From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=missing; spf=pass (domain: intel.com, ip: 134.134.136.20, mailfrom: hao.a.wu@intel.com) Received: from mga02.intel.com (mga02.intel.com [134.134.136.20]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 17 Sep 2019 20:50:03 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga006.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.20]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 Sep 2019 20:50:02 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,519,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="387782608" Received: from fmsmsx107.amr.corp.intel.com ([10.18.124.205]) by fmsmga006.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 17 Sep 2019 20:50:02 -0700 Received: from fmsmsx112.amr.corp.intel.com (10.18.116.6) by fmsmsx107.amr.corp.intel.com (10.18.124.205) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.3.439.0; Tue, 17 Sep 2019 20:50:02 -0700 Received: from shsmsx108.ccr.corp.intel.com (10.239.4.97) by FMSMSX112.amr.corp.intel.com (10.18.116.6) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.3.439.0; Tue, 17 Sep 2019 20:50:02 -0700 Received: from shsmsx104.ccr.corp.intel.com ([169.254.5.32]) by SHSMSX108.ccr.corp.intel.com ([169.254.8.146]) with mapi id 14.03.0439.000; Wed, 18 Sep 2019 11:50:00 +0800 From: "Wu, Hao A" To: "devel@edk2.groups.io" , "Bi, Dandan" CC: "Wang, Jian J" , "Gao, Liming" , Laszlo Ersek Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Thread-Topic: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Thread-Index: AQHVbc4XWJ0Vt2k8fkegBt7JpVm896cwzIpw Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 03:49:59 +0000 Message-ID: References: <20190918030557.55256-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> <20190918030557.55256-5-dandan.bi@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190918030557.55256-5-dandan.bi@intel.com> Accept-Language: zh-CN, en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [10.239.127.40] MIME-Version: 1.0 Return-Path: hao.a.wu@intel.com Content-Language: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > -----Original Message----- > From: devel@edk2.groups.io [mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io] On Behalf Of > Dandan Bi > Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2019 11:06 AM > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: Wang, Jian J; Wu, Hao A; Gao, Liming; Laszlo Ersek > Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: > Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION >=20 > For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, > the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid > EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. > This follows UEFI Spec. >=20 > But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer > the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION > like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. >=20 > This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly > for the caller in PlatformDriOverrideDxe which don't have the policy to > defer the execution of the image. >=20 > Cc: Jian J Wang > Cc: Hao A Wu > Cc: Liming Gao > Cc: Laszlo Ersek > REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 > Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi > --- > .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 ++++++++++- > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >=20 > diff --git > a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c > b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c > index 2d3736b468..f91f038b7a 100644 > --- > a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c > +++ > b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ > /** @file > Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vver= ride > mapping. >=20 > - Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. > + Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. > SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent >=20 > **/ >=20 > #include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h" > @@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping ( > ); > ASSERT (DriverBinding !=3D NULL); > DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle =3D ImageHandle; > } > } else { > + // > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was load= ed and > an ImageHandle was created > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image = can > not be started right now. > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the exe= cution of an > image, we should > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid r= esource > leak. > + // > + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); > + } Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu Best Regards, Hao Wu > DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable =3D TRUE; > DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle =3D NULL; > } > } > } > -- > 2.18.0.windows.1 >=20 >=20 >=20