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From: "Wu, Hao A" <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
To: "devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
	"Bi, Dandan" <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: "Wang, Jian J" <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
	"Gao, Liming" <liming.gao@intel.com>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 03:49:59 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <B80AF82E9BFB8E4FBD8C89DA810C6A093C933446@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190918030557.55256-5-dandan.bi@intel.com>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io [mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io] On Behalf Of
> Dandan Bi
> Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2019 11:06 AM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: Wang, Jian J; Wu, Hao A; Gao, Liming; Laszlo Ersek
> Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride:
> Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> 
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
> 
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
> the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> 
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for the caller in PlatformDriOverrideDxe which don't have the policy to
> defer the execution of the image.
> 
> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> ---
>  .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c       | 11 ++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git
> a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> index 2d3736b468..f91f038b7a 100644
> ---
> a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> +++
> b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
>  /** @file
>    Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverride
> mapping.
> 
> -  Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +  Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
>    SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> 
>  **/
> 
>  #include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h"
> @@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping (
>                                     );
>                  ASSERT (DriverBinding != NULL);
>                  DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = ImageHandle;
>                }
>              } else {
> +              //
> +              // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and
> an ImageHandle was created
> +              // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can
> not be started right now.
> +              // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> +              // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> +              //
> +              if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +                gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +              }


Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>

Best Regards,
Hao Wu


>                DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable = TRUE;
>                DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = NULL;
>              }
>            }
>          }
> --
> 2.18.0.windows.1
> 
> 
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-18  3:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-18  3:05 [patch v2 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:27   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:23   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:35   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  5:28   ` [edk2-devel] " Gao, Zhichao
2019-09-24 10:34   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:49   ` Wu, Hao A [this message]
2019-09-24 10:37   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 5/5] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:30   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
     [not found] ` <15C569713949E871.11658@groups.io>
2019-09-24  1:28   ` [edk2-devel] [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi

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