public inbox for devel@edk2.groups.io
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: devel@edk2.groups.io, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Mark TPM MMIO range as unencrypted for SEV
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 2021 12:26:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8417023b-b3d6-5268-e92a-0c6f5ebfff6b@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1f64ca5689ec86c427e4db8c41da598896dca4ba.1618959281.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

review#2 from scratch:

On 04/21/21 00:54, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> 
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3345
> 
> The TPM support in OVMF performs MMIO accesses during the PEI phase. At
> this point, MMIO ranges have not been marked un-encyrpted, so an SEV-ES
> guest will fail attempting to perform MMIO to an encrypted address.

(1) As discussed, please update the commit message, for more clarify
about SEV vs. SEV-ES.

> 
> Read the PcdTpmBaseAddress and mark the specification defined range
> (0x5000 in length) as un-encrypted, to allow an SEV-ES guest to process
> the MMIO requests.
> 
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf |  1 +
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c        | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
> index 6ef77ba7bb21..de60332e9390 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
> @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ [Pcd]
>  
>  [FixedPcd]
>    gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress
> +  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress
>    gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiACPIMemoryNVS
>    gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiACPIReclaimMemory
>    gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiReservedMemoryType
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
> index dddffdebda4b..d524929f9e10 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
> @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ AmdSevInitialize (
>    )
>  {
>    UINT64                            EncryptionMask;
> +  UINT64                            TpmBaseAddress;
>    RETURN_STATUS                     PcdStatus;
>  
>    //
> @@ -206,6 +207,24 @@ AmdSevInitialize (
>      }
>    }
>  
> +  //
> +  // PEI TPM support will perform MMIO accesses, be sure this range is not
> +  // marked encrypted.
> +  //
> +  TpmBaseAddress = PcdGet64 (PcdTpmBaseAddress);
> +  if (TpmBaseAddress != 0) {

It's OK to keep this as a sanity check, yes.

> +    RETURN_STATUS  DecryptStatus;
> +
> +    DecryptStatus = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask (
> +                      0,
> +                      TpmBaseAddress,
> +                      EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (0x5000),

(2) Should be (UINTN)0x5000, as discussed earlier.

> +                      FALSE
> +                      );
> +
> +    ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (DecryptStatus);

(3) So this is where the mess begins.

The idea is to delay the dispatch of Tcg2ConfigPei until after
PlatformPei determines if SEV is active, and (in case SEV is active)
PlatformPei decrypts the MMIO range of the TPM.

For this, we need to change the IA32 / X64 DEPEX of Tcg2ConfigPei, from
the current TRUE, to some PPI GUID.

There are two choices for that PPI:

(a) gEfiPeiMemoryDiscoveredPpiGuid

Advantages:

- no new PPI definition needed,

- no new PPI installation needed,

- OvmfPkg/Bhyve/PlatformPei needs no separate change

Disadvantages:

- total abuse of gEfiPeiMemoryDiscoveredPpiGuid


(b) gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid

Disadvantages:

- this new GUID must be defined in "OvmfPkg.dec", in the [Ppis] section,
in a separate patch; its comment should say "this PPI signals that
accessing the MMIO range of the TPM is possible in the PEI phase,
regardless of memory encryption". The PPI definitions should be kept
alphabetically ordered.

- OvmfPkg/PlatformPei must install this new PPI, with a NULL interface.
(See "mPpiBootMode" as a technical example.) OvmfPkg/PlatformPei must
install this new PPI either when the SEV check at the top of
AmdSevInitialize() fails, or when MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask() succeeds.

- OvmfPkg/Bhyve/PlatformPei must receive the same update, in a separate
patch. That's because "OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.fdf" includes the same
"Tcg2ConfigPei", but consumes "OvmfPkg/Bhyve/PlatformPei" rather than
"OvmfPkg/PlatformPei". Tcg2ConfigPei will receive the same
stricter-than-before depex, so something on the bhyve platform too must
produce the new PPI.

Advantages:

- more or less palatable as a concept, with the new PPI precisely
expressing the dependency we have.


In approach (b), the "OvmfPkg/Bhyve/PlatformPei" patch needs to be CC'd
to the Bhyve reviewers. If the Bhyve reviewers determine that such an
update is actually unnecessary, because on Bhyve, there is no TPM
support and/or no SEV support in fact, then *first* we have to create an
independent Bhyve cleanup series, that rips out the TPM and/or SEV
remnants from the OvmfPkg/Bhyve sub-tree.


I prefer approach (b). I'm sorry that it means extra work wrt. Bhyve,
but I strongly believe in keeping all platforms in the tree, and that
means we need to spend time on such changes.

I'm not CC'ing Rebecca and Peter on this message -- we're deep into this
patch review thread, and they'd have no useful context. I suggest simply
including the "OvmfPkg/Bhyve/PlatformPei" patch in the next version of
this series, with a proper explanation in the blurb (patch#0) and on the
"OvmfPkg/Bhyve/PlatformPei" patch. That should give them enough context
to evaluate whether the change is necessary, or whether we should purge
the TPM and/or the SEV bits from Bhyve. You could also ask them just
this question in advance, in a separate email on the list (with
distilled context). Personally I'm unsure if the TPM and SEV bits
survived into Bhyve because those bits are actually put to use there, or
because the initial platform creation / cloning wasn't as minimal as it
could have been.

Note that in case TPM makes sense on bhyve but SEV doesn't, then
"OvmfPkg/Bhyve/PlatformPei" will have to install the new PPI
unconditionally.

Thanks
Laszlo


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-04-23 10:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-20 22:54 [PATCH 0/3] SEV-ES TPM enablement fixes Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-20 22:54 ` [PATCH 1/3] OvfmPkg/VmgExitLib: Properly decode MMIO MOVZX and MOVSX opcodes Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-22  5:28   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-22 13:35     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-23  9:07       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-20 22:54 ` [PATCH 2/3] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for new MMIO MOV opcodes Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-22  5:50   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-22 14:15     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-22 15:42       ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-23  9:10         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-23 13:24           ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-20 22:54 ` [PATCH 3/3] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Mark TPM MMIO range as unencrypted for SEV Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-20 23:17   ` Eric van Tassell
2021-04-21 14:09     ` [edk2-devel] " Andrew Fish
     [not found]     ` <1677E4DA25FD7265.31957@groups.io>
2021-04-21 17:20       ` Andrew Fish
2021-04-21 17:45         ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-21 22:24           ` Andrew Fish
2021-04-22  6:07     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-23 10:26   ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2021-04-23 13:04     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-23 13:09       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-23 17:41       ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-23 20:02         ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-26 12:07           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-26 14:21             ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-27 14:58               ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-28 16:12                 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-28 19:09                   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-30 15:39                     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 17:37                       ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-26 11:08         ` Laszlo Ersek
     [not found] ` <1677B2EC90F30786.1355@groups.io>
2021-04-20 23:13   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-22  7:34     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-22  8:31       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-22  8:39       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-22 19:10         ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-23  9:28           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-22 14:51       ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-22 16:04         ` Lendacky, Thomas

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-list from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=8417023b-b3d6-5268-e92a-0c6f5ebfff6b@redhat.com \
    --to=devel@edk2.groups.io \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox