From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: devel@edk2.groups.io, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
erdemaktas@google.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com, min.m.xu@intel.com,
jordan.l.justen@intel.com, ard.biesheuvel@arm.com,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF.
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2021 18:42:42 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8d695e5b-a508-27b8-3a1f-dc1317be8d4f@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210622174603.GA6366@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
On 06/22/21 19:46, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> Hello Laszlo,
>
> Please see my replies below :
>
> On Tue, Jun 22, 2021 at 07:20:53PM +0200, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
>> Hi Ashish,
>>
>> (+Dave, +Paolo)
>>
>> On 06/21/21 15:56, Ashish Kalra wrote:
>>> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>>>
>>> By default all the SEV guest memory regions are considered encrypted,
>>> if a guest changes the encryption attribute of the page (e.g mark a
>>> page as decrypted) then notify hypervisor. Hypervisor will need to
>>> track the unencrypted pages. The information will be used during
>>> guest live migration, guest page migration and guest debugging.
>>>
>>> The patch-set adds a new SEV and SEV-ES hypercall abstraction
>>> library to support SEV Page encryption/decryption status hypercalls
>>> for SEV and SEV-ES guests.
>>>
>>> BaseMemEncryptSevLib invokes hypercalls via this new hypercall library.
>>>
>>> The patch-set detects if it is running under KVM hypervisor and then
>>> checks for SEV live migration feature support via KVM_FEATURE_CPUID,
>>> if detected setup a new UEFI enviroment variable to indicate OVMF
>>> support for SEV live migration.
>>>
>>> A branch containing these patches is available here:
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fashkalra%2Fedk2%2Ftree%2Fsev_live_migration_v4&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7Ca402470f4cba428feaac08d935a21c79%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792647899814%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=41Jj%2BGNUyEL43UhZgI19iwGcOJcP%2FWg94D8fTopaZxQ%3D&reserved=0
>>>
>>> Changes since v3:
>>> - Fix all DSC files under OvmfPkg except X64 to add support for
>>> BaseMemEncryptLib and add NULL instance of BaseMemEncryptLib
>>> for 32 bit platforms.
>>> - Add the MemEncryptHypercallLib-related files to Maintainers.txt,
>>> in section "OvmfPkg: Confidential Computing".
>>> - Add support for the new KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall interface.
>>> - Add patch for SEV live migration support.
>>
>> I have absolutely zero context in my mind about this work.
>>
>> By v1 / v2 / v3, are you referring to the following patch series (from December 2020):
>>
>> - [PATCH v1 0/2] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flistman.redhat.com%2Farchives%2Fedk2-devel-archive%2F2020-December%2Fmsg00081.html&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7Ca402470f4cba428feaac08d935a21c79%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792647899814%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=cVUvWe6VgjR78OAk5LXgBQiKon4Gp%2F62a2hc%2FKwoLw4%3D&reserved=0
>>
>> - [PATCH v2 0/3] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flistman.redhat.com%2Farchives%2Fedk2-devel-archive%2F2020-December%2Fmsg00198.html&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7Ca402470f4cba428feaac08d935a21c79%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792647899814%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=IXLGA2ttyxdVoC63HeCkPVNuUMH3u5Vd3U1fc6c8LQc%3D&reserved=0
>>
>> - [PATCH v3 0/3] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flistman.redhat.com%2Farchives%2Fedk2-devel-archive%2F2020-December%2Fmsg00202.html&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7Ca402470f4cba428feaac08d935a21c79%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792647899814%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=cOJBqGyM3a7xMbfhbBAh3IEm7IBJFOGu2ReQMSFJ%2BDw%3D&reserved=0
>>
>
> Yes, actually the guest kernel API for SEV live migration was not
> decided at the time of the last patch-set submission, hence, i am now
> submitting this patch-set as the guest kernel API has been discussed and
> closed and the corresponding KVM/kernel patches have been queued now.
>
> And therefore, this is simply not the SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support
> anymore, but the SEV live migration support which includes the guest page
> encryption status tracking.
