From: "Wu, Jiaxin" <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
To: "devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
"lersek@redhat.com" <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
"Wang, Jian J" <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
Sivaraman Nainar <sivaramann@amiindia.co.in>,
"Lu, XiaoyuX" <xiaoyux.lu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 0/8] support server identity validation in HTTPS Boot (CVE-2019-14553)
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 02:37:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <895558F6EA4E3B41AC93A00D163B727416F915C1@SHSMSX107.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191026053719.10453-1-lersek@redhat.com>
Test matrix - that's a great summary! The result is also good to me.
Thanks Laszlo's patches to fix the gap.
Series Reviewed-by: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of Laszlo
> Ersek
> Sent: Saturday, October 26, 2019 1:37 PM
> To: edk2-devel-groups-io <devel@edk2.groups.io>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>; Wang, Jian J
> <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; Wu, Jiaxin <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>; Sivaraman
> Nainar <sivaramann@amiindia.co.in>; Lu, XiaoyuX <xiaoyux.lu@intel.com>
> Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 0/8] support server identity validation in
> HTTPS Boot (CVE-2019-14553)
>
> Repo: https://github.com/lersek/edk2.git
> Branch: bz960_with_inet_pton_v2
> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960
>
> Previous posting from Jiaxin:
>
> [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 0/4]
> Support HTTPS HostName validation feature(CVE-2019-14553)
>
> https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/48183
> http://mid.mail-archive.com/20190927034441.3096-1-Jiaxin.wu@intel.com
>
> In v2, I have inserted 4 new patches in the middle, to satisfy two
> additional requirements raised by Siva and David:
>
> - If the Subject Alternative Name in the server certificate contains an
> IP address in binary representation, and the URL specifies an IP
> address in literal form for "hostname", then both of those things
> should be compared against each other, after converting the literal
> from the URL to binary representation. In other words, a server
> certificate with an IP address SAN should be recognized.
>
> - If the URL specifies an IP address literal, then, according to
> RFC-2818, "the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present in the
> certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI". In other words,
> if a certificate matches the IP address literal from the URL via
> Common Name only, then the certificate must be rejected.
>
> I've also fixed two commit message warts in Jiaxin's patches (see the
> Notes sections on the patches).
>
> I've tested the series painstakingly. Here's the script I wrote for
> certificate generation:
>
> > ## @file
> > # Bash shell script for generating test certificates, for
> > # <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960>.
> > #
> > # Copyright (C) 2019, Red Hat, Inc.
> > #
> > # SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> > #
> > # Customize te variables in section "Configuration", then run the script with
> > # "bash gencerts.sh".
> > #
> > # The script creates 17 files in the current working directory:
> > # - one CA certificate (note: key is discarded);
> > #
> > # - for the (IPv4 domain name, IPv4 address) pair, one keypair (that is, a
> > # CA-issued certificate, plus the private key) for each case below:
> > # - Common Name = IPv4 domain name, no subjectAltName,
> > # - Common Name = IPv4 domain name, IPv4 address in
> subjectAltName,
> > # - Common Name = IPv4 address literal, no subjectAltName,
> > # - Common Name = IPv4 address literal, IPv4 address in subjectAltName;
> > #
> > # - for the (IPv6 domain name, IPv6 address) pair, a similar set of files.
> > #
> > # Finally, the script prints some commands for the root user that are
> related
> > # to the following OVMF feature: OVMF can HTTPS boot while trusting the
> same
> > # set of CA certificates that the virt host trusts. The commands install the
> > # new CA certificate on the host (note: this should never be done in
> > # production, in spite of the CA key being discarded), and also extract all CA
> > # certs in the format that OVMF expects. (This edk2-specific extraction is
> > # normally performed by the "update-ca-trust" command, but if yours isn't
> > # up-to-date enough for that, build and install p11-kit from source, and set
> > # MY_P11_KIT_PREFIX, before invoking this script.) See
> "OvmfPkg/README" for
> > # passing the extracted CA certs to OVMF on the QEMU cmdline.
> > ##
> > set -e -u -C
> >
> > # Configuration.
> > CA_NAME=TianoCore_BZ_960_CA
> > IPV4_NAME=ipv4-server
> > IPV4_ADDR=192.168.124.2
> > IPV6_NAME=ipv6-server
> > IPV6_ADDR=fd33:eb1b:9b36::2
> >
> > # Create a temporary directory for transient files.
> > TMP_D=$(mktemp -d)
> > trap 'rm -f -r -- "$TMP_D"' EXIT
> >
> > # Set some helper variables.
