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* [PATCH v2 0/2] UEFI memmap workaround for hiding page-access caps from OSes hides SP and CRYPTO caps too
@ 2020-09-24 10:21 jacek.kukiello
  2020-09-24 10:21 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe: expose SP and CRYPTO capabilities in UEFI memmap Malgorzata Kukiello
                   ` (3 more replies)
  0 siblings, 4 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: jacek.kukiello @ 2020-09-24 10:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: devel
  Cc: Malgorzata Kukiello, Michael D Kinney, Jian J Wang, Hao A Wu,
	Dandan Bi, Liming Gao, Zhiguang Liu, Oleksiy Yakovlev,
	Ard Biesheuvel

REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2982

The workaround in the UEFI memmap construction, near the end of the
function CoreGetMemoryMap() [MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c] should
not clear the SP and CRYPTO bits, because OSes do (apparently) correctly
interpret SP and CRYPTO as capabilities, and not as currently set
attributes (upon which the OSes should set their page tables). For this
reason, the SP and CRYPTO bits should be separated from the bitmask that
we use for hiding the page-access attributes, in the workaround

Signed-off-by: Malgorzata Kukiello <jacek.kukiello@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Oleksiy Yakovlev <oleksiyy@ami.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel (ARM address) <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>

 MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c | 12 ++++++------
 MdePkg/Include/Uefi/UefiSpec.h   |  3 ++-
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2020-10-10  3:35 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-09-24 10:21 [PATCH v2 0/2] UEFI memmap workaround for hiding page-access caps from OSes hides SP and CRYPTO caps too jacek.kukiello
2020-09-24 10:21 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe: expose SP and CRYPTO capabilities in UEFI memmap Malgorzata Kukiello
2020-09-24 10:21 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] MdePkg/UefiSpec: separate page access bitmask from SP and CRYPTO caps Malgorzata Kukiello
2020-09-24 13:04 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 0/2] UEFI memmap workaround for hiding page-access caps from OSes hides SP and CRYPTO caps too Laszlo Ersek
2020-09-25  8:54 ` 回复: " gaoliming
2020-09-28 15:39   ` Malgorzata Kukiello
2020-09-29  1:13     ` 回复: " gaoliming
2020-10-02 12:52       ` Malgorzata Kukiello
     [not found]       ` <163A2DF5FC986A3A.27356@groups.io>
2020-10-09  6:01         ` Malgorzata Kukiello
2020-10-09  9:30           ` 回复: " gaoliming
     [not found]           ` <163C48FE4529CC02.8231@groups.io>
2020-10-10  3:35             ` gaoliming

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