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charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Nickle, Pleased, see my comments on your questions below. Another point I missed in my previous mail. You have that function in the library to get credentials and it is used by = RedfishCredentialsDxe driver to create the protocol which in its turn will = be used by other Redfish modules. We do not know how many modules and how many times will call this function = during boot. Right? And on each call of this function you call IPMI command. That command will = create new Redfish account on BMC side according to Redfish HI specificatio= n: " If the Get Bootstrap Account Credentials command has been issued and resp= onds with the completion code 00h, a bootstrap account shall be added to the manager's account collection and en= abled. If the Get Bootstrap Account Credentials command is sent subsequent times and responds with the completi= on code 00h, a new account shall be created based on the newly generated credentials. Any existing bootstrap ac= counts shall remain active." As I know BMC may have some restrictions on the number of Redfish accounts = they can support. And because of that BOS may hit this limit. Which is not good. On the other hand I'm not sure we need to have different credentials for di= fferent modules? All those modules are part of FW. And all of them will be = associated with the same RoleID (FW role) on BMC side. So, all of them may use the same credentials. Could we cash the credentials on first call of that RedfishCredentialGetAut= hInfo and then use those cashed credentials on subsequential calls? It will also may save a boot time, since there is no need to send IPMI comm= and. Thank you, Igor -----Original Message----- From: devel@edk2.groups.io On Behalf Of Nickle Wang = via groups.io Sent: Thursday, October 27, 2022 9:26 AM To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Igor Kulchytskyy ; abner.chang@amd= .com Cc: Nick Ramirez Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] RedfishPkg/RedfishPlatformCred= entialLib: IPMI implementation **CAUTION: The e-mail below is from an external source. Please exercise cau= tion before opening attachments, clicking links, or following guidance.** Hi Igor, Thank you for your help to review my changes. > And it will be blocked by our IPMI call. I see your point. So, BIOS should never be the person to shutdown credentia= l service because BIOS always get executed prior to OS, right? Igor: Yes, my point is that we should not shutdown credential service from = BIOS. Even if OS sends that IPMI command, new account will be created and B= IOS credentials will not be compromised. > Should it be configured with some PCD? Maybe user may select in Setup wha= t method should be used? Or it could be build time configuration? I have below assumption while I implemented the library. I admit this is no= t always true. No Auth: I think this is rare case for Redfish service which gives anonymou= s privilege to change BIOS settings. Basic Auth: this is the authentication method which uses username and passw= ord to build base64 encoded string. Session Auth: I assume that client must have a session token first and then= use this authentication method. Can we use username and password to genera= te session token on our own? If my memory serves me correctly, client has t= o do a login with username and password first and then client can receive s= ession token from server. Igor: BIOS will use the credentials to create session. It should send POST = request to the session URI with user name and password to create session. If a session created successfully then on response BMC returns header "X-Au= th-Token" which then used for the subsequential calls. If we really like to know what authentication method that Redfish service u= sed, we can issue a HTTP query to "/redfish/v1/Systems" with "No Auth". The= n we can know what authentication method is required by reading the "WWW-Au= thenticate " filed in returned HTTP header. Igor: As my understanding, even if you include authentication header (Base6= 4 encoded) in the request to BMC and BMC has NoAuth configuration, then tha= t authentication header would be just ignored by BMC. Thanks, Nickle -----Original Message----- From: devel@edk2.groups.io On Behalf Of Igor Kulchyt= skyy via groups.io Sent: Wednesday, October 26, 2022 11:26 PM To: Nickle Wang ; devel@edk2.groups.io; abner.chang@amd= .com Cc: Nick Ramirez Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] RedfishPkg/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib: = IPMI implementation External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hi Nickle, I would like to discuss that DisableBootstrapControl