> > TMP_EXT=$TMP_D/ext # OpenSSL extensions
> > TMP_CSR=$TMP_D/csr # certificate request
> > TMP_CA_KEY=$TMP_D/ca.key # CA key
> > TMP_CA_SRL=$TMP_D/ca.srl # CA serial number
> >
> > # Generate the CA certificate.
> > openssl req -x509 -nodes \
> > -subj /CN="$CA_NAME" \
> > -out "$CA_NAME".crt \
> > -keyout "$TMP_CA_KEY"
> >
> > # Create a CA-issued certificate.
> > # Parameters:
> > # $1: Common Name
> > # $2: IPv4 or IPv6 address literal, to be used in SAN; or empty string
> > gencrt()
> > {
> > local CN="$1"
> > local SANIP="$2"
> > local STEM
> > local EXT
> >
> > if test -z "$SANIP"; then
> > # File name stem consists of Common Name only. No certificate
> extensions.
> > STEM=svr_$CN
> > EXT=
> > else
> > # File name stem includes Common Name and IP address literal.
> > STEM=svr_${CN}_${SANIP}
> >
> > # SAN IP extension in the certificate. Rewrite the ad-hoc extensions file
> > # with the current SAN IP.
> > echo "subjectAltName=IP:$SANIP" >| "$TMP_EXT"
> > EXT="-extfile $TMP_EXT"
> > fi
> > STEM=${STEM//[:.]/_}
> >
> > # Generate CSR.
> > openssl req -new -nodes \
> > -subj /CN="$CN" \
> > -out "$TMP_CSR" \
> > -keyout "$STEM".key
> >
> > # Sign the certificate request, potentially adding the SAN IP.
> > openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial $EXT \
> > -in "$TMP_CSR" \
> > -out "$STEM".crt \
> > -CA "$CA_NAME".crt \
> > -CAkey "$TMP_CA_KEY" \
> > -CAserial "$TMP_CA_SRL"
> > }
> >
> > # Generate all certificates.
> > gencrt "$IPV4_NAME" "" # domain name in CN, no SAN IPv4
> > gencrt "$IPV4_NAME" "$IPV4_ADDR" # domain name in CN, SAN IPv4
> > gencrt "$IPV4_ADDR" "" # IPv4 literal in CN, no SAN IPv4
> > gencrt "$IPV4_ADDR" "$IPV4_ADDR" # IPv4 literal in CN, SAN IPv4
> > gencrt "$IPV6_NAME" "" # domain name in CN, no SAN IPv6
> > gencrt "$IPV6_NAME" "$IPV6_ADDR" # domain name in CN, SAN IPv6
> > gencrt "$IPV6_ADDR" "" # IPv6 literal in CN, no SAN IPv6
> > gencrt "$IPV6_ADDR" "$IPV6_ADDR" # IPv6 literal in CN, SAN IPv6
> >
> > # Print commands for the root user:
> > # - for making the CA a trusted CA
> > echo
> > echo install -o root -g root -m 644 -t /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors \
> > "$PWD/$CA_NAME".crt
> > echo restorecon -Fvv /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/"$CA_NAME".crt
> > echo update-ca-trust extract
> >
> > # - and for extracting the CA certificates for OVMF.
> > if test -v MY_P11_KIT_PREFIX; then
> > echo mkdir -p -v /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/edk2
> > echo chmod -c --reference=/etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/java \
> > /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/edk2
> > echo "$MY_P11_KIT_PREFIX/bin/p11-kit" extract --overwrite \
> > --format=edk2-cacerts \
> > --filter=ca-anchors \
> > --purpose=server-auth \
> > /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/edk2/cacerts.bin
> > echo chmod -c --reference=/etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/java/cacerts \
> > /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/edk2/cacerts.bin
> > echo restorecon -FvvR /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/edk2
> > fi
>
> And here's the test matrix:
>
> > Server Certificate URL cURL edk2 unpatched edk2
> patched
> > --------------------- -------------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------
> --
> > Common Subject hostname resolves status expected status
> expected status expected
> > Name Alt. Name to IPvX
> > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> ------
> > IP-literal - IP-literal IPv4 accept COMPAT/1 accept NO/2 reject
> yes
> > IP-literal - IP-literal IPv6 accept COMPAT/1 accept NO/2 reject
> yes
> > IP-literal - domainname IPv4 reject yes accept NO/2 reject
> yes
> > IP-literal - domainname IPv6 reject yes accept NO/2 reject
> yes
> > IP-literal IP IP-literal IPv4 accept yes accept yes accept yes
> > IP-literal IP IP-literal IPv6 accept yes accept yes accept yes
> > IP-literal IP domainname IPv4 reject yes accept NO/2 reject
> yes
> > IP-literal IP domainname IPv6 reject yes accept NO/2 reject
> yes
> > domainname - IP-literal IPv4 reject yes accept NO/2 reject
> yes
> > domainname - IP-literal IPv6 reject yes accept NO/2 reject
> yes
> > domainname - domainname IPv4 accept yes accept yes
> accept yes
> > domainname - domainname IPv6 accept yes accept yes
> accept yes
> > domainname IP IP-literal IPv4 accept yes accept yes accept
> yes
> > domainname IP IP-literal IPv6 accept yes accept yes accept
> yes
> > domainname IP domainname IPv4 accept yes accept yes
> accept yes
> > domainname IP domainname IPv6 accept yes accept yes
> accept yes
> >
> > #1 -- should not be accepted: an IP literal in the URL must match the IP
> > address in the SAN, regardless of the Common Name; but cURL accepts it
> > for compatibility
> >
> > #2 -- this is (or exemplifies) CVE-2019-14553
