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From: "Wu, Hao A" <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
To: "Bi, Dandan" <dandan.bi@intel.com>,
	"devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Wang, Jian J" <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
	"Ni, Ray" <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	"Gao, Liming" <liming.gao@intel.com>,
	"Gao, Zhichao" <zhichao.gao@intel.com>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	"Philippe Mathieu-Daude" <philmd@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 02:05:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <B80AF82E9BFB8E4FBD8C89DA810C6A093C935957@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3C0D5C461C9E904E8F62152F6274C0BB40C5F796@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bi, Dandan
> Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2019 9:56 AM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Wu, Hao A
> Cc: Leif Lindholm; Ard Biesheuvel; Wang, Jian J; Ni, Ray; Gao, Liming; Gao,
> Zhichao; Laszlo Ersek; Philippe Mathieu-Daude; Bi, Dandan
> Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 0/5] Unload image on
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> 
> Hi Hao,
> 
> Could you help to push this V3 patch series?


The series has been pushed via commits 590c9d5828..c671c9106c.

Best Regards,
Hao Wu


> 
> 
> Thanks,
> Dandan
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: devel@edk2.groups.io [mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io] On Behalf Of
> > Dandan Bi
> > Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2019 9:17 PM
> > To: devel@edk2.groups.io
> > Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>; Ard Biesheuvel
> > <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>; Wang, Jian J <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; Wu,
> > Hao A <hao.a.wu@intel.com>; Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com>; Gao, Liming
> > <liming.gao@intel.com>; Gao, Zhichao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>; Laszlo
> > Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>; Philippe Mathieu-Daude
> <philmd@redhat.com>
> > Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 0/5] Unload image on
> > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> >
> > REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> >
> > v2:
> > Just enahnce the code error handling logic in patch 3.
> > Other patches are the same and pick up the Acked-by and Reviewed-by in
> > other patches.
> >
> > v2:
> > (1) Just separate the patch in MdeModulePkg into module level, the
> changes
> > in EmbeddedPkg and ShellPkg are the same with V1.
> > (2) Drop the update in PciBusDxe module in MdeModulePkg since with
> > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION returned, the image may be used later.
> >
> >
> > For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the
> > Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> > EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right
> now.
> > This follows UEFI Spec.
> >
> > But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the
> > execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any
> > other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> >
> > This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for
> > the callers in edk2 which don't have the policy to defer the execution of
> the
> > image.
> >
> > Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
> > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> > Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> > Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
> > Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> > Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> > Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
> > Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> Dandan Bi (3):
> >   EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> >   MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: Unload image on
> > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> >   MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on
> > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> >   MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on
> >     EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> >   ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> >
> >  .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c         |  9 +++++++++
> >  .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
> >  .../Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c         |  9 +++++++++
> >  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c     |  9 +++++++++
> >  .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c        | 14 ++++++++++++--
> >  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c     | 14
> > ++++++++++++--
> >  .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c      | 11 ++++++++++-
> >  ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c          |  9 +++++++++
> >  .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c  | 11 ++++++++++-
> >  ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c   | 11 ++++++++++-
> >  10 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >
> > --
> > 2.18.0.windows.1
> >
> >
> > 


      reply	other threads:[~2019-09-25  2:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <15C762418138FF70.23104@groups.io>
2019-09-25  1:56 ` [edk2-devel] [patch v3 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-25  2:05   ` Wu, Hao A [this message]

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