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From: "Dov Murik" <dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	"tobin@ibm.com" <tobin@ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 11/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 09:42:45 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8b46fe32-beda-0195-8c67-c7ef19194f85@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210430115148.22267-12-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

[+cc: Tobin]

Hi Brijesh,

On 30/04/2021 14:51, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
> 
> When AMD SEV is enabled in the guest VM, a hypervisor need to insert a
> secrets page.
> 
> When SEV-SNP is enabled, the secrets page contains the VM platform
> communication keys. The guest BIOS and OS can use this key to communicate
> with the SEV firmware to get attesation report. See the SEV-SNP firmware
> spec for more details for the content of the secrets page.
> 
> When SEV and SEV-ES is enabled, the secrets page contains the information
> provided by the guest owner after the attestation. See the SEV
> LAUNCH_SECRET command for more details.
> 
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c   | 16 +++++++++++++++-
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf |  1 +
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                 |  2 ++
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                 |  5 +++++
>  4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
> index ad491515dd..92836c562c 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
>  #include <PiPei.h>
>  #include <Library/HobLib.h>
>  #include <Library/PcdLib.h>
> +#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
> 
>  EFI_STATUS
>  EFIAPI
> @@ -15,10 +16,23 @@ InitializeSecretPei (
>    IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES     **PeiServices
>    )
>  {
> +  UINTN   Type;
> +
> +  //
> +  // The secret page should be mapped encrypted by the guest OS and must not
> +  // be treated as a system RAM. Mark it as ACPI NVS so that guest OS maps it
> +  // encrypted.
> +  //
> +  if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
> +    Type = EfiACPIMemoryNVS;
> +  } else {
> +    Type = EfiBootServicesData;
> +  }
> +

Would it make sense to always use EfiACPIMemoryNVS for the injected secret area, even for regular SEV (non-SNP)?

-Dov



>    BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
>      PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase),
>      PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize),
> -    EfiBootServicesData
> +    Type
>      );
> 
>    return EFI_SUCCESS;
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> index 08be156c4b..9265f8adee 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
>    HobLib
>    PeimEntryPoint
>    PcdLib
> +  MemEncryptSevLib
> 
>  [FixedPcd]
>    gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> index a7d747f6b4..593c0e69f6 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> @@ -716,6 +716,7 @@
>    OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.inf
>  !endif
>    UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
> +  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> 
>  !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE
>    OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf
> @@ -965,6 +966,7 @@
>    OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
>    OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
>    OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf
> +  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
> 
>  !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
>    OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccess2Dxe.inf
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
> index d519f85328..b04175f77c 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
> @@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase|gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevE
>  0x00C000|0x001000
>  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
> 
> +0x00D000|0x001000
> +gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
> +
>  0x010000|0x010000
>  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
> 
> @@ -178,6 +181,7 @@ INF  OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf
>  INF  SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf
>  INF  SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf
>  !endif
> +INF  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> 
>  ################################################################################
> 
> @@ -313,6 +317,7 @@ INF  OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf
>  INF  ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf
> 
>  INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf
> +INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
> 
>  #
>  # Network modules
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2021-05-05  6:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-30 11:51 [PATCH RFC v2 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 01/28] MdePkg: Expand the SEV MSR to include the SNP definition Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03  8:39   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 11:42     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 02/28] MdePkg: Define the GHCB Hypervisor features Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 10:10   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:40       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 03/28] MdePkg: Define the GHCB GPA structure Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 10:24   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:19     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:55       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:50         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 13:55           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 04/28] MdePkg: Define the Page State Change VMGEXIT structures Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 12:33   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 13:59     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 14:48       ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-05-04 18:07         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 18:53     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 18:24       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-05 19:27         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 05/28] MdePkg: Add AsmPvalidate() support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 13:58   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 14:09     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 19:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 18:56       ` Laszlo Ersek
     [not found]     ` <167BF2A01FA60569.6407@groups.io>
2021-05-04 19:55       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:10         ` Laszlo Ersek
     [not found]       ` <167BF53DA09B327E.22277@groups.io>
2021-05-04 20:28         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 23:03           ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:19             ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-05 19:17           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 06/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 10:39   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 19:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 07/28] OvmfPkg: Use MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear EncMask from Mmio Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 10:50   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 19:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 08/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Remove CacheFlush parameter Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 11:08   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 09/28] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Allow PMBASE register access in Dxe phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 14:08   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 14:12     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-07 13:29     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-07 15:10       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-07 15:19         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-07 15:47           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 10/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 11/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05  6:42   ` Dov Murik [this message]
2021-05-05 13:11     ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:33       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 10:57         ` Dov Murik
2021-05-06 15:06           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 16:12           ` James Bottomley
2021-05-06 16:02         ` James Bottomley
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 12/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 13/28] OvmfPkg: Validate the data pages used in the Reset vector and SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 14/28] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 15/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 16/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 17/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:05   ` Erdem Aktas
2021-05-03 14:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 18/28] OvmfPkg: Add a library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 19/28] OvmfPkg: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 20/28] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 21/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 14:04   ` Erdem Aktas
2021-05-03 18:56     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 22/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 23/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 24/28] OvmfPkg/SecMain: Pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 25/28] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 26/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 27/28] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05  7:10   ` [edk2-devel] " Dov Murik
2021-05-05 19:37     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 28/28] MdePkg/GHCB: Increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 16:49 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek

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