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From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com>,
	jordan.l.justen@intel.com, edk2-devel@ml01.01.org
Cc: leo.duran@amd.com, brijesh.sing@amd.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Set memory encryption when SEV is active
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 17:35:50 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8aff33dd-51c1-0d06-b7e0-dfa59ac93b76@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3ec1cf2d-952d-97fa-108d-a6c70e613277@amd.com>

On 03/07/17 17:25, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 3/6/2017 5:27 PM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> SEV guest VMs have the concept of private and shared memory. Private
>> memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared memory
>> may be encrypted with hypervisor key. The C-bit (encryption attribute)
>> in PTE indicates whether the page is private or shared.
>>
>> If SEV is active, set the memory encryption attribute while building
>> the page table.
>>
>> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm |   52
>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  1 file changed, 52 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
>> b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
>> index 6201cad..eaf9732 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
>> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ BITS    32
>>  %define PAGE_GLOBAL           0x0100
>>  %define PAGE_2M_MBO            0x080
>>  %define PAGE_2M_PAT          0x01000
>> +%define KVM_FEATURE_SEV         0x08
>>
>>  %define PAGE_2M_PDE_ATTR (PAGE_2M_MBO + \
>>                            PAGE_ACCESSED + \
>> @@ -37,6 +38,33 @@ BITS    32
>>                         PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
>>                         PAGE_PRESENT)
>>
>> +; Check if Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature
>> +; is enabled in KVM
>> +;
>> +;  If SEV is enabled, then EAX will contain Memory encryption bit
>> position
>> +;
>> +CheckKVMSEVFeature:
>> +    ; Check for SEV feature
>> +    ;  CPUID KVM_FEATURE - Bit 8
>> +    mov       eax, 0x40000001
>> +    cpuid
>> +    bt        eax, KVM_FEATURE_SEV
>> +    jnc       NoSev
>> +
>> +    ; Get memory encryption information
>> +    ; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
>> +    ;
>> +    mov       eax,  0x8000001f
>> +    cpuid
>> +    mov       eax, ebx
>> +    and       eax, 0x3f
>> +    jmp       SevExit
>> +
>> +NoSev:
>> +    xor       eax, eax
>> +
>> +SevExit:
>> +    OneTimeCallRet CheckKVMSEVFeature
>>
>>  ;
>>  ; Modified:  EAX, ECX
>> @@ -60,18 +88,41 @@ clearPageTablesMemoryLoop:
>>      mov     dword[ecx * 4 + PT_ADDR (0) - 4], eax
>>      loop    clearPageTablesMemoryLoop
>>
>> +    ; Check if it SEV-enabled Guest
>> +    ;
>> +    OneTimeCall   CheckKVMSEVFeature
>> +    xor     edx, edx
>> +    test    eax, eax
>> +    jz      SevNotActive
>> +
>> +    ; If SEV is enabled, Memory encryption bit is always above 31
>> +    mov     ebx, 32
>> +    sub     ebx, eax
>> +    bts     edx, eax
>> +
>> +SevNotActive:
>> +
>> +    ;
>>      ;
>>      ; Top level Page Directory Pointers (1 * 512GB entry)
>>      ;
>> +    ; edx contain the memory encryption bit mask, must be applied
>> +    ; to upper 31 bit on 64-bit address
>> +    ;
>>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0)], PT_ADDR (0x1000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
>> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (4)], edx
>>
>>      ;
>>      ; Next level Page Directory Pointers (4 * 1GB entries => 4GB)
>>      ;
>>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1000)], PT_ADDR (0x2000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
>> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1004)], edx
>>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1008)], PT_ADDR (0x3000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
>> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x100C)], edx
>>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1010)], PT_ADDR (0x4000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
>> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1004)], edx
> 
> Shouldn't this be 0x1014?
> 
>>      mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x1018)], PT_ADDR (0x5000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
>> +    mov     dword[PT_ADDR (0x100C)], edx
> 
> Same here, shouldn't this be 0x101C?

Right. Other than that, it looks sane to me.

Thanks
Laszlo

> 
> Thanks,
> Tom
> 
>>
>>      ;
>>      ; Page Table Entries (2048 * 2MB entries => 4GB)
>> @@ -83,6 +134,7 @@ pageTableEntriesLoop:
>>      shl     eax, 21
>>      add     eax, PAGE_2M_PDE_ATTR
>>      mov     [ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000 - 8)], eax
>> +    mov     [(ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000 - 8)) + 4], edx
>>      loop    pageTableEntriesLoop
>>
>>      ;
>>



  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-03-07 16:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-06 23:27 [RFC PATCH v1 0/5] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Set memory encryption when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <3ec1cf2d-952d-97fa-108d-a6c70e613277@amd.com>
2017-03-07 16:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 16:35     ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2017-03-08 18:38   ` Jordan Justen
2017-03-08 18:42     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/5] OvmfPkg/MemcryptSevLib: Add SEV helper library Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 17:06   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-07 19:14     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 22:08       ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-07 22:36         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08  8:40           ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-17  2:02             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 10:29               ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-17 14:08                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 14:56         ` Duran, Leo
2017-03-08 15:19           ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-06 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/5] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Initialize SEV support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 17:08   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-07 19:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 4/5] OvmfPkg/BaseIoLibIntrinsic: import BaseIoLibIntrinsic package Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 17:20   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-07 20:06     ` Jordan Justen
2017-03-07 22:18       ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-08 15:41       ` Gao, Liming
2017-03-08 16:26         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09  1:43           ` Gao, Liming
2017-03-08 18:58         ` Jordan Justen
2017-03-09  1:48           ` Gao, Liming
2017-03-09 15:36             ` Duran, Leo
2017-03-09 16:36               ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-06 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 5/5] OvmfPkg/BaseIoLibIntrinsic: Unroll String I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <5a66f334-27e1-3b49-150e-c01209ecb2f6@amd.com>
2017-03-07 18:43     ` Brijesh Singh

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