From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: "edk2-devel@lists.01.org" <edk2-devel@lists.01.org>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes()
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2017 16:11:50 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu8pVyitCPbOYY2s6eXKvziVz-gsFH7Up8dNT8hb6B4gKg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170306144834.GV16034@bivouac.eciton.net>
On 6 March 2017 at 15:48, Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:36:15AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> Enable the use of strict memory permissions on ARM by processing the
>> EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP rather than ignoring them. As before,
>> calls to CpuArchProtocol::SetMemoryAttributes that only set RO/XP
>> bits will preserve the cacheability attributes. Permissions attributes
>> are not preserved when setting the memory type only: the way the memory
>> permission attributes are defined does not allows for that, and so this
>> situation does not deviate from other architectures.
>>
>> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
>> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
>> ---
>> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c | 151 ++++++++------------
>> 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
>> index 26b637e7658f..6dd749dadf8b 100644
>> --- a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
>> +++ b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
>> @@ -374,50 +374,41 @@ UpdatePageEntries (
>>
>> // EntryMask: bitmask of values to change (1 = change this value, 0 = leave alone)
>> // EntryValue: values at bit positions specified by EntryMask
>> - EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
>> - EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE;
>> + EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_MASK | TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_MASK;
>> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_XP) != 0) {
>> + EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE_XN;
>> + } else {
>> + EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE;
>> + }
>> +
>> // Although the PI spec is unclear on this the GCD guarantees that only
>> // one Attribute bit is set at a time, so we can safely use a switch statement
>
> But the switch statement is going away.
>
> The change effectively introduces a guaranteed priority of
> interpretation if the spec is violated. Say something about this order
> being arbitrarily decided due to PI spce guarantee instead?
>
Indeed.
>> - switch (Attributes) {
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_UC:
>> - // modify cacheability attributes
>> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> - // map to strongly ordered
>> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
>> - break;
>> -
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_WC:
>> - // modify cacheability attributes
>> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> - // map to normal non-cachable
>> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
>> - break;
>> -
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_WT:
>> - // modify cacheability attributes
>> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> - // write through with no-allocate
>> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
>> - break;
>> -
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_WB:
>> - // modify cacheability attributes
>> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> - // write back (with allocate)
>> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
>> - break;
>> -
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_WP:
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_XP:
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_UCE:
>> - // cannot be implemented UEFI definition unclear for ARM
>> - // Cause a page fault if these ranges are accessed.
>> - EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_FAULT;
>> - DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): setting page %lx with unsupported attribute %x will page fault on access\n", BaseAddress, Attributes));
>> - break;
>> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_UC) != 0) {
>
> Or should these be "Attributes & Mask" == "ATTRIBUTE"?
>
I know this is more idiomatic for EDK2, but the mask *is* the
attribute in this case, and so the former implies the latter. If the
mask were
(EFI_MEMORY_WB | EFI_MEMORY_WT | etc
it would make more sense do to the latter I think
>> + // modify cacheability attributes
>> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> + // map to strongly ordered
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
>> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WC) != 0) {
>> + // modify cacheability attributes
>> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> + // map to normal non-cachable
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
>> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WT) != 0) {
>> + // modify cacheability attributes
>> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> + // write through with no-allocate
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
>> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WB) != 0) {
>> + // modify cacheability attributes
>> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> + // write back (with allocate)
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
>> + }
>>
>> - default:
>> - return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
>
> Do we not want a fallback handling for the if-form as well?
>
No, and that is actually the point of this patch. SetMemoryAttributes
may be called without a memory type argument, in which case it only
modifies permission attributes, and leaves the memory type attributes
only.
>> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_RO) != 0) {
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_RO_RO;
>> + } else {
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_RW_RW;
>> }
>>
>> // Obtain page table base
>> @@ -520,53 +511,42 @@ UpdateSectionEntries (
>> // EntryValue: values at bit positions specified by EntryMask
>>
>> // Make sure we handle a section range that is unmapped
>> - EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_MASK;
>> + EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_MASK | TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_XN_MASK |
>> + TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_MASK;
>> EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_SECTION;
>>
>> // Although the PI spec is unclear on this the GCD guarantees that only
>> // one Attribute bit is set at a time, so we can safely use a switch statement
>
> Repeat of above.
>
>> - switch(Attributes) {
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_UC:
>> - // modify cacheability attributes
>> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> - // map to strongly ordered
>> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
>> - break;
>> -
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_WC:
>> - // modify cacheability attributes
>> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> - // map to normal non-cachable
>> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
>> - break;
>> -
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_WT:
>> - // modify cacheability attributes
>> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> - // write through with no-allocate
>> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
>> - break;
>> -
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_WB:
>> - // modify cacheability attributes
>> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> - // write back (with allocate)
>> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
>> - break;
>> -
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_WP:
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_XP:
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_RP:
>> - case EFI_MEMORY_UCE:
>> - // cannot be implemented UEFI definition unclear for ARM
>> - // Cause a page fault if these ranges are accessed.
>> - EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_FAULT;
>> - DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): setting section %lx with unsupported attribute %x will page fault on access\n", BaseAddress, Attributes));
>> - break;
>> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_UC) != 0) {
>> + // modify cacheability attributes
>> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> + // map to strongly ordered
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
>> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WC) != 0) {
>> + // modify cacheability attributes
>> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> + // map to normal non-cachable
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
>> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WT) != 0) {
>> + // modify cacheability attributes
>> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> + // write through with no-allocate
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
>> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WB) != 0) {
>> + // modify cacheability attributes
>> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
>> + // write back (with allocate)
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
>> + }
>
> (Again, same questions as above.)
>
>>
>> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_RO) != 0) {
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_RO_RO;
>> + } else {
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_RW_RW;
>> + }
>>
>> - default:
>> - return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
>> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_XP) != 0) {
>> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_XN_MASK;
>> }
>>
>> // obtain page table base
>> @@ -693,13 +673,6 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
>> UINT64 ChunkLength;
>> BOOLEAN FlushTlbs;
>>
>> - //
>> - // Ignore invocations that only modify permission bits
>> - //
>> - if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_CACHETYPE_MASK) == 0) {
>> - return EFI_SUCCESS;
>> - }
>> -
>> FlushTlbs = FALSE;
>> while (Length > 0) {
>> if ((BaseAddress % TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE == 0) &&
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-06 15:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-02 10:36 [PATCH v2 0/4] ArmPkg, ArmVirtpkg ARM: enable strict memory protection Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid splitting page table sections unnecessarily Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 14:12 ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-06 14:55 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 16:24 ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid unnecessary cache/TLB maintenance Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 14:27 ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-06 15:06 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes() Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 14:48 ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-06 15:11 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2017-03-06 16:40 ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM platforms Ard Biesheuvel
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