>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
> Cc: Sivaraman Nainar <sivaramann@amiindia.co.in>
> Cc: Xiaoyu Lu <xiaoyux.lu@intel.com>
>
> Thanks,
> Laszlo
>
> Laszlo Ersek (4):
> CryptoPkg/Crt: turn strchr() into a function (CVE-2019-14553)
> CryptoPkg/Crt: satisfy "inet_pton.c" dependencies (CVE-2019-14553)
> CryptoPkg/Crt: import "inet_pton.c" (CVE-2019-14553)
> CryptoPkg/TlsLib: TlsSetVerifyHost: parse IP address literals as such
> (CVE-2019-14553)
>
> Wu, Jiaxin (4):
> MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h: Add the data type of EfiTlsVerifyHost
> (CVE-2019-14553)
> CryptoPkg/TlsLib: Add the new API "TlsSetVerifyHost" (CVE-2019-14553)
> NetworkPkg/TlsDxe: Add the support of host validation to TlsDxe driver
> (CVE-2019-14553)
> NetworkPkg/HttpDxe: Set the HostName for the verification
> (CVE-2019-14553)
>
> CryptoPkg/Include/Library/TlsLib.h | 20 ++
> CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/BaseCryptLib.inf | 1 +
> CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c | 5 +
> CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/inet_pton.c | 257
> ++++++++++++++++++++
> CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h | 19 +-
> CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/inet.h | 9 +
> CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/nameser.h | 9 +
> CryptoPkg/Library/Include/netinet/in.h | 9 +
> CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/param.h | 9 +
> CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/socket.h | 9 +
> CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsConfig.c | 58 ++++-
> MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h | 68 +++++-
> NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpProto.h | 1 +
> NetworkPkg/HttpDxe/HttpsSupport.c | 21 +-
> NetworkPkg/TlsDxe/TlsProtocol.c | 44 +++-
> 15 files changed, 519 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/inet.h
> create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/arpa/nameser.h
> create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/netinet/in.h
> create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/param.h
> create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/socket.h
> create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/inet_pton.c
>
> --
> 2.19.1.3.g30247aa5d201
>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-29 2:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-26 5:37 [PATCH v2 0/8] support server identity validation in HTTPS Boot (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-26 5:37 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h: Add the data type of EfiTlsVerifyHost (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-28 8:12 ` [edk2-devel] " Liming Gao
2019-10-26 5:37 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] CryptoPkg/TlsLib: Add the new API "TlsSetVerifyHost" (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-26 11:51 ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-11-02 11:01 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-28 5:28 ` Wang, Jian J
2019-10-26 5:37 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] CryptoPkg/Crt: turn strchr() into a function (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-26 11:47 ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-10-28 5:12 ` Wang, Jian J
2019-10-26 5:37 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] CryptoPkg/Crt: satisfy "inet_pton.c" dependencies (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-28 5:34 ` Wang, Jian J
2019-10-28 13:06 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-29 0:47 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-29 2:44 ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-29 3:19 ` Wang, Jian J
2019-10-26 5:37 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] CryptoPkg/Crt: import "inet_pton.c" (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-28 6:16 ` Wang, Jian J
2019-10-26 5:37 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] CryptoPkg/TlsLib: TlsSetVerifyHost: parse IP address literals as such (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-28 6:12 ` Wang, Jian J
2019-10-26 5:37 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] NetworkPkg/TlsDxe: Add the support of host validation to TlsDxe driver (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-26 5:37 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] NetworkPkg/HttpDxe: Set the HostName for the verification (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-29 2:37 ` Wu, Jiaxin [this message]
2019-11-02 11:15 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 0/8] support server identity validation in HTTPS Boot (CVE-2019-14553) Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-31 9:28 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-11-02 11:23 ` Laszlo Ersek
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