Re: [edk2-devel] CPU hotplug using SMM with QEMU+OVMF

["Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>]

below

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paolo Bonzini [mailto:pbonzini@redhat.com]
> Sent: Friday, August 16, 2019 3:20 PM
> To: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Laszlo Ersek
> <lersek@redhat.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: edk2-rfc-groups-io <rfc@edk2.groups.io>; qemu devel list
> <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>; Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>;
> Chen, Yingwen <yingwen.chen@intel.com>; Nakajima, Jun
> <jun.nakajima@intel.com>; Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>;
> Joao Marcal Lemos Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>; Phillip Goerl
> <phillip.goerl@oracle.com>
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] CPU hotplug using SMM with QEMU+OVMF
> 
> On 16/08/19 04:46, Yao, Jiewen wrote:
> > Comment below:
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Paolo Bonzini [mailto:pbonzini@redhat.com]
> >> Sent: Friday, August 16, 2019 12:21 AM
> >> To: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io; Yao,
> Jiewen
> >> <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> >> Cc: edk2-rfc-groups-io <rfc@edk2.groups.io>; qemu devel list
> >> <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>; Igor Mammedov
> <imammedo@redhat.com>;
> >> Chen, Yingwen <yingwen.chen@intel.com>; Nakajima, Jun
> >> <jun.nakajima@intel.com>; Boris Ostrovsky
> <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>;
> >> Joao Marcal Lemos Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>; Phillip Goerl
> >> <phillip.goerl@oracle.com>
> >> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] CPU hotplug using SMM with QEMU+OVMF
> >>
> >> On 15/08/19 17:00, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> >>> On 08/14/19 16:04, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> >>>> On 14/08/19 15:20, Yao, Jiewen wrote:
> >>>>>> - Does this part require a new branch somewhere in the OVMF SEC
> >> code?
> >>>>>>   How do we determine whether the CPU executing SEC is BSP or
> >>>>>>   hot-plugged AP?
> >>>>> [Jiewen] I think this is blocked from hardware perspective, since the
> first
> >> instruction.
> >>>>> There are some hardware specific registers can be used to determine
> if
> >> the CPU is new added.
> >>>>> I don’t think this must be same as the real hardware.
> >>>>> You are free to invent some registers in device model to be used in
> >> OVMF hot plug driver.
> >>>>
> >>>> Yes, this would be a new operation mode for QEMU, that only applies
> to
> >>>> hot-plugged CPUs.  In this mode the AP doesn't reply to INIT or SMI,
> in
> >>>> fact it doesn't reply to anything at all.
> >>>>
> >>>>>> - How do we tell the hot-plugged AP where to start execution? (I.e.
> >> that
> >>>>>>   it should execute code at a particular pflash location.)
> >>>>> [Jiewen] Same real mode reset vector at FFFF:FFF0.
> >>>>
> >>>> You do not need a reset vector or INIT/SIPI/SIPI sequence at all in
> >>>> QEMU.  The AP does not start execution at all when it is unplugged,
> so
> >>>> no cache-as-RAM etc.
> >>>>
> >>>> We only need to modify QEMU so that hot-plugged APIs do not reply
> to
> >>>> INIT/SIPI/SMI.
> >>>>
> >>>>> I don’t think there is problem for real hardware, who always has CAR.
> >>>>> Can QEMU provide some CPU specific space, such as MMIO region?
> >>>>
> >>>> Why is a CPU-specific region needed if every other processor is in SMM
> >>>> and thus trusted.
> >>>
> >>> I was going through the steps Jiewen and Yingwen recommended.
> >>>
> >>> In step (02), the new CPU is expected to set up RAM access. In step
> >>> (03), the new CPU, executing code from flash, is expected to "send
> board
> >>> message to tell host CPU (GPIO->SCI) -- I am waiting for hot-add
> >>> message." For that action, the new CPU may need a stack (minimally if
> we
> >>> want to use C function calls).
> >>>
> >>> Until step (03), there had been no word about any other (= pre-plugged)
> >>> CPUs (more precisely, Jiewen even confirmed "No impact to other
> >>> processors"), so I didn't assume that other CPUs had entered SMM.
> >>>
> >>> Paolo, I've attempted to read Jiewen's response, and yours, as carefully
> >>> as I can. I'm still very confused. If you have a better understanding,
> >>> could you please write up the 15-step process from the thread starter
> >>> again, with all QEMU customizations applied? Such as, unnecessary
> steps
> >>> removed, and platform specifics filled in.
> >>
> >> Sure.
> >>
> >> (01a) QEMU: create new CPU.  The CPU already exists, but it does not
> >>      start running code until unparked by the CPU hotplug controller.
> >>
> >> (01b) QEMU: trigger SCI
> >>
> >> (02-03) no equivalent
> >>
> >> (04) Host CPU: (OS) execute GPE handler from DSDT
> >>
> >> (05) Host CPU: (OS) Port 0xB2 write, all CPUs enter SMM (NOTE: New CPU
> >>      will not enter CPU because SMI is disabled)
> >>
> >> (06) Host CPU: (SMM) Save 38000, Update 38000 -- fill simple SMM
> >>      rebase code.
> >>
> >> (07a) Host CPU: (SMM) Write to CPU hotplug controller to enable
> >>      new CPU
> >>
> >> (07b) Host CPU: (SMM) Send INIT/SIPI/SIPI to new CPU.
> > [Jiewen] NOTE: INIT/SIPI/SIPI can be sent by a malicious CPU. There is no
> > restriction that INIT/SIPI/SIPI can only be sent in SMM.
> 
> All of the CPUs are now in SMM, and INIT/SIPI/SIPI will be discarded
> before 07a, so this is okay.
[Jiewen] May I know why INIT/SIPI/SIPI is discarded before 07a but is delivered at 07a?
I don’t see any extra step between 06 and 07a.
What is the magic here?



> However I do see a problem, because a PCI device's DMA could overwrite
> 0x38000 between (06) and (10) and hijack the code that is executed in
> SMM.  How is this avoided on real hardware?  By the time the new CPU
> enters SMM, it doesn't run off cache-as-RAM anymore.
[Jiewen] Interesting question.
I don’t think the DMA attack is considered in threat model for the virtual environment. We only list adversary below:
-- Adversary: System Software Attacker, who can control any OS memory or silicon register from OS level, or read write BIOS data.
-- Adversary: Simple hardware attacker, who can hot add or hot remove a CPU.

I agree it is a threat from real hardware perspective. SMM may check VTd to make sure the 38000 is blocked.
I doubt if it is a threat in virtual environment. Do we have a way to block DMA in virtual environment?



> Paolo
> 
> >> (08a) New CPU: (Low RAM) Enter protected mode.
> >
> > [Jiewen] NOTE: The new CPU still cannot use any physical memory,
> because
> > the INIT/SIPI/SIPI may be sent by malicious CPU in non-SMM environment.
> >
> >> (08b) New CPU: (Flash) Signals host CPU to proceed and enter cli;hlt loop.
> >>
> >> (09) Host CPU: (SMM) Send SMI to the new CPU only.
> >>
> >> (10) New CPU: (SMM) Run SMM code at 38000, and rebase SMBASE to
> >>      TSEG.
> >>
> >> (11) Host CPU: (SMM) Restore 38000.
> >>
> >> (12) Host CPU: (SMM) Update located data structure to add the new CPU
> >>      information. (This step will involve CPU_SERVICE protocol)
> >>
> >> (13) New CPU: (Flash) do whatever other initialization is needed
> >>
> >> (14) New CPU: (Flash) Deadloop, and wait for INIT-SIPI-SIPI.
> >>
> >> (15) Host CPU: (OS) Send INIT-SIPI-SIPI to pull new CPU in..
> >>
> >>
> >> In other words, the cache-as-RAM phase of 02-03 is replaced by the
> >> INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence of 07b-08a-08b.
> > [Jiewen] I am OK with this proposal.
> > I think the rule is same - the new CPU CANNOT touch any system memory,
> > no matter it is from reset-vector or from INIT/SIPI/SIPI.
> > Or I would say: if the new CPU want to touch some memory before first
> SMI, the memory should be
> > CPU specific or on the flash.
> >
> >
> >
> >>>> The QEMU DSDT could be modified (when secure boot is in effect) to
> OUT
> >>>> to 0xB2 when hotplug happens.  It could write a well-known value to
> >>>> 0xB2, to be read by an SMI handler in edk2.
> >>>
> >>> I dislike involving QEMU's generated DSDT in anything SMM (even
> >>> injecting the SMI), because the AML interpreter runs in the OS.
> >>>
> >>> If a malicious OS kernel is a bit too enlightened about the DSDT, it
> >>> could willfully diverge from the process that we design. If QEMU
> >>> broadcast the SMI internally, the guest OS could not interfere with that.
> >>>
> >>> If the purpose of the SMI is specifically to force all CPUs into SMM
> >>> (and thereby force them into trusted state), then the OS would be
> >>> explicitly counter-interested in carrying out the AML operations from
> >>> QEMU's DSDT.
> >>
> >> But since the hotplug controller would only be accessible from SMM,
> >> there would be no other way to invoke it than to follow the DSDT's
> >> instruction and write to 0xB2.  FWIW, real hardware also has plenty of
> >> 0xB2 writes in the DSDT or in APEI tables (e.g. for persistent store
> >> access).
> >>
> >> Paolo