From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, devel@edk2.groups.io,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 10:46:36 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8689d369-b5a3-07ee-5df5-981637224fcd@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211015052648.rcr55juuhoit4efh@sirius.home.kraxel.org>
On 10/14/21 10:26 PM, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 14, 2021 at 05:11:22PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> On 10/14/21 1:58 AM, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
>>> On Wed, Oct 13, 2021 at 11:57:11AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>> When SEV-SNP is active, the CPUID and Secrets memory range contains the
>>>> information that is used during the VM boot. The content need to be persist
>>>> across the kexec boot. Mark the memory range as Reserved in the EFI map
>>>> so that guest OS or firmware does not use the range as a system RAM.
>>> Why is this needed? Isn't the complete firmware memory tagged as
>>> reserved anyway?
>> PlatformPei detects all the guest memory and marks it as a SYSTEM_RAM
>> unless its an MMIO or added as reserved in e820 map file. Since the
>> Secrets and CPUID pages are part of system RAM so we need to explicitly
>> exclude these region.
> secret and cpuid are in memfd which in turn is part of the firmware
> image mapping which is reserved in the e820 map:
>
> kraxel@rhel8 ~# dmesg | grep -i e820
> [ ... some lines snipped ... ]
> [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000007ff7c000-0x000000007fffffff] reserved
> [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000b0000000-0x00000000bfffffff] reserved
> [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000ffc00000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved <= here
> [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000027fffffff] usable
>
> I think they should be covered already ...
The MEMFD range is outside of the firmware image map, MEMFD begins with
0x800000 [1] and in my boots I don't see it reserved in e820. Here is
the snippet.
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009ffff] usable
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000007fffff] usable
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000800000-0x0000000000807fff]
ACPI NVS
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000808000-0x000000000080afff] usable
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000080b000-0x000000000080bfff]
ACPI NVS
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000080c000-0x000000000080ffff] usable
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000810000-0x00000000008fffff]
ACPI NVS
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000900000-0x000000007f4eefff] usable
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000007f4ef000-0x000000007f76efff]
reserved
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000007f76f000-0x000000007f77efff]
ACPI data
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000007f77f000-0x000000007f7fefff]
ACPI NVS
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000007f7ff000-0x000000007fcfbfff] usable
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000007fcfc000-0x000000007fd7ffff]
reserved
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000007fd80000-0x000000007fffffff]
ACPI NVS
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000b0000000-0x00000000bfffffff]
reserved
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000017fffffff] usable
[1]
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgDefines.fdf.inc#L97
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-15 15:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-13 16:56 [PATCH v9 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 6:59 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:00 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:02 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:08 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-14 19:51 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-15 5:08 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:09 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:10 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:13 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:15 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:42 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:44 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:47 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:48 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 7:50 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:02 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:03 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:19 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:31 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-14 19:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-13 16:56 ` [PATCH v9 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:33 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:34 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 20/32] UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:38 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-14 20:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:39 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:41 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-14 21:58 ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:42 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:43 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:43 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:44 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:48 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:52 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:53 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:58 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-14 22:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-15 5:26 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-15 15:46 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-10-18 6:01 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-19 14:36 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-20 4:46 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 8:59 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-13 16:57 ` [PATCH v9 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-10-14 9:02 ` Gerd Hoffmann
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