From: "Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, kraxel@redhat.com
Cc: "Xu, Min M" <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
"Justen, Jordan L" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH V5 1/2] OvmfPkg: Introduce Tdx BFV/CFV PCDs and PcdOvmfImageSizeInKb
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 08:57:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMj1kXGSf-_0yYwGu4tp=+f+HFxchS+rhujBo5C5nqzr+LpKwQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210901061033.auj6v3nnofmcawxc@sirius.home.kraxel.org>
On Wed, 1 Sept 2021 at 08:10, Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> > > I didn't fully investigate what kind of attacks one can do. I'm pretty sure simply
> > > making the variable store larger and the spare smaller works, so parts of the
> > > variable store are outside the area you are measuring. Not fully sure whenever
> > > one can actually reorder the sections to move the varstore completely into the
> > > unmeasured area. Or play out other attacks with the same effect, like bloating
> > > some header struct.
> > >
> > > Simply measuring everything (including the spare) will stop all that.
> > > Changes wouldn't go unnoticed, period. No ifs and buts. So I'm wondering why
> > > you not doing that? Performance? Wouldn't be the first time a performance
> > > optimization pokes a hole into a security concept ...
> > >
> > The measurement value of the CFV (provisioned configuration data) is extended to
> > RTMR registers (similar to TPM PCRs). At the same time it is recorded in the TD Event
> > log.
> > These information will be used by the Attestation server (This is the so-called Attestation).
> > In other words there is a known *good* CFV measurement value. Any changes to
> > the CFV, for example the layout, the order of the variables, the content of the variables
> > will produce a *bad* CFV measurement.
>
> Yes. The attacker would need a varstore with a modified layout being
> approved by the attestation server as first step, then he would be able
> to modify variables unnoticed in a second step.
>
> So, assuming an attacker isn't able to carry out the first step it
> should be all fine in theory. When it comes to security it never hurts
> to have another line of defense though, so I would still strongly
> recommend to measure the complete varstore (including spare).
>
> At the end of the day it is your call, I'm not going to veto the patch.
> But I'll reserve the right to pull a "told you so" in case someone
> manages to exploit that some day.
>
Have to agree with Gerd here: if those contents are being interpreted
by the code, and may therefore affect its execution, I don't think it
should be omitted from the measurement unless there is a compelling
reason for it. Omitting it simply because you can doesn't seem
sufficient justification to me.
--
Ard.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-01 6:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-30 2:35 [PATCH V5 0/2] Add Intel TDX support in OvmfPkg/ResetVector Min Xu
2021-08-30 2:35 ` [PATCH V5 1/2] OvmfPkg: Introduce Tdx BFV/CFV PCDs and PcdOvmfImageSizeInKb Min Xu
2021-08-30 7:03 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-08-31 3:29 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-08-31 5:13 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-08-31 6:17 ` Min Xu
2021-08-31 10:21 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-01 5:18 ` Min Xu
2021-09-01 6:10 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-01 6:57 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2021-09-01 7:19 ` Min Xu
2021-09-01 7:44 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-01 8:59 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-01 16:53 ` James Bottomley
2021-09-01 19:19 ` Andrew Fish
2021-09-10 17:03 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-08-30 2:35 ` [PATCH V5 2/2] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Enable Intel TDX in ResetVector of Ovmf Min Xu
2021-08-30 7:40 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-08-31 3:09 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-08-31 5:35 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-02 0:05 ` Min Xu
2021-09-02 7:18 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-02 7:49 ` Min Xu
2021-09-03 3:03 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-03 5:39 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-09 13:54 ` Min Xu
2021-09-10 8:19 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-14 3:54 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-11 1:17 ` Erdem Aktas
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