From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
Date: Thu, 27 May 2021 11:42:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <75c7002f-79e2-0b70-9c91-cf73eda2ea6c@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210526231118.12946-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
On 05/27/21 01:10, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> (I missed adding devel@edk2.groups.io, resending the series)
>
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
>
> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity
> protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
> replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
> encryption environment.
>
> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP
> VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP
> such as interrupt protection.
>
> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP
> VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the
> guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to
> guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE
> instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request NAE"
> defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page
> from the RMP table.
>
> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated,
> as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two
> approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and
> Lazy Validation.
>
> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under
> lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a
> unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception
> handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of
> the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The
> recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate the
> unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS.
>
> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the available
> system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated
> before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
>
> This series does not implements the following SEV-SNP features yet:
>
> * CPUID filtering
> * Lazy validation
> * Interrupt security
>
> The series builds on SNP pre-patch posted here: https://tinyurl.com/pu6admks
>
> Additional resources
> ---------------------
> SEV-SNP whitepaper
> https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
>
> APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)
>
> The complete source is available at
> https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/sev-snp-rfc-2
>
> GHCB spec:
> https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
>
> SEV-SNP firmware specification:
> https://developer.amd.com/sev/
>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
>
> Changes since v2:
> * Add support for the AP creation.
> * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI reads.
> * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
> *
> Changes since v1:
> * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
> * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
> * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is supported.
> * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from MMIO ranges.
> * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
> * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location through
> EFI configuration table.
>
> Brijesh Singh (21):
> UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled
> field
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features
> OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
> OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page
> OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
> UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
> enabled
> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
> OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
> phase
> OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
> table
> MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
>
> Tom Lendacky (1):
> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
>
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 21 ++
> UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 11 +
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 2 +
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 7 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 8 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 17 +-
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf | 4 +
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf | 1 +
> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 +
> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 7 +
> .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 +
> .../GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.inf | 33 +++
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 5 +
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 4 +
> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 3 +
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 4 +
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 4 +
> MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h | 2 +-
> .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h | 18 ++
> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/GhcbRegisterLib.h | 27 ++
> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 31 +-
> .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h | 31 ++
> .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 19 ++
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 19 ++
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c | 22 ++
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c | 15 +-
> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++
> .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 17 ++
> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++
> .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 19 ++
> .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 40 +++
> .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 167 ++++++++++-
> .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 126 ++++++++
> .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 36 +++
> .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c | 230 +++++++++++++++
> .../Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.c | 97 +++++++
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 81 ++++++
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 12 +
> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 106 +++++++
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 11 +-
> .../MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 31 ++
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 274 ++++++++++++++++--
> .../MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 44 +++
> OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc | 5 +
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 23 ++
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm | 227 +++++++++++++++
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 6 +
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc | 1 +
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 51 ++++
> 52 files changed, 1956 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.inf
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/GhcbRegisterLib.h
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.c
> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
>
I'm confirming that this series is in my review queue.
However, I may need unusually long time to get to it. Thanks for your
patience.
Thanks
Laszlo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-27 9:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-26 23:10 [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 01/22] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 8:15 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 12:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:07 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 13:38 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 02/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:43 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 03/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 14:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 11:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 8:17 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 16:42 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 04/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 11:54 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 8:49 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 14:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 21:36 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-09 10:50 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 05/22] OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 12:26 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:48 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 17:33 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 9:22 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 15:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 9:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 15:43 ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 18:01 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 06/22] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 07/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 08/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 09/22] OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 10/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 11/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 12/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 13/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 14/22] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 15/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 16/22] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 17/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 18/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 19/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 20/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 21/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 22/22] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:08 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 1:17 ` 回复: " gaoliming
2021-05-27 9:42 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2021-06-02 17:09 ` [edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04 9:32 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04 11:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:09 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:04 ` Laszlo Ersek
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