flag and how it is use= d in our implementation. According to Redfish HI specification we can use this flag to disable crede= ntial bootstrapping control. It can be disabled permanently or till next reboot of the host or service. = That depend on the EnableAfterReset setting on BMC side: CredentialBootstrapping (v1.3+) { object The credential bootstrapping settings for this interface. EnableAfterReset (v1.3+) Boolean read-write (null) An indication of= whether credential bootstrapping is enabled after a reset for this interfa= ce. Enabled (v1.3+) Boolean read-write (null) An indication of whether = credential bootstrapping is enabled for this interface. RoleId (v1.3+) string read-write The role used for the bootstrap ac= count created for this interface. } So, if EnableAfterReset set to false, that means BMC will response with 0x8= 0 error and will not return any credentials after reboot. And BIOS BMC comm= unication will fail. Another concern with disabling credential bootstrapping control is that we= do it on Exit Boot event before passing a control to OS. But OS may also need to communicate to BMC through Redfish Host Interface t= o post some information. And it will be blocked by our IPMI call. We create that SMBIOS Type 42 table with Redfish Host Interface settings wh= ich can be used by OS to communicate with BMC. But without the credentials = it will not be possible. Another question is AuthMethod parameter you initialize in this library: *AuthMethod =3D AuthMethodHttpBasic; According to Redfish HI specification 3 methods may be used - No Auth, Basi= c Auth and Session Auth. Basic Auth and Session Auth methods are required the credentials to be used= by BIOS. And both of them should be supported by BMC. And your high level function RedfishCreateLibredfishService also supports o= f creation Basic or Session Auth service. I'm not sure why low level library which is created to get credentials from= BMC should decide what Authentication method should be used? Should it be configured with some PCD? Maybe user may select in Setup what = method should be used? Or it could be build time configuration? Thank you, Igor -----Original Message----- From: Nickle Wang Sent: Tuesday, October 25, 2022 4:24 AM To: devel@edk2.groups.io; abner.chang@amd.com Cc: Nick Ramirez ; Igor Kulchytskyy Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] RedfishPkg/RedfishPlatformCred= entialLib: IPMI implementation **CAUTION: The e-mail below is from an external source. Please exercise cau= tion before opening attachments, clicking links, or following guidance.** Thanks for your review comments, Abner! I will update new version patch lat= er. The CI build error will be handled together. > please add Igor as reviewer too Sure! > + *UserId =3D AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (CHAR8) * USERNAME_MAX_SIZE); if [Chang, Abner] Allocation memory with the size (USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH + 1) for both BootUse= rname and BootstrapPassword? Because the maximum number of characters def= ined in the spec is USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH for the user/password. Yes, the additional one byte is for NULL terminator. USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH is= defined as 16 and follow host interface specification. Regards, Nickle -----Original Message----- From: devel@edk2.groups.io On Behalf Of Chang, Abner= via groups.io Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2022 3:01 PM To: Nickle Wang ; devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Nick Ramirez ; Igor Kulchytskyy Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] RedfishPkg/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib: = IPMI implementation External email: Use caution opening links or attachments [AMD Official Use Only - General] Hi Nickle, please add Igor as reviewer too. My comments is in below, > -----Original Message----- > From: Nickle Wang > Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2022 10:55 AM > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: Chang, Abner ; Nick Ramirez > > Subject: [PATCH] RedfishPkg/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib: IPMI > implementation > > Caution: This message originated from an External Source. Use proper > caution when opening attachments, clicking links, or responding. > > > This library follows Redfish Host Interface specification and use IPMI > command to get bootstrap account credential(NetFn 2Ch, Command 02h) from = BMC. > RedfishHostInterfaceDxe will use this credential for the following > communication between BIOS and BMC. > > Cc: Abner Chang > Cc: Nick Ramirez > Signed-off-by: Nickle Wang > --- > .../RedfishPlatformCredentialLib.c | 273 ++++++++++++++++++ > .../RedfishPlatformCredentialLib.h | 75 +++++ > .../RedfishPlatformCredentialLib.inf | 37 +++ [Chang, Abner] Could we name this library RedfishPlatformCredentialIpmi so the naming styl= e is consistent with RedfishPlatformCredentialNull? > 3 files changed, 385 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 > RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformCredential= Lib. > c > create mode 100644 > RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformCredential= Lib. > h > create mode 100644 > RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformCredent > ialLib.i > nf > > diff --git > a/RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformCrede > ntialLi > b.c > b/RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformCrede > ntialLi > b.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..23a15ab1fa > --- /dev/null > +++ b/RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformC > +++ re > +++ dentialLib.c > @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ > +/** @file > +* > +* Copyright (c) 2022 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserv= ed. > +* > +* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent [Chang, Abner] We can have "@par Revision Reference:" in the file header to point out the= spec. https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.dmt= f.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fstandards%2Fdocuments%2FDSP0270_1.3.0.pdf= &data=3D05%7C01%7Cigork%40ami.com%7Ca1da2ef246da436260c408dab81ec693%7C= 27e97857e15f486cb58e86c2b3040f93%7C1%7C1%7C638024739579162477%7CUnknown%7CT= WFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%= 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=3DM3rvDfC6hyZBJeBKgL5pLswv2V3kYcf1FV8hLl7iEi8%= 3D&reserved=3D0 > +* > +**/ > + > +#include "RedfishPlatformCredentialLib.h" > + > +// > +// Global flag of controlling credential service // BOOLEAN > +mRedfishServiceStopped =3D FALSE; > + > +/** > + Notify the Redfish service provide to stop provide configuration > +service to this > platform. > + > + This function should be called when the platfrom is about to leave > + the safe > environment. > + It will notify the Redfish service provider to abort all logined > + session, and prohibit further login with original auth info. > + GetAuthInfo() will return EFI_UNSUPPORTED once this function is return= ed. > + > + @param[in] This Pointer to > EDKII_REDFISH_CREDENTIAL_PROTOCOL instance. > + @param[in] ServiceStopType Reason of stopping Redfish service. > + > + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Service has been stoped successfully. > + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER This is NULL. > + @retval Others Some error happened. > + > +**/ > +EFI_STATUS > +EFIAPI > +LibStopRedfishService ( > + IN EDKII_REDFISH_CREDENTIAL_PROTOCOL *This, > + IN EDKII_REDFISH_CREDENTIAL_STOP_SERVICE_TYPE ServiceStopType > + ) > +{ > + EFI_STATUS Status; > + > + if ((ServiceStopType <=3D ServiceStopTypeNone) || (ServiceStopType >= =3D > ServiceStopTypeMax)) { > + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + } > + > + // > + // Raise flag first > + // > + mRedfishServiceStopped =3D TRUE; > + > + // > + // Notify BMC to disable credential bootstrapping support. > + // > + Status =3D GetBootstrapAccountCredentials (TRUE, NULL, NULL); if > + (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: fail to disable bootstrap credential: > + %r\n", > __FUNCTION__, Status)); > + return Status; > + } > + > + return EFI_SUCCESS; > +} > + > +/** > + Notification of Exit Boot Service. > + > + @param[in] This Pointer to EDKII_REDFISH_CREDENTIAL_PROTOCOL. > +**/ > +VOID > +EFIAPI > +LibCredentialExitBootServicesNotify ( > + IN EDKII_REDFISH_CREDENTIAL_PROTOCOL *This > + ) > +{ > + // > + // Stop the credential support when system is about to enter OS. > + // > + LibStopRedfishService (This, ServiceStopTypeExitBootService); } > + > +/** > + Notification of End of DXe. > + > + @param[in] This Pointer to EDKII_REDFISH_CREDENTIAL_PROTOCOL. > +**/ > +VOID > +EFIAPI > +LibCredentialEndOfDxeNotify ( > + IN EDKII_REDFISH_CREDENTIAL_PROTOCOL *This > + ) > +{ > + // > + // Do nothing now. > + // We can stop credential support when system reach end-of-dxe for > +security > reason. > + // > +} > + > +/** > + Function to retrieve temporary use credentials for the UEFI redfish > +client [Chang, Abner] We miss the functionality to disable bootstrap credential service in the fu= nction description. > + > + @param[in] DisableBootstrapControl > + TRUE - Tell the BMC to disable the= bootstrap credential > + service to ensure no one el= se gains credentials > + FALSE Allow the bootstrap > + credential service to continue @param[out] BootstrapUsername > + A pointer to