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From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>, Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 18/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Validate the memory during set or clear enc attribute
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 15:07:56 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9e56dfd0-0114-9ce4-06bf-ca9c15685b72@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210324153215.17971-19-brijesh.singh@amd.com>


On 3/24/21 10:32 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
>
> The MemEncryptSev{Set,Clear}PageEncMask() functions are used to set or
> clear the memory encryption attribute in the page table. When SEV-SNP is
> active, we also need to validate or invalidate the pages and update the
> RMP entry.
>
> Before clearing the encryption attribute we need to invalidate the memory,
> and then make the page shared in the RMP entry. Similarly, after setting
> the encryption attribute in the page table, we add the memory as private
> in the RMP entry and validate it.
>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf     |  3 ++
>  OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf     |  1 +
>  OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeSnpSetPageState.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++
>  OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c   | 36 ++++++++++++++++++--
>  OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpSetPageState.h       | 27 +++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf
> index f2e162d680..fa8f7719a7 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf
> @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
>  [Sources.X64]
>    X64/MemEncryptSevLib.c
>    X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c
> +  X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
> +  X64/PeiDxeSnpSetPageState.c
>    X64/VirtualMemory.c
>    X64/VirtualMemory.h
>  
> @@ -49,6 +51,7 @@
>    DebugLib
>    MemoryAllocationLib
>    PcdLib
> +  VmgExitLib
>  
>  [FeaturePcd]
>    gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmmSmramRequire
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
> index cb9dd2bb21..d16ec44954 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
> @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
>  [Sources.X64]
>    X64/MemEncryptSevLib.c
>    X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c
> +  X64/PeiDxeSnpSetPageState.c
>    X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>    X64/SnpPageStateTrack.c
>    X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeSnpSetPageState.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeSnpSetPageState.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..0a3d58ac22
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeSnpSetPageState.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
> +/** @file
> +
> +  SEV-SNP Page Validation functions.
> +
> +  Copyright (c) 2020 - 2021, AMD Incorporated. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +
> +  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> +
> +**/
> +
> +#include <Uefi/UefiBaseType.h>
> +#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
> +
> +#include "PeiSnpPageStateChange.h"


There is one minor error in this hunk, Please ignore it during your
reviews. I will fix it in next version.

The include should be "../SnpPageStateChange.h" and not
"PeiSnppageStateChange.h".


> +
> +VOID
> +SnpSetMemoryPrivate (
> +  IN  PHYSICAL_ADDRESS      PhysicalAddress,
> +  IN  UINTN                 Length
> +  )
> +{
> +  SetPageStateInternal (PhysicalAddress, EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (Length), SevSnpPagePrivate, FALSE);
> +}
> +
> +VOID
> +SnpSetMemoryShared (
> +  IN  PHYSICAL_ADDRESS      PhysicalAddress,
> +  IN  UINTN                 Length
> +  )
> +{
> +  SetPageStateInternal (PhysicalAddress, EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (Length), SevSnpPageShared, FALSE);
> +}
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c
> index 33d9bafe9f..26d363d427 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
>  #include <Register/Cpuid.h>
>  
>  #include "VirtualMemory.h"
> +#include "SnpSetPageState.h"
>  
>  STATIC BOOLEAN mAddressEncMaskChecked = FALSE;
>  STATIC UINT64  mAddressEncMask;
> @@ -700,22 +701,34 @@ SetMemoryEncDec (
>    UINT64                         AddressEncMask;
>    BOOLEAN                        IsWpEnabled;
>    RETURN_STATUS                  Status;
> +  BOOLEAN                        NeedPageStateChange;
> +  PHYSICAL_ADDRESS               OrigPhysicalAddress;
> +  UINTN                          OrigLength;
>  
>    //
>    // Set PageMapLevel4Entry to suppress incorrect compiler/analyzer warnings.
>    //
>    PageMapLevel4Entry = NULL;
>  
> +  //
> +  // When SEV-SNP is active, before clearing the encryption attribute from
> +  // the page table we also need to update the RMP entry for the memory
> +  // region to make the region shared. And after setting the encryption
> +  // attribute, the region must be made private in the RMP table.
> +  //
> +  NeedPageStateChange = MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ();
> +
>    DEBUG ((
>      DEBUG_VERBOSE,
> -    "%a:%a: Cr3Base=0x%Lx Physical=0x%Lx Length=0x%Lx Mode=%a CacheFlush=%u\n",
> +    "%a:%a: Cr3Base=0x%Lx Physical=0x%Lx Length=0x%Lx Mode=%a CacheFlush=%u Rmpupdate=%u\n",
>      gEfiCallerBaseName,
>      __FUNCTION__,
>      Cr3BaseAddress,
>      PhysicalAddress,
>      (UINT64)Length,
>      (Mode == SetCBit) ? "Encrypt" : "Decrypt",
> -    (UINT32)CacheFlush
> +    (UINT32)CacheFlush,
> +    (UINT32)NeedPageStateChange
>      ));
>  
>    //
> @@ -749,6 +762,18 @@ SetMemoryEncDec (
>      DisableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect ();
>    }
>  
> +  //
> +  // Make the RMP updates before clearing the encryption attribute in the page table.
> +  //
> +  if (NeedPageStateChange && (Mode == ClearCBit)) {
> +    SnpSetMemoryShared (PhysicalAddress, Length);
> +  }
> +
> +  //
> +  // Save the values, we need it later during the Page state change.
> +  //
> +  OrigPhysicalAddress = PhysicalAddress;
> +  OrigLength = Length;
>    Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
>  
>    while (Length != 0)
> @@ -923,6 +948,13 @@ SetMemoryEncDec (
>    //
>    CpuFlushTlb();
>  
> +  //
> +  // Make the RMP updates after setting the encryption attribute in the page table.
> +  //
> +  if (NeedPageStateChange && (Mode == SetCBit)) {
> +    SnpSetMemoryPrivate (OrigPhysicalAddress, OrigLength);
> +  }
> +
>  Done:
>    //
>    // Restore page table write protection, if any.
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpSetPageState.h b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpSetPageState.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..0b29bad612
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpSetPageState.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
> +/** @file
> +
> +  SEV-SNP Page Validation functions.
> +
> +  Copyright (c) 2020 - 2021, AMD Incorporated. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +
> +  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> +
> +**/
> +
> +#ifndef PEI_DXE_SNP_PAGE_STATE_INTERNAL_H_
> +#define PEI_DXE_SNP_PAGE_STATE_INTERNAL_H_
> +
> +#include "../SnpPageStateChange.h"
> +
> +VOID
> +SnpSetMemoryPrivate (
> +  IN  PHYSICAL_ADDRESS      PhysicalAddress,
> +  IN  UINTN                 Length
> +  );
> +
> +VOID
> +SnpSetMemoryShared (
> +  IN  PHYSICAL_ADDRESS      PhysicalAddress,
> +  IN  UINTN                 Length
> +  );
> +#endif

