From: "Wu, Hao A" <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
To: "Bi, Dandan" <dandan.bi@intel.com>,
"devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: "Wang, Jian J" <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
"Ni, Ray" <ray.ni@intel.com>,
"Gao, Liming" <liming.gao@intel.com>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 05:37:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <B80AF82E9BFB8E4FBD8C89DA810C6A093C92EA0A@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190904082555.35424-3-dandan.bi@intel.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bi, Dandan
> Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2019 4:26 PM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: Wang, Jian J; Wu, Hao A; Ni, Ray; Gao, Liming; Laszlo Ersek
> Subject: [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: Unload image on
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
>
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
>
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
> the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
>
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for the callers in MdeModulePkg which don't have the policy to defer the
> execution of the image.
>
> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> ---
> MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c | 9
> +++++++++
> MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c | 9
> +++++++++
> MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c | 9 +++++++++
> .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c | 11
> ++++++++++-
> .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 ++++++++++-
Hello,
Could you help to provide the information on what tests have been performed for
this patch? Thanks.
Also, since the patch is touching multiple features (PCI, Capsule, BM and
driver override), I would suggest to break this patch into multiple ones
so that it will be more clear to evaluate the impact for each change.
Best Regards,
Hao Wu
> 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c
> index c994ed5fe3..1a8d9811b0 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c
> @@ -726,10 +726,19 @@ ProcessOpRomImage (
> Buffer,
> BufferSize,
> &ImageHandle
> );
> if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
> //
> // Record the Option ROM Image device path when LoadImage fails.
> // PciOverride.GetDriver() will try to look for the Image Handle using the
> device path later.
> //
> AddDriver (PciDevice, NULL, PciOptionRomImageDevicePath);
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c
> index 95aa9de087..74c00ecf9e 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c
> @@ -1028,10 +1028,19 @@ StartFmpImage (
> ImageSize,
> &ImageHandle
> );
> DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: LoadImage - %r\n", Status));
> if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be
> started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image,
> we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
> FreePool(DriverDevicePath);
> return Status;
> }
>
> DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: StartImage ...\n"));
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> index 952033fc82..c8de7eec03 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
> if (FilePath != NULL) {
> FreePool (FilePath);
> }
>
> if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
> //
> // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure to
> load boot option
> //
> BmReportLoadFailure
> (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status);
> BootOption->Status = Status;
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> index 07592f8ebd..233fb43c27 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> /** @file
> Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing load
> options.
>
> -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
> SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> @@ -1409,10 +1409,19 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
> FileSize,
> &ImageHandle
> );
> FreePool (FileBuffer);
>
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be
> started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image,
> we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
> if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle,
> &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
> ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
>
> ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize;
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> index 6b8fb4d924..cdfc57741b 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> /** @file
> Misc library functions.
>
> -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
> SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> @@ -491,10 +491,19 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
> ImageDevicePath,
> NULL,
> 0,
> &ImageHandle
> );
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
> if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> LoadCount++;
> //
> // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for
> // a 5 Minute period
> diff --git
> a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> index 2d3736b468..e4b6b26330 100644
> ---
> a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> +++
> b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> /** @file
> Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverride
> mapping.
>
> - Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> + Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> #include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h"
> @@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping (
> );
> ASSERT (DriverBinding != NULL);
> DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = ImageHandle;
> }
> } else {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and
> an ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can
> not be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
> DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable = TRUE;
> DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = NULL;
> }
> }
> }
> --
> 2.18.0.windows.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-05 5:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-04 8:25 [patch 0/3] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-04 8:25 ` [patch 1/3] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-04 17:24 ` [edk2-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-09-05 18:50 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-09-04 8:25 ` [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-05 5:37 ` Wu, Hao A [this message]
2019-09-05 6:23 ` Dandan Bi
2019-09-05 8:35 ` Wu, Hao A
2019-09-10 3:37 ` Dandan Bi
2019-09-05 19:01 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2019-09-04 8:25 ` [patch 3/3] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-05 2:20 ` Gao, Zhichao
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