From: "Duran, Leo" <leo.duran@amd.com>
To: 'Jordan Justen' <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"edk2-devel@lists.01.org" <edk2-devel@lists.01.org>
Cc: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>, Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 21:44:49 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DM5PR12MB12436E63CF6CA10C46EA40E7F9D50@DM5PR12MB1243.namprd12.prod.outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149937735857.21467.1917283905856299959@jljusten-skl.jf.intel.com>
Jordan,
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jordan Justen [mailto:jordan.l.justen@intel.com]
> Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 4:43 PM
> To: Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>; edk2-devel@lists.01.org
> Cc: Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>; Lendacky, Thomas
> <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>; Duran, Leo <leo.duran@amd.com>; Jeff
> Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>; Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>; Laszlo Ersek
> <lersek@redhat.com>; Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Michael D
> Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
>
> On 2017-07-06 13:11:03, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 07/06/2017 11:45 AM, Jordan Justen wrote:
> > > On 2017-07-05 15:31:20, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> > >> Hi Jordan and Laszlo,
> > >>
> > >> Ping.
> > >>
> > >> It has been a while, Do you have any further feedbacks on this series ?
> > >> If you want then I can rebase the patches before you commit into
> upstream repos.
> > >>
> > >
> > > I'm still dissappointed by the APRIORI usage.
> > >
> > > As I understand it, you are also dissatisfied with this approach and
> > > you hope to improve things by somehow hooking into DXE Core. Is that
> > > true? If so, can you create a bugzilla regarding this feature? When
> > > would you plan to work to address that?
> > >
> >
> > I think we agree in that this particular use-case has shown the need
> > for re-thinking the existing GCD interface. However, the problem we
> > are trying to solve with this patch-set is enabling the SEV feature.
> > As it turns out, we can do so within the existing GCD framework by simply
> leveraging the APRIORI hook already in use by OvmfPkg.
> >
> > In that context, our proposal is that we limit the scope of this
> > patch-set to simply enabling the SEV feature, and then allow the 'GCD
> > experts' to separately propose updates to the framework.
>
> This sounds like you don't plan to work on this, but will just leave it to the
> 'GCD experts'. Is that right?
>
> I am asking that you file and own a bugzilla for this. You'd obviously need to
> work with the package owners though. Unless you drive this, I don't think
> anyone will be motivated enough to get it fixed.
>
[Duran, Leo]
OK, we will file the BZ... But please don't let that keep you from moving these patches forward.
Thanks! :-).
> -Jordan
>
> >
> > > I guess with that resolved, you could add an Acked-by from me.
> > >
> > > In general, it'd also be nice to move the processor features to more
> > > generic places, although that may be challenging if the next step is
> > > some kind of platform hook from DXE Core. Maybe if the DXE Core
> > > calls out to some protocol or signals an event then a driver in
> > > UefiCpuPkg could handle the protocol implementation to modify the
> page tables.
> > >
> > > -Jordan
> > >
> > >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-06 21:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-26 14:43 [PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 01/17] UefiCpuPkg: Define AMD Memory Encryption specific CPUID and MSR Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 02/17] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Set C-bit when building initial page table Brijesh Singh
2017-06-01 8:09 ` Jordan Justen
2017-06-01 13:43 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 03/17] OvmfPkg: Update dsc to use IoLib from BaseIoLibIntrinsicSev.inf Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 04/17] OvmfPkg/BaseMemcryptSevLib: Add SEV helper library Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 20:54 ` Jordan Justen
2017-05-26 21:06 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-05-27 1:26 ` Yao, Jiewen
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 05/17] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Set memory encryption PCD when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 06/17] OvmfPkg: Add AmdSevDxe driver Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 07/17] OvmfPkg: Introduce IoMmