Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 0/8] Measured SEV boot with kernel/initrd/cmdline

["Dov Murik" <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>]

On 25/05/2021 8:31, Dov Murik wrote:
> Booting with SEV prevented the loading of kernel, initrd, and kernel
> command-line via QEMU fw_cfg interface because they arrive from the VMM
> which is untrusted in SEV.
> 
> However, in some cases the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are not secret
> but should not be modified by the host.  In such a case, we want to
> verify inside the trusted VM that the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are
> indeed the ones expected by the Guest Owner, and only if that is the
> case go on and boot them up (removing the need for grub inside OVMF in
> that mode).
> 
> This patch series declares a new page in MEMFD which will contain the
> hashes of these three blobs (kernel, initrd, cmdline), each under its
> own GUID entry.  This tables of hashes is populated by QEMU before
> launch, and encrypted as part of the initial VM memory; this makes sure
> theses hashes are part of the SEV measurement (which has to be approved
> by the Guest Owner for secret injection, for example).  Note that this
> requires a new QEMU patch which will be submitted soon.


The QEMU patch is submitted at:

https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210525065931.1628554-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/

-Dov