From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com>
To: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: edk2-devel@lists.01.org, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
Leo Duran <leo.duran@amd.com>,
brijesh.singh@amd.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Set memory encryption when SEV is active
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2017 12:42:15 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+HCGMY_AgPFbhyE082jgDtG-P4J3LBW4UuebaiGLn+ukmuhhQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148899829524.16179.6226467722763003659@jljusten-skl>
On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 12:38 PM, Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
wrote:
> On 2017-03-06 15:27:35, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> > SEV guest VMs have the concept of private and shared memory. Private
> > memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared memory
> > may be encrypted with hypervisor key. The C-bit (encryption attribute)
> > in PTE indicates whether the page is private or shared.
> >
> > If SEV is active, set the memory encryption attribute while building
> > the page table.
> >
> > Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> > ---
> > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm | 52
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
> b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
> > index 6201cad..eaf9732 100644
> > --- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
> > +++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
> > @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ BITS 32
> > %define PAGE_GLOBAL 0x0100
> > %define PAGE_2M_MBO 0x080
> > %define PAGE_2M_PAT 0x01000
> > +%define KVM_FEATURE_SEV 0x08
> >
> > %define PAGE_2M_PDE_ATTR (PAGE_2M_MBO + \
> > PAGE_ACCESSED + \
> > @@ -37,6 +38,33 @@ BITS 32
> > PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
> > PAGE_PRESENT)
> >
> > +; Check if Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature
> > +; is enabled in KVM
> > +;
> > +; If SEV is enabled, then EAX will contain Memory encryption bit
> position
> > +;
> > +CheckKVMSEVFeature:
>
> Code style would be CheckKvmSevFeature.
>
>
Thanks Jordan, I will fix the coding style in next rev
> > + ; Check for SEV feature
> > + ; CPUID KVM_FEATURE - Bit 8
> > + mov eax, 0x40000001
> > + cpuid
> > + bt eax, KVM_FEATURE_SEV
> > + jnc NoSev
> > +
> > + ; Get memory encryption information
> > + ; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
> > + ;
> > + mov eax, 0x8000001f
> > + cpuid
> > + mov eax, ebx
> > + and eax, 0x3f
> > + jmp SevExit
> > +
> > +NoSev:
> > + xor eax, eax
> > +
> > +SevExit:
> > + OneTimeCallRet CheckKVMSEVFeature
> >
> > ;
> > ; Modified: EAX, ECX
> > @@ -60,18 +88,41 @@ clearPageTablesMemoryLoop:
> > mov dword[ecx * 4 + PT_ADDR (0) - 4], eax
> > loop clearPageTablesMemoryLoop
> >
> > + ; Check if it SEV-enabled Guest
> > + ;
> > + OneTimeCall CheckKVMSEVFeature
> > + xor edx, edx
> > + test eax, eax
> > + jz SevNotActive
> > +
> > + ; If SEV is enabled, Memory encryption bit is always above 31
> > + mov ebx, 32
> > + sub ebx, eax
> > + bts edx, eax
> > +
> > +SevNotActive:
> > +
> > + ;
> > ;
> > ; Top level Page Directory Pointers (1 * 512GB entry)
> > ;
> > + ; edx contain the memory encryption bit mask, must be applied
> > + ; to upper 31 bit on 64-bit address
> > + ;
> > mov dword[PT_ADDR (0)], PT_ADDR (0x1000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> > + mov dword[PT_ADDR (4)], edx
> >
> > ;
> > ; Next level Page Directory Pointers (4 * 1GB entries => 4GB)
> > ;
> > mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1000)], PT_ADDR (0x2000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> > + mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1004)], edx
> > mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1008)], PT_ADDR (0x3000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> > + mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x100C)], edx
> > mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1010)], PT_ADDR (0x4000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> > + mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1004)], edx
> > mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1018)], PT_ADDR (0x5000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
> > + mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x100C)], edx
> >
> > ;
> > ; Page Table Entries (2048 * 2MB entries => 4GB)
> > @@ -83,6 +134,7 @@ pageTableEntriesLoop:
> > shl eax, 21
> > add eax, PAGE_2M_PDE_ATTR
> > mov [ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000 - 8)], eax
> > + mov [(ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000 - 8)) + 4], edx
> > loop pageTableEntriesLoop
> >
> > ;
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > edk2-devel mailing list
> > edk2-devel@lists.01.org
> > https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
>
--
Confusion is always the most honest response.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-08 18:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-06 23:27 [RFC PATCH v1 0/5] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Set memory encryption when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <3ec1cf2d-952d-97fa-108d-a6c70e613277@amd.com>
2017-03-07 16:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 16:35 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-08 18:38 ` Jordan Justen
2017-03-08 18:42 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-03-06 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/5] OvmfPkg/MemcryptSevLib: Add SEV helper library Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 17:06 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-07 19:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 22:08 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-07 22:36 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 8:40 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-17 2:02 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 10:29 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-17 14:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 14:56 ` Duran, Leo
2017-03-08 15:19 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-06 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/5] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Initialize SEV support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 17:08 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-07 19:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 4/5] OvmfPkg/BaseIoLibIntrinsic: import BaseIoLibIntrinsic package Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 17:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-07 20:06 ` Jordan Justen
2017-03-07 22:18 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-08 15:41 ` Gao, Liming
2017-03-08 16:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 1:43 ` Gao, Liming
2017-03-08 18:58 ` Jordan Justen
2017-03-09 1:48 ` Gao, Liming
2017-03-09 15:36 ` Duran, Leo
2017-03-09 16:36 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-03-06 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 5/5] OvmfPkg/BaseIoLibIntrinsic: Unroll String I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <5a66f334-27e1-3b49-150e-c01209ecb2f6@amd.com>
2017-03-07 18:43 ` Brijesh Singh
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