  reply	other threads:[~2021-03-24 20:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-24 15:31 [RFC PATCH 00/19] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support brijesh.singh
2021-03-24 15:31 ` [RFC PATCH 01/19] OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-06  8:11   ` Min Xu
2021-04-06 12:16     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07  0:21       ` Min Xu
2021-04-07  0:44         ` James Bottomley
2021-04-07 15:02           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 15:12             ` James Bottomley
2021-04-08  6:24             ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-04-08 13:31               ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-09 12:29                 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-09 13:32                 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-09 13:44                   ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-09 14:11                     ` separate OVMF binary for TDX? [was: OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest] Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-12  8:35                       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-04-12 11:54                         ` [edk2-devel] " Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-12 14:33                           ` James Bottomley
2021-04-14 23:34                             ` erdemaktas
2021-04-15  7:59                               ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-15 19:42                                 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-04-21  0:38                                   ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-21 10:44                                     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-21 17:07                                       ` Erdem Aktas
2021-04-22 14:20                                         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 13:22         ` [RFC PATCH 01/19] OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 13:24           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-08  0:45           ` Min Xu
2021-04-07  0:31       ` James Bottomley
2021-04-12 14:52   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-13  9:49     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-13 11:29       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-13 13:13         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-19 21:42       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-20  8:14         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-03-24 15:31 ` [RFC PATCH 02/19] OvmfPkg: validate the data pages used in the SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:31 ` [RFC PATCH 03/19] MdePkg: Expand the SEV MSR to include the SNP definition Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 04/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 05/19] MdePkg: Define the GHCB GPA structure Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 06/19] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 07/19] OvmfPkg: Add a library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 08/19] OvmfPkg: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 09/19] MdePkg: Add AsmPvalidate() support Brijesh Singh
2021-03-25  2:49   ` 回复: [edk2-devel] " gaoliming
2021-03-25 10:54     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-26 20:02       ` Andrew Fish
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 10/19] OvmfPkg: Define the Page State Change VMGEXIT structures Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 11/19] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 12/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-04-01  6:37   ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-01 13:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 13/19] OvmfPkg/SecMain: Validate the data/code pages used for the PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 14/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate RAM in " Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 15/19] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 16/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-01  6:43   ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 17/19] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Allow PMBASE register access in Dxe phase Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 18/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Validate the memory during set or clear enc attribute Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 20:07   ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 19/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Skip page state change for non RAM region Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 19:14 ` [edk2-devel] [RFC PATCH 00/19] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-08  9:58 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-08 11:59   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-09 12:24     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-09 22:43       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-12 16:23         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-12 20:14           ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-13 13:00             ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-14 11:18               ` Brijesh Singh

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