug message to tell people this is skipped. > > > // > > > // Skip any FV not meant for current boot mode. > > > // > > > if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE > > > (BootMode)) != 0) { > > > continue; > > > } > > > > > > > Right. I'll add one. > [Jiewen] Thank you. > > > > > > 7) Would you please clarify why and when a platform need report multiple > > > StartedHashFv ? > > > do { > > > Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi ( > > > &gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid, > > > Instance, > > > NULL, > > > (VOID**)&StoredHashFvPpi > > > ); > > > if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && StoredHashFvPpi != NULL && > > StoredHashFvPpi- > > > >FvNumber > 0) { > > > > > > It will be better, if you can those description in StoredHashFvPpi.h file > > > > > > > I don't know if there's such necessity. It's just trying to keep a certain of > > flexibility. > [Jiewen] I prefer NOT. If we cannot find usage, please don't add such feature. > It adds the complexity of code, and adds the validation effort. > > No matter you choose single PPI or multiple PPI, please describe this supported > case in PPI. > Agree. I'll update the code and PPI description. > > > > > 8) Same code above, would you please clarify if it is legal or illegal that > > > StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber == 0 ? > > > If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSERT() > > > > > > > Let's call it illegal in case of skipping. > [Jiewen] Thanks. Please add ASSERT. > > > > > Regards, > > Jian > > > > > Thank you > > > Yao Jiewen > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: Wang, Jian J > > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2019 2:36 AM > > > > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > > > > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Yao, Jiewen > > > > <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > > > > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry > > <harry.han@intel.com> > > > > Subject: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > > > > > > > >V2: fix parameter description error found by ECC > > > > > > > > https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 > > > > > > > > Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> > > > > Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> > > > > Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com> > > > > Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com> > > > > > > > > Jian J Wang (3): > > > > SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification > > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and > > reporter > > > > SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation > > > > > > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c | 418 > > > > ++++++++++++++++++ > > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h | 121 +++++ > > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf | 57 +++ > > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni | 14 + > > > > .../FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni | 12 + > > > > .../Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h | 61 +++ > > > > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 9 + > > > > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc | 5 + > > > > 8 files changed, 697 insertions(+) > > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c > > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h > > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf > > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni > > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni > > > > create mode 100644 > > > > SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h > > > > > > > > -- > > > > 2.17.1.windows.2 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <15A7E930E191F486.2329@groups.io>]
* Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature [not found] ` <15A7E930E191F486.2329@groups.io> @ 2019-06-14 5:11 ` Wang, Jian J 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Wang, Jian J @ 2019-06-14 5:11 UTC (permalink / raw) To: devel@edk2.groups.io, Wang, Jian J, Yao, Jiewen Cc: Zhang, Chao B, Hernandez Beltran, Jorge, Han, Harry Forgot to mention test: 1. Unit test and security test based on HBFA test framework 2. System test on three real platforms Regards, Jian > -----Original Message----- > From: devel@edk2.groups.io [mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io] On Behalf Of Wang, > Jian J > Sent: Friday, June 14, 2019 8:30 AM > To: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > Jiewen, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Yao, Jiewen > > Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2019 12:49 PM > > To: Wang, Jian J <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io > > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > > Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > > > Thanks Jian. Some comment below: > > > > 0) Please add what unit test has been done. > > > > 1) Can we use UINT64 for Base and Length? > > typedef struct _HASHED_FV_INFO { > > UINT32 Base; > > UINT32 Length; > > UINT64 Flag; > > } HASHED_FV_INFO; > > > > Yes, we can. But is it necessary? Isn't the flash address always below 4G? > > > 2) Can we remove the hard code HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER and use more > > flexible way? > > #define HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER 10 > > struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { > > UINTN FvNumber; > > HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[HASHED_FV_MAX_NUMBER]; > > UINTN HashNumber; > > FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo[1]; > > }; > > > > Yes. I thought we need more than one hash value here. I went through the > whole > logic here. Maybe one hash value is enough (no need to pass the hash value not > meant for current boot mode). So we can put the FvInfo at the end of structure > and remove the hard-coded fv number. > > > 3) can we use better way to organize the table? It is weird to have so many > zero. > > Why not just use TPM_ALG_xxx as the first field and search? > > STATIC CONST HASH_ALG_INFO mHashAlgInfo[] = { > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0000 TPM_ALG_ERROR > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0001 TPM_ALG_FIRST > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0002 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0003 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0004 TPM_ALG_SHA1 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0005 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0006 TPM_ALG_AES > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0007 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0008 TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0009 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000A > > {SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final, > > Sha256HashAll}, // 000B TPM_ALG_SHA256 > > {SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final, > > Sha384HashAll}, // 000C TPM_ALG_SHA384 > > {SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final, > > Sha512HashAll}, // 000D TPM_ALG_SHA512 > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000E > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 000F > > {0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0010 TPM_ALG_NULL > > //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0011 > > //{0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, // 0012 TPM_ALG_SM3_256 > > }; > > > > I prefer the code directly index the algorithm info/methods as array. It > makes code quite simpler. > > > 4) Why not just add one bit say: skip in S3 ? Why need such complexity? > > #define HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (0x100, > > (Mode)) > > #define FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE(Mode) LShiftU64 (1, (Mode)) > > > > I am not sure how that works. Is boot mode bit start from BIT0 or BIT8 ? I am > > confused. > > > > if ((StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex].HashFlag > > & FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) { > > HashInfo = &StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo[HashIndex]; > > break; > > } > > > > Boot mode is just a const number less than 64. So 64 bits can hold all different > boot mode. Using this way is just to keep the flexibility to avoid code change if > we want to support more boot modes besides S3. But if there's never such > possibility at all, you're right that one bit is enough. > > > 5) Why the producer want skip both verified boot and measured boot? Is that > > legal or illegal? If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSER() to tell people. > > if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT) == 0 && > > (FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT) == 0) { > > continue; > > } > > Suppose there's a use case, most likely for developers, which need to disable > security feature temporarily. The BIOS still need to boot. The developers don't > need to remove this driver in order to do it. I think it's legacl. > > > > > 6) I recommend to add one debug message to tell people this is skipped. > > // > > // Skip any FV not meant for current boot mode. > > // > > if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE > > (BootMode)) != 0) { > > continue; > > } > > > > Right. I'll add one. > > > 7) Would you please clarify why and when a platform need report multiple > > StartedHashFv ? > > do { > > Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi ( > > &gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid, > > Instance, > > NULL, > > (VOID**)&StoredHashFvPpi > > ); > > if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && StoredHashFvPpi != NULL && StoredHashFvPpi- > > >FvNumber > 0) { > > > > It will be better, if you can those description in StoredHashFvPpi.h file > > > > I don't know if there's such necessity. It's just trying to keep a certain of > flexibility. > > > 8) Same code above, would you please clarify if it is legal or illegal that > > StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber == 0 ? > > If it is illegal, I prefer use ASSERT() > > > > Let's call it illegal in case of skipping. > > Regards, > Jian > > > Thank you > > Yao Jiewen > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Wang, Jian J > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2019 2:36 AM > > > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > > > Cc: Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>; Yao, Jiewen > > > <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Hernandez Beltran, Jorge > > > <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>; Han, Harry <harry.han@intel.com> > > > Subject: [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature > > > > > > >V2: fix parameter description error found by ECC > > > > > > https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 > > > > > > Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> > > > Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> > > > Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com> > > > Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com> > > > > > > Jian J Wang (3): > > > SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter > > > SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation > > > > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c | 418 > > > ++++++++++++++++++ > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h | 121 +++++ > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf | 57 +++ > > > SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni | 14 + > > > .../FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni | 12 + > > > .../Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h | 61 +++ > > > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 9 + > > > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc | 5 + > > > 8 files changed, 697 insertions(+) > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.h > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.inf > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.uni > > > create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPeiPeiExtra.uni > > > create mode 100644 > > > SecurityPkg/Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h > > > > > > -- > > > 2.17.1.windows.2 > > > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-06-14 16:53 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2019-06-10 18:35 [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature Wang, Jian J 2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] SecurityPkg: add definitions for OBB verification Wang, Jian J 2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter Wang, Jian J 2019-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] SecurityPkg: add FvReportPei.inf in dsc for build validation Wang, Jian J 2019-06-12 4:48 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] Common OBB verification feature Yao, Jiewen 2019-06-14 0:29 ` Wang, Jian J 2019-06-14 10:41 ` Yao, Jiewen 2019-06-14 16:53 ` Wang, Jian J [not found] ` <15A7E930E191F486.2329@groups.io> 2019-06-14 5:11 ` [edk2-devel] " Wang, Jian J
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