From: "Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
To: "devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
"dgilbert@redhat.com" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: "Xu, Min M" <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
"thomas.lendacky@amd.com" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"jejb@linux.ibm.com" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Justen, Jordan L" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
"Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] separate OVMF binary for TDX? [was: OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest]
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 11:54:38 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <BY5PR11MB4166FCB474FF5F87D9BE4C768C709@BY5PR11MB4166.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YHQGPid0ijLPB/oT@work-vm>
I totally agree with you that from security perspective, the best idea to isolate AMD SEV/Intel TDX from standard OVMF.
Do you want to propose move AMD SEV support to another SEC?
> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of Dr. David
> Alan Gilbert
> Sent: Monday, April 12, 2021 4:35 PM
> To: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Xu, Min M <min.m.xu@intel.com>;
> devel@edk2.groups.io; thomas.lendacky@amd.com; jejb@linux.ibm.com;
> Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L
> <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>; Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>;
> Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>; Nathaniel McCallum
> <npmccallum@redhat.com>
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] separate OVMF binary for TDX? [was: OvmfPkg:
> Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest]
>
> * Laszlo Ersek (lersek@redhat.com) wrote:
> > On 04/09/21 15:44, Yao, Jiewen wrote:
> > > Hi Laszlo
> > > Thanks.
> > >
> > > We did provide a separate binary in the beginning - see
> https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF, with same goal - easy to
> maintain and develop. A clean solution, definitely.
> > >
> > > However, we got requirement to deliver one binary solution together with 1)
> normal OVMF, 2) AMD-SEV, 3) Intel-TDX.
> > > Now, we are struggling to merge them......
> > >
> > > For DXE, we hope to isolate TDX driver whenever it is possible.
> > > But we only have one reset vector here. Sigh...
> >
> > Can we please pry a little bit at that "one binary" requirement?
> >
> > Ultimately the "guest bundle" is going to be composed by much
> > higher-level code, I expect (such as some userspace code, written in
> > python or similar); selecting a firmware binary in such an environment
> > is surely easier than handling this "polymorphism" in the most
> > restrictive software environment imaginable (reset vector assembly code
> > in the guest)?
>
> I think also there's a security argument here; some people like to
> measure security in kloc's; so having your secure boot image as small
> as possible for the environment you're actually running does make some
> sense, which favours the 2 image idea.
>
> Dave
>
> > Thanks
> > Laszlo
> --
> Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
>
>
>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-12 11:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-24 15:31 [RFC PATCH 00/19] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support brijesh.singh
2021-03-24 15:31 ` [RFC PATCH 01/19] OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-06 8:11 ` Min Xu
2021-04-06 12:16 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 0:21 ` Min Xu
2021-04-07 0:44 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-07 15:02 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 15:12 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-08 6:24 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-04-08 13:31 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-09 12:29 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-09 13:32 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-09 13:44 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-09 14:11 ` separate OVMF binary for TDX? [was: OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest] Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-12 8:35 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-04-12 11:54 ` Yao, Jiewen [this message]
2021-04-12 14:33 ` [edk2-devel] " James Bottomley
2021-04-14 23:34 ` erdemaktas
2021-04-15 7:59 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-15 19:42 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-04-21 0:38 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-21 10:44 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-21 17:07 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-04-22 14:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 13:22 ` [RFC PATCH 01/19] OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 13:24 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-08 0:45 ` Min Xu
2021-04-07 0:31 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-12 14:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-13 9:49 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-13 11:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-13 13:13 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-19 21:42 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-20 8:14 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-03-24 15:31 ` [RFC PATCH 02/19] OvmfPkg: validate the data pages used in the SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:31 ` [RFC PATCH 03/19] MdePkg: Expand the SEV MSR to include the SNP definition Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 04/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 05/19] MdePkg: Define the GHCB GPA structure Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 06/19] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 07/19] OvmfPkg: Add a library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 08/19] OvmfPkg: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 09/19] MdePkg: Add AsmPvalidate() support Brijesh Singh
2021-03-25 2:49 ` 回复: [edk2-devel] " gaoliming
2021-03-25 10:54 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-26 20:02 ` Andrew Fish
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 10/19] OvmfPkg: Define the Page State Change VMGEXIT structures Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 11/19] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 12/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-04-01 6:37 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-01 13:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 13/19] OvmfPkg/SecMain: Validate the data/code pages used for the PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 14/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate RAM in " Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 15/19] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 16/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-01 6:43 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 17/19] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Allow PMBASE register access in Dxe phase Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 18/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Validate the memory during set or clear enc attribute Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 19/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Skip page state change for non RAM region Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 19:14 ` [edk2-devel] [RFC PATCH 00/19] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-08 9:58 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-08 11:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-09 12:24 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-09 22:43 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-12 16:23 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-12 20:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-13 13:00 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-14 11:18 ` Brijesh Singh
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