Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support

["Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>]

Thank Jiewen,

I have ping'ed UefiCpuPkg maintainer (Ray and Rahul) on every patch
which touches the UefiCpuPkg. If maintainer wants me to rework on
something then I will work accordingly. If they are okay with v11 then
now the merge will create a conflict (due to the TDX patches merge
commit). I have rebased my series to the recent master and have pushed
it here: https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/snp-v12. I can post the
series if you prefer it.

thanks

On 10/23/21 8:46 PM, Yao, Jiewen via groups.io wrote:
> Yes. I will try my best to merge.
>
> I checked the patch set but I did not find the "R-B" from UefiCpuPkg maintainer. Neither from email nor from you v11.
>
> Did I miss something?
>
> Thank you
> Yao Jiewen
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2021 12:13 PM
>> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
>> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M <min.m.xu@intel.com>;
>> Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky
>> <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>;
>> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas
>> <erdemaktas@google.com>; Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>; Gerd
>> Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>; Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> Subject: [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
>>
>> Hi Gerd and Jiewen,
>>
>> CI was a bit unstable during my v10 submission, so, I was not able to
>> run it to the completion. Finally, I managed to get the CI going,
>> and it reported few Windows 32-bit build errors. The v11 fixes those build
>> errors. Please consider this for the merge.
>>
>> Thank you so much for all your support in reviewing the series.
>>
>> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> BZ: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.tianocore.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D3275&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=L41krO6G221HaIsG92FloIzgCDqMLAAsU26jaEMF7yw%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>
>> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
>> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
>> integrity
>> protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
>> replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
>> encryption environment.
>>
>> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP
>> VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP
>> such as interrupt protection.
>>
>> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
>> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP
>> VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the
>> guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to
>> guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE
>> instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request
>> NAE"
>> defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page
>> from the RMP table.
>>
>> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated,
>> as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two
>> approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and
>> Lazy Validation.
>>
>> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under
>> lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a
>> unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception
>> handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of
>> the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The
>> recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate
>> the
>> unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS.
>>
>> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the available
>> system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated
>> before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
>>
>> Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP
>> guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the
>> SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted.
>>
>> Additional resources
>> ---------------------
>> SEV-SNP whitepaper
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2FSEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=nVMSG%2FvSS2Wa21lu1lGrHr9OYX8hL7FoAcQXBBiCztc%3D&amp;reserved=0
>> isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
>>
>> APM 2: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F24593.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=G8Xg2glOGY2EjHpeQ3WM4gZChuI0k8QcLDTbpJiTplg%3D&amp;reserved=0 (section 15.36)
>>
>> The complete source is available at
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsnp-v11&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=HMHFq8G%2FPqdhzNW3Ashmc4%2Bmv1RcDULD4vniofhiS54%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>
>> GHCB spec:
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeveloper.amd.com%2Fwp-content%2Fresources%2F56421.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=YiPgZU87fdnl5rJpD0E2ue9aTKbqUwizuBrKxom0FiU%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>
>> SEV-SNP firmware specification:
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F56860.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=bfQsY4%2BRnlFGuD3Bg%2BFPb3lRgSGgpomNocXswHqkm%2F4%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>
>> Change since v10:
>>  * fix 'unresolved external symbol __allshl' link error when building I32 for
>> VS2017.
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>>  * Move CCAttrs Pcd define in MdePkg
>>  * Add comment to indicate that allocating the identity map PT is temporary until
>> we get lazy validation
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>>  * drop the generic metadata and make it specific to SEV.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>>  * Move SEV specific changes in MpLib in AmdSev file
>>  * Update the GHCB register function to not restore the GHCB MSR because
>>    we were already in the MSR protocol mode.
>>  * Drop the SNP name from PcdSnpSecPreValidate.
>>  * Add new section for GHCB memory in the OVMF metadata.
>>
>> Change since v6:
>>  * Drop the SNP boot block GUID and switch to using the Metadata guided
>> structure
>>    proposed by Min in TDX series.
>>  * Exclude the GHCB page from the pre-validated region. It simplifies the reset
>>    vector code where we do not need to unvalidate the GHCB page.
>>  * Now that GHCB page is not validated so move the VMPL check from reset
>> vector
>>    code to the MemEncryptSevLib on the first page validation.
>>  * Introduce the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD to communicate which
>>    memory encryption is active so that MpInitLib can make use of it.
>>  * Drop the SEVES specific PCD as the information can be communicated via
>>    the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.
>>  * Move the SNP specific AP creation function in AmdSev.c.
>>  * Define the SNP Blob GUID in a new file.
>>
>> Change since v5:
>>  * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page
>>  * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c
>>  * Rebase to the latest code
>>  * Add the review feedback from Yao.
>>
>> Change since v4:
>>  * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS
>>  * Add VMPL-0 check
>>
>> Change since v3:
>>  * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to
>> keep
>>    the code readable.
>>  * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state.
>>  * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB GPA.
>>  * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the
>>    AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it.
>>  * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets.
>>
>> Changes since v2:
>>  * Add support for the AP creation.
>>  * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI
>> reads.
>>  * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
>>  *
>> Changes since v1:
>>  * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
>>  * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
>>  * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is
>> supported.
>>  * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from
>> MMIO ranges.
>>  * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
>>  * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location
>> through
>>    EFI configuration table.
>>
>> Brijesh Singh (28):
>>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain
>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use
>>   OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page
>>   OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page
>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase
>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
>>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>>   OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0
>>   OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
>>     phase
>>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
>>   UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr
>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is
>>     active
>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV
>>     status
>>   UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures
>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD
>>   MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
>>     enabled
>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table
>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
>>   OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
>>     table
>>
>> Michael Roth (3):
>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
>>   OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check
>>
>> Tom Lendacky (1):
>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
>>
>>  MdePkg/MdePkg.dec                             |   4 +
>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |  18 +
>>  UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec                     |   5 +
>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc                  |   8 +-
>>  OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc                    |   5 +-
>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc                       |   4 +
>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc                    |   9 +-
>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |   8 +-
>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc                           |   5 +-
>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                        |   6 +
>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf               |   7 +
>>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   7 +
>>  .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>>  OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf  |   2 +
>>  OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf     |   3 +
>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf           |   7 +
>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf           |   5 +
>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf                       |   4 +
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
>>  .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h  |  25 +
>>  MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h            |   2 +-
>>  .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h    |  33 ++
>>  OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h    |  26 +
>>  .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h                  |  36 ++
>>  .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h  |  24 +
>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h                |   5 +
>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h                          |  95 ++++
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h          |  93 ++++
>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c                 |  23 +
>>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>>  .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c                   |  17 +
>>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>>  .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  19 +
>>  .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  40 ++
>>  .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c                 | 167 ++++++-
>>  .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c             | 127 +++++
>>  .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  82 ++++
>>  .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c          | 294 ++++++++++++
>>  OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444 ++++++++++++++++--
>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c                  | 231 +++++++++
>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c               |   2 +
>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c                          | 298 ++++++++++++
>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c                         | 158 +------
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c         | 239 ++++++++++
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c       |  16 +-
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c    |  70 +++
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c          | 345 +++++---------
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c       |   4 +-
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c     | 261 ++++++++++
>>  OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc       |   5 +
>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm  |  17 +
>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm           |  86 +++-
>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb         |  18 +
>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm   |  74 +++
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc        |   2 +
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm  | 200 ++++++++
>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 100 +---
>>  59 files changed, 3329 insertions(+), 528 deletions(-)
>>  create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h
>>  create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h
>>  create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
>>  create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>  create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>  create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>  create mode 100644
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c
>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c
>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c
>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm
>>
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>
>
> 
>
>