From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=missing; spf=pass (domain: intel.com, ip: 192.55.52.93, mailfrom: hao.a.wu@intel.com) Received: from mga11.intel.com (mga11.intel.com [192.55.52.93]) by groups.io with SMTP; Thu, 05 Sep 2019 01:35:11 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 05 Sep 2019 01:35:11 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,470,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="334488862" Received: from fmsmsx104.amr.corp.intel.com ([10.18.124.202]) by orsmga004.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 05 Sep 2019 01:35:10 -0700 Received: from fmsmsx156.amr.corp.intel.com (10.18.116.74) by fmsmsx104.amr.corp.intel.com (10.18.124.202) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.3.439.0; Thu, 5 Sep 2019 01:35:08 -0700 Received: from shsmsx107.ccr.corp.intel.com (10.239.4.96) by fmsmsx156.amr.corp.intel.com (10.18.116.74) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.3.439.0; Thu, 5 Sep 2019 01:35:08 -0700 Received: from shsmsx104.ccr.corp.intel.com ([169.254.5.32]) by SHSMSX107.ccr.corp.intel.com ([169.254.9.89]) with mapi id 14.03.0439.000; Thu, 5 Sep 2019 16:35:06 +0800 From: "Wu, Hao A" To: "Bi, Dandan" , "devel@edk2.groups.io" , "Ni, Ray" , "Gao, Zhichao" CC: "Wang, Jian J" , "Ni, Ray" , "Gao, Liming" , Laszlo Ersek Subject: Re: [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Thread-Topic: [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Thread-Index: AQHVYvptyH6Ffthe4EeiYwW7e4Mznqccj+eQgAAJeDCAACQvkA== Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 08:35:06 +0000 Message-ID: References: <20190904082555.35424-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> <20190904082555.35424-3-dandan.bi@intel.com> <3C0D5C461C9E904E8F62152F6274C0BB40C57431@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <3C0D5C461C9E904E8F62152F6274C0BB40C57431@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com> Accept-Language: zh-CN, en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [10.239.127.40] MIME-Version: 1.0 Return-Path: hao.a.wu@intel.com Content-Language: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > -----Original Message----- > From: Bi, Dandan > Sent: Thursday, September 05, 2019 2:24 PM > To: Wu, Hao A; devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: Wang, Jian J; Ni, Ray; Gao, Liming; Laszlo Ersek; Bi, Dandan > Subject: RE: [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: Unload image on > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION >=20 > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Wu, Hao A > > Sent: Thursday, September 5, 2019 1:38 PM > > To: Bi, Dandan ; devel@edk2.groups.io > > Cc: Wang, Jian J ; Ni, Ray ; G= ao, > > Liming ; Laszlo Ersek > > Subject: RE: [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: Unload image on > > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Bi, Dandan > > > Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2019 4:26 PM > > > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > > > Cc: Wang, Jian J; Wu, Hao A; Ni, Ray; Gao, Liming; Laszlo Ersek > > > Subject: [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: Unload image on > > > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION > > > > > > For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, > > > the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid > > > EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right > > now. > > > This follows UEFI Spec. > > > > > > But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the > > > execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like > > > any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the > > > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. > > > > > > This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION > > > explicitly for the callers in MdeModulePkg which don't have the polic= y > > > to defer the execution of the image. > > > > > > Cc: Jian J Wang > > > Cc: Hao A Wu > > > Cc: Ray Ni > > > Cc: Liming Gao > > > Cc: Laszlo Ersek > > > REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 > > > Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi > > > --- > > > MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c | 9 > > > +++++++++ > > > MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c | 9 > > > +++++++++ > > > MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c | 9 > > +++++++++ > > > .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c | 11 +++++++++= +- > > > MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c | 11 > > > ++++++++++- > > > .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 +++++++++= +- > > > > > > Hello, > > > > Could you help to provide the information on what tests have been > > performed for this patch? Thanks. >=20 > Previously I only did the VS build since I think these are just the > enhancement for error handling. > For these callers, they don't have the real use case to defer the execut= ion of > the image. > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION for them just like other errors, the only > difference is that with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, we need to call > UnloadImage () to free resource. >=20 > Hao and other feature owners, do you have any suggestion for the tests? Hello, For the PciBusDxe change, I think 'PciOptionRomImageDevicePath', which shou= ld be the loaded image device path, will still be used by AddDriver() when EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is returned by LoadImage(): // // Record the Option ROM Image device path when LoadImage fails. // PciOverride.GetDriver() will try to look for the Image Handle using th= e device path later. // AddDriver (PciDevice, NULL, PciOptionRomImageDevicePath); Later in GetDriver(), the device path will be used to locate the image hand= le: if (Override->DriverImageHandle =3D=3D NULL) { Override->DriverImageHandle =3D LocateImageHandle (Override->DriverImag= ePath); } Ray, could you help to share your thoughts on this one? Thanks. For the DxeCapsuleLibFmp & PlatformDriOverrideDxe changes, I am okay with o= nly the build test. It looks to me that both of the cases will not attempt to consume the loaded image later if EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is returned. For the UefiBootManagerLib changes, I will leave it to Ray and Zhichao. Best Regards, Hao Wu >=20 >=20 > > > > Also, since the patch is touching multiple features (PCI, Capsule, BM a= nd > > driver override), I would suggest to break this patch into multiple one= s so > > that it will be more clear to evaluate the impact for each change. > > > I will separate the patch into module level and send the new patch series= . >=20 >=20 > Thanks, > Dandan >=20 > > Best Regards, > > Hao Wu > > > > > > > 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c > > > b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c > > > index c994ed5fe3..1a8d9811b0 100644 > > > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c > > > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c > > > @@ -726,10 +726,19 @@ ProcessOpRomImage ( > > > Buffer, > > > BufferSize, > > > &ImageHandle > > > ); > > > if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > > > + // > > > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded an= d > > > + an > > > ImageHandle was created > > > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can > > > + not > > > be started right now. > > > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the executio= n > > > + of an > > > image, we should > > > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resour= ce > > leak. > > > + // > > > + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > > > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); > > > + } > > > // > > > // Record the Option ROM Image device path when LoadImage fail= s. > > > // PciOverride.GetDriver() will try to look for the Image > > > Handle using the device path later. > > > // > > > AddDriver (PciDevice, NULL, PciOptionRomImageDevicePath); diff > > > --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c > > > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c > > > index 95aa9de087..74c00ecf9e 100644 > > > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c > > > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c > > > @@ -1028,10 +1028,19 @@ StartFmpImage ( > > > ImageSize, > > > &ImageHandle > > > ); > > > DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: LoadImage - %r\n", Status)); > > > if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { > > > + // > > > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and > > > + an > > > ImageHandle was created > > > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not > > > + be > > > started right now. > > > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution > > > + of an image, > > > we should > > > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource > > leak. > > > + // > > > + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > > > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); > > > + } > > > FreePool(DriverDevicePath); > > > return Status; > > > } > > > > > > DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: StartImage ...\n")); diff --git > > > a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c > > > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c > > > index 952033fc82..c8de7eec03 100644 > > > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c > > > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c > > > @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot ( > > > if (FilePath !=3D NULL) { > > > FreePool (FilePath); > > > } > > > > > > if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > > > + // > > > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded an= d > > > + an > > > ImageHandle was created > > > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can > > > + not > > > be started right now. > > > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the executio= n > > > + of an > > > image, we should > > > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resour= ce > > leak. > > > + // > > > + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > > > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); > > > + } > > > // > > > // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that > > > the failure to load boot option > > > // > > > BmReportLoadFailure > > > (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status); > > > BootOption->Status =3D Status; > > > diff --git > a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c > > > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c > > > index 07592f8ebd..233fb43c27 100644 > > > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c > > > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c > > > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ > > > /** @file > > > Load option library functions which relate with creating and > > > processing load options. > > > > > > -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights > > > reserved.
> > > +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights > > > +reserved.
> > > (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP > > > SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent > > > > > > **/ > > > > > > @@ -1409,10 +1409,19 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption ( > > > FileSize, > > > &ImageHandle > > > ); > > > FreePool (FileBuffer); > > > > > > + // > > > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and > > > + an > > > ImageHandle was created > > > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not > > > + be > > > started right now. > > > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution > > > + of an image, > > > we should > > > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource > > leak. > > > + // > > > + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > > > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); > > > + } > > > if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > > > Status =3D gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, > > > &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo); > > > ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); > > > > > > ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize =3D LoadOption->OptionalDataSize; d= iff > > > --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c > > > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c > > > index 6b8fb4d924..cdfc57741b 100644 > > > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c > > > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c > > > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ > > > /** @file > > > Misc library functions. > > > > > > -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights > > > reserved.
> > > +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights > > > +reserved.
> > > (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
> > > SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent > > > > > > **/ > > > > > > @@ -491,10 +491,19 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages ( > > > ImageDevicePath, > > > NULL, > > > 0, > > > &ImageHandle > > > ); > > > + // > > > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded an= d > > > + an > > > ImageHandle was created > > > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can > > > + not > > > be started right now. > > > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the executio= n > > > + of an > > > image, we should > > > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resour= ce > > leak. > > > + // > > > + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > > > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); > > > + } > > > if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > > > LoadCount++; > > > // > > > // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for > > > // a 5 Minute period > > > diff --git > > > > a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c > > > > b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c > > > index 2d3736b468..e4b6b26330 100644 > > > --- > > > > a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c > > > +++ > > > > b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c > > > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ > > > /** @file > > > Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver > > > vverride mapping. > > > > > > - Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights > > > reserved.
> > > + Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights > > > + reserved.
> > > SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent > > > > > > **/ > > > > > > #include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h" > > > @@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping ( > > > ); > > > ASSERT (DriverBinding !=3D NULL); > > > DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle =3D ImageHandle; > > > } > > > } else { > > > + // > > > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was > > > + loaded and > > > an ImageHandle was created > > > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the > > > + image can > > > not be started right now. > > > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the > > > + execution of an > > > image, we should > > > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoi= d > > > + resource > > > leak. > > > + // > > > + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > > > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); > > > + } > > > DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable =3D TRUE; > > > DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle =3D NULL; > > > } > > > } > > > } > > > -- > > > 2.18.0.windows.1