>
>> We certainly need a new TianoCore BZ for tracking this feature; I only found the above patch set versions because I have full text search for my complete email traffic on my laptop. Sending v4 after half a year hiatus is like sending it in the next century. :)
>>
>
> Ok.
>
> As i mentioned above it took such a long time to re-submit the
> patch-set because of the guest kernel API discussions taking some
> time and getting closed.
>
>> Anyway, where I'm particularly lost is that I (very vaguely) recall conflicting approaches from AMD and IBM on migration. Has an agreement been reached there?
>>
>
> Yes, these are the slow SEV live migration patches. The fast migration
> support is being developed by IBM and that is a separate effort.
>
> As this slow live migration support has now been included in KVM, we
> will need the corresponding OVMF and QEMU support now.
>
>> I certainly apologize for missing the context here; had someone asked me if I had seen any version of this patch set before, I would have *sworn* that I hadn't.
>>
>> I'm basically incapable of tracking this volume of development around confidential computing; sorry.
>>
>>
>
> Please find below your reply on v3 of this patch-set :
>
> Please include such a patch in v4 -- if Tom and Brijesh agree, I'd like to put the new lib explicitly under their reviewership.
>
> Also, I plan to review this series (v4, at this point) only for formalities. I'd like to receive an R-b from Tom or Brijesh [*], and another from Dov or a colleague at IBM, for this series; those together should suffice for merging the library.
>
> So, if you are fine with this approach, then probably Tom or Brijesh can
> take these patches under their reviewership and provide their R-b for
> this patch-set to be accepted and merged.
Indeed. This helps. Thanks.
I'll keep this patch set in my review queue then, for said "formalities
review".
Thanks.
Laszlo
>
> I believe that they are anyway the maintainers for confidential computing related stuff.
>
> Thanks,
> Ashish
>
>>>
>>> Changes since v2:
>>> - GHCB_BASE setup during reset-vector as decrypted is marked explicitly
>>> in the hypervisor page encryption bitmap after setting the
>>> PcdSevEsIsEnabled PCD.
>>>
>>> Changes since v1:
>>> - Mark GHCB_BASE setup during reset-vector as decrypted explicitly in
>>> the hypervisor page encryption bitmap.
>>> - Resending the series with correct shallow threading.
>>>
>>> Ashish Kalra (3):
>>> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptHypercallLib: add library to support SEV hypercalls.
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Mark SEC GHCB page as unencrypted via hypercall
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe: Add support for SEV live migration.
>>>
>>> Brijesh Singh (1):
>>> OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptLib: Support to issue unencrypted hypercall
>>>
>>> Maintainers.txt | 2 +
>>> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/MemEncryptLib.h | 20 ++++
>>> .../Include/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib.h | 43 +++++++
>>> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 1 +
>>> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 1 +
>>> .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 22 ++++
>>> .../Ia32/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c | 37 ++++++
>>> .../MemEncryptHypercallLib.inf | 42 +++++++
>>> .../X64/AsmHelperStub.nasm | 28 +++++
>>> .../X64/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 1 +
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 +
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 +
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 +
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 1 +
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/AmdSev.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.c | 5 +
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf | 2 +
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/PlatformConfig.h | 5 +
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 10 ++
>>> 20 files changed, 436 insertions(+)
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/MemEncryptLib.h
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib.h
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/Ia32/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/MemEncryptHypercallLib.inf
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/X64/AsmHelperStub.nasm
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/X64/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/AmdSev.c
>>>
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-23 16:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-21 13:56 [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF Ashish Kalra
2021-06-21 13:56 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptHypercallLib: add library to support SEV hypercalls Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 19:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-22 19:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-22 22:47 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-22 23:20 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 23:38 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-23 1:47 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-23 15:02 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-21 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptLib: Support to issue unencrypted hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 22:50 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-21 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Mark SEC GHCB page as unencrypted via hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 20:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-21 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe: Add support for SEV live migration Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 23:06 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-24 16:29 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 17:20 ` [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-22 17:45 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-22 17:46 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-23 13:18 ` [edk2-devel] " Dov Murik
2021-06-23 16:42 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2021-06-23 16:49 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-23 17:03 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-30 9:11 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-30 16:25 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
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