a UTF-8 encoded > + string for the credential > username > + When DisableBootstrapControl is > + TRUE, this pointer can be NULL > + > + @param[out] BootstrapPassword > + A pointer to a UTF-8 encoded > + string for the credential > password > + When DisableBootstrapControl is > + TRUE, this pointer can be NULL > + > + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Credentials were successfully fetc= hed and > returned > + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER BootstrapUsername or > BootstrapPassword is NULL when DisableBootstrapControl > + is set to FALSE > + @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR An IPMI failure occurred [Chang, Abner] The return status should also include the status of disabling bootstrap cre= dential. > +**/ > +EFI_STATUS > +GetBootstrapAccountCredentials ( > + IN BOOLEAN DisableBootstrapControl, > + IN OUT CHAR8 *BootstrapUsername, OPTIONAL > + IN OUT CHAR8 *BootstrapPassword OPTIONAL > + ) > +{ > + EFI_STATUS Status; > + IPMI_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIALS_COMMAND_DATA CommandData; > + IPMI_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIALS_RESULT_RESPONSE ResponseData; > + UINT32 ResponseSize; > + > + if (!PcdGetBool (PcdIpmiFeatureEnable)) { > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: IPMI is not enabled! Unable to fetch > + Redfish > credentials\n", __FUNCTION__)); > + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; > + } > + > + // > + // NULL buffer check > + // > + if (!DisableBootstrapControl && ((BootstrapUsername =3D=3D NULL) || > (BootstrapPassword =3D=3D NULL))) { > + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + } > + > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%a: Disable bootstrap control: 0x%x\n", > + __FUNCTION__, DisableBootstrapControl)); > + > + // > + // IPMI callout to NetFn 2C, command 02 > + // Request data: > + // Byte 1: REDFISH_IPMI_GROUP_EXTENSION > + // Byte 2: DisableBootstrapControl > + // > + CommandData.GroupExtensionId =3D REDFISH_IPMI_GROUP_EXTENSION; > + CommandData.DisableBootstrapControl =3D (DisableBootstrapControl ? > + REDFISH_IPMI_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIAL_DISABLE : > + REDFISH_IPMI_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIAL_ENABLE); > + > + ResponseSize =3D sizeof (ResponseData); > + > + // > + // Response data: > + // Byte 1 : Completion code > + // Byte 2 : REDFISH_IPMI_GROUP_EXTENSION > + // Byte 3-18 : Username > + // Byte 19-34: Password > + // > + Status =3D IpmiSubmitCommand ( > + IPMI_NETFN_GROUP_EXT, > + REDFISH_IPMI_GET_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIALS_CMD, > + (UINT8 *)&CommandData, > + sizeof (CommandData), > + (UINT8 *)&ResponseData, > + &ResponseSize > + ); > + > + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: IPMI transaction failure. Returning\n", > __FUNCTION__)); > + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); > + return Status; > + } else { > + if (ResponseData.CompletionCode !=3D IPMI_COMP_CODE_NORMAL) { > + if (ResponseData.CompletionCode =3D=3D > REDFISH_IPMI_COMP_CODE_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIAL_DISABLED) { > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: bootstrap credential support was > disabled\n", __FUNCTION__)); > + return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; > + } > + > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Completion code =3D 0x%x. Returning\n", > __FUNCTION__, ResponseData.CompletionCode)); > + return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR; > + } else if (ResponseData.GroupExtensionId !=3D > REDFISH_IPMI_GROUP_EXTENSION) { > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Group Extension Response =3D 0x%x. > Returning\n", __FUNCTION__, ResponseData.GroupExtensionId)); > + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; > + } else { > + if (BootstrapUsername !=3D NULL) { > + CopyMem (BootstrapUsername, ResponseData.Username, > USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH); > + // > + // Manually append null-terminator in case 16 characters > + username > returned. > + // > + BootstrapUsername[USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH] =3D '\0'; > + } > + > + if (BootstrapPassword !=3D NULL) { > + CopyMem (BootstrapPassword, ResponseData.Password, > PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH); > + // > + // Manually append null-terminator in case 16 characters > + password > returned. > + // > + BootstrapPassword[PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH] =3D '\0'; > + } > + } > + } > + > + return Status; > +} > + > +/** > + Retrieve platform's Redfish authentication information. > + > + This functions returns the Redfish authentication method together > + with the user Id and password. > + - For AuthMethodNone, the UserId and Password could be used for > + HTTP > header authentication > + as defined by RFC7235. > + - For AuthMethodRedfishSession, the UserId and Password could be > + used for > Redfish > + session login as defined by Redfish API specification (DSP0266). > + > + Callers are responsible for and freeing the returned string storage. > + > + @param[in] This Pointer to > EDKII_REDFISH_CREDENTIAL_PROTOCOL instance. > + @param[out] AuthMethod Type of Redfish authentication method= . > + @param[out] UserId The pointer to store the returned Use= rId string. > + @param[out] Password The pointer to store the returned Pas= sword > string. > + > + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get the authentication information su= ccessfully. > + @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED SecureBoot is disabled after EndOfDxe= . > + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER This or AuthMethod or UserId or > Password is NULL. > + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resources= . > + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported authentication method is > found. > + > +**/ > +EFI_STATUS > +EFIAPI > +LibCredentialGetAuthInfo ( > + IN EDKII_REDFISH_CREDENTIAL_PROTOCOL *This, > + OUT EDKII_REDFISH_AUTH_METHOD *AuthMethod, > + OUT CHAR8 **UserId, > + OUT CHAR8 **Password > + ) > +{ > + EFI_STATUS Status; > + > + if ((AuthMethod =3D=3D NULL) || (UserId =3D=3D NULL) || (Password =3D= =3D NULL)) { > + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + } > + > + *UserId =3D NULL; > + *Password =3D NULL; > + > + if (mRedfishServiceStopped) { > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: credential service is stopped due to > + security > reason\n", __FUNCTION__)); > + return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; > + } > + > + *AuthMethod =3D AuthMethodHttpBasic; > + > + *UserId =3D AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (CHAR8) * USERNAME_MAX_SIZE); if [Chang, Abner] Allocation memory with the size (USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH + 1) for both BootUse= rname and BootstrapPassword? Because the maximum number of characters def= ined in the spec is USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH for the user/password. > + (*UserId =3D=3D NULL) { > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > + } > + > + *Password =3D AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (CHAR8) * PASSWORD_MAX_SIZE); > + if (*Password =3D=3D NULL) { > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > + } > + > + Status =3D GetBootstrapAccountCredentials (FALSE, *UserId, > + *Password); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: fail to get bootstrap credential: > + %r\n", > __FUNCTION__, Status)); > + return Status; > + } > + > + return EFI_SUCCESS; > +} > diff --git > a/RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformCrede > ntialLi > b.h > b/RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformCrede > ntialLi > b.h > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..5b448e01be > --- /dev/null > +++ b/RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformC > +++ re > +++ dentialLib.h > @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ > +/** @file > +* > +* Copyright (c) 2022 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserv= ed. > +* > +* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent > +* > +**/ > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include #include > + > + > +#define REDFISH_IPMI_GROUP_EXTENSION 0x52 > +#define REDFISH_IPMI_GET_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIALS_CMD 0x02 > +#define REDFISH_IPMI_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIAL_ENABLE 0xA5 > +#define REDFISH_IPMI_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIAL_DISABLE 0x00 > +#define REDFISH_IPMI_COMP_CODE_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIAL_DISABLED > 0x80 > + > +// > +// Per Redfish Host Interface Specification 1.3, The maximum lenght > +of // username and password is 16 characters long. > +// > +#define USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH 16 > +#define PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH 16 > +#define USERNAME_MAX_SIZE (USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH + 1) // NULL > terminator > +#define PASSWORD_MAX_SIZE (PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH + 1) // NULL > terminator > + > +#pragma pack(1) > +/// > +/// The definition of IPMI command to get bootstrap account > +credentials /// typedef struct { > + UINT8 GroupExtensionId; > + UINT8 DisableBootstrapControl; > +} IPMI_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIALS_COMMAND_DATA; > + > +/// > +/// The