From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [216.205.24.124]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.4574.1622108556877988003 for ; Thu, 27 May 2021 02:42:37 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=@redhat.com header.s=mimecast20190719 header.b=c8cC1lcN; spf=pass (domain: redhat.com, ip: 216.205.24.124, mailfrom: lersek@redhat.com) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1622108556; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=4HkrDqnuuJ2KQUKlEo79Ek84GwQkDGDX/sE+ehLtga4=; b=c8cC1lcNsqmBqoy3vYzZi+buMGHDwdL628p82XJ1onCnfrV44Y9ay7mxparSnE9fkO0ole LSRdkEWDP1fHCmtHIMjCLgnOeXJd06sT4rkvLVP9i6uLlv/zj07hSNlCvWytwKtRgYYI+M YEDv+0h80TcjA1SWHjJk/B83CoRPKQw= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-527-ib8keaIRMpGAVODj_joo5A-1; Thu, 27 May 2021 05:42:30 -0400 X-MC-Unique: ib8keaIRMpGAVODj_joo5A-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 813A8425D3; Thu, 27 May 2021 09:42:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lacos-laptop-7.usersys.redhat.com (ovpn-115-44.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.115.44]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C989F5D9C6; Thu, 27 May 2021 09:42:25 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support To: devel@edk2.groups.io, brijesh.singh@amd.com, James Bottomley , Min Xu , Jiewen Yao , Tom Lendacky , Jordan Justen , Erdem Aktas , Eric Dong , Ray Ni , Rahul Kumar Cc: Ard Biesheuvel References: <20210526231118.12946-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> From: "Laszlo Ersek" Message-ID: <75c7002f-79e2-0b70-9c91-cf73eda2ea6c@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 27 May 2021 11:42:24 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20210526231118.12946-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=lersek@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 05/27/21 01:10, Brijesh Singh wrote: > (I missed adding devel@edk2.groups.io, resending the series) > > BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 > > SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding > new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity > protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data > replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory > encryption environment. > > This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP > VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP > such as interrupt protection. > > Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new > structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP > VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the > guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to > guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE > instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request NAE" > defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page > from the RMP table. > > Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated, > as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two > approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and > Lazy Validation. > > Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under > lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a > unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception > handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of > the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The > recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate the > unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS. > > At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the available > system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated > before it is made available to the EDK2 core. > > This series does not implements the following SEV-SNP features yet: > > * CPUID filtering > * Lazy validation > * Interrupt security > > The series builds on SNP pre-patch posted here: https://tinyurl.com/pu6admks > > Additional resources > --------------------- > SEV-SNP whitepaper > https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf > > APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36) > > The complete source is available at > https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/sev-snp-rfc-2 > > GHCB spec: > https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf > > SEV-SNP firmware specification: > https://developer.amd.com/sev/ > > Cc: James Bottomley > Cc: Min Xu > Cc: Jiewen Yao > Cc: Tom Lendacky > Cc: Jordan Justen > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel > Cc: Laszlo Ersek > Cc: Erdem Aktas > > Changes since v2: > * Add support for the AP creation. > * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI reads. > * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page. > * > Changes since v1: > * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region. > * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions. > * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is supported. > * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from MMIO ranges. > * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build. > * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location through > EFI configuration table. > > Brijesh Singh (21): > UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled > field > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features > OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD > OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page > OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest > UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is > enabled > OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM > OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI > phase > OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address > OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration > table > MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version > > Tom Lendacky (1): > UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs > > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 21 ++ > UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 11 + > OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 5 +- > OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 5 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 2 + > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 7 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 8 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 5 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 17 +- > OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf | 4 + > OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf | 1 + > .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + > .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 7 + > .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + > .../GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.inf | 33 +++ > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 5 + > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 4 + > OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 3 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 4 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 4 + > MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h | 2 +- > .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h | 18 ++ > OvmfPkg/Include/Library/GhcbRegisterLib.h | 27 ++ > OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 31 +- > .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h | 31 ++ > .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 19 ++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 19 ++ > OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c | 22 ++ > OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c | 15 +- > .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ > .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 17 ++ > .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ > .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 19 ++ > .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 40 +++ > .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 167 ++++++++++- > .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 126 ++++++++ > .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 36 +++ > .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c | 230 +++++++++++++++ > .../Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.c | 97 +++++++ > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 81 ++++++ > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 12 + > OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 106 +++++++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 11 +- > .../MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 31 ++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 274 ++++++++++++++++-- > .../MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 44 +++ > OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc | 5 + > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 23 ++ > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm | 227 +++++++++++++++ > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 6 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc | 1 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 51 ++++ > 52 files changed, 1956 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.inf > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/GhcbRegisterLib.h > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.c > create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c > create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c > I'm confirming that this series is in my review queue. However, I may need unusually long time to get to it. Thanks for your patience. Thanks Laszlo