response data of getting bootstrap credential /// typedef > +struct { > + UINT8 CompletionCode; > + UINT8 GroupExtensionId; > + CHAR8 Username[USERNAME_MAX_LENGTH]; > + CHAR8 Password[PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH]; > +} IPMI_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIALS_RESULT_RESPONSE; > + > +#pragma pack() > + > +/** > + Function to retrieve temporary use credentials for the UEFI redfish > +client [Chang, Abner] We miss the functionality to disable bootstrap credential service in the fu= nction description. > + > + @param[in] DisableBootstrapControl > + TRUE - Tell the BMC to disable the= bootstrap credential > + service to ensure no one el= se gains credentials > + FALSE Allow the bootstrap > + credential service to continue @param[out] BootstrapUsername > + A pointer to a UTF-8 encoded > + string for the credential username > + > + @param[out] BootstrapPassword > + A pointer to a UTF-8 encoded > + string for the credential password > + > + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Credentials were successfully fetc= hed and > returned [Chang, Abner] Or the bootstrap credential service is disabled successfully, right? > + @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR An IPMI failure occurred > +**/ > +EFI_STATUS > +GetBootstrapAccountCredentials ( > + IN BOOLEAN DisableBootstrapControl, > + IN OUT CHAR8 *BootstrapUsername, > + IN OUT CHAR8 *BootstrapPassword > + ); > diff --git > a/RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformCrede > ntialLi > b.inf > b/RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformCrede > ntialLi > b.inf > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..a990d28363 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/RedfishPkg/Library/RedfishPlatformCredentialLib/RedfishPlatformC > +++ re > +++ dentialLib.inf > @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ > +## @file > +# > +# Copyright (c) 2022 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserve= d. > +# > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent # ## > + > +[Defines] > + INF_VERSION =3D 0x0001000b > + BASE_NAME =3D RedfishPlatformCredentialLib > + FILE_GUID =3D 9C45D622-4C66-417F-814C-F76246D9723= 3 > + MODULE_TYPE =3D DXE_DRIVER > + VERSION_STRING =3D 1.0 > + LIBRARY_CLASS =3D RedfishPlatformCredentialLib > + > +[Sources] > + RedfishPlatformCredentialLib.c > + > +[Packages] > + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec > + MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec > + RedfishPkg/RedfishPkg.dec > + IpmiFeaturePkg/IpmiFeaturePkg.dec [Chang, Abner] Could you please add a comment to the reference of IpmiFeaturePkg? We have= to give customers a notice that the dependence of "edk2-platforms/Features= /Intel/OutOfBandManagement/". They have to add the path to PACKAGES_PATH. Y= ou also have to skip this dependence in the RedfishPkg.yaml to avoid the CI= error. Another thing is I propose to move out IpmiFeaturePkg from edk2-platforms/F= eatures/Intel/OutOfBandManagement to edk2-platforms/Features/ManageabilityP= kg that also provides the implementation of PLDM/MCTP/IPMI/KCS. I had an = initial talk with IpmiFeaturePkg owner and get the positive response on thi= s proposal. I will kick off the discussion on the dev mailing list. That is= to say this module may need a little bit change later, however that is goo= d to me having this implementation now. Thanks Abner > + > +[LibraryClasses] > + UefiLib > + DebugLib > + IpmiBaseLib > + MemoryAllocationLib > + BaseMemoryLib > + > +[Pcd] > + gIpmiFeaturePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdIpmiFeatureEnable > + > +[Depex] > + TRUE > -- > 2.17.1 -The information contained in this message may be confidential and propriet= ary to American Megatrends (AMI). This communication is intended to be read= only by the individual or entity to whom it is addressed or by their desig= nee. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are o= n notice that any distribution of this message, in any form, is strictly pr= ohibited. Please promptly notify the sender by reply e-mail or by telephone= at 770-246-8600, and then delete or destroy all copies of the transmission= . -The information contained in this message may be confidential and propriet= ary to American Megatrends (AMI). This communication is intended to be read= only by the individual or entity to whom it is addressed or by their desig= nee. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are o= n notice that any distribution of this message, in any form, is strictly pr= ohibited. Please promptly notify the sender by reply e-mail or by telephone= at 770-246-8600, and then delete or destroy all copies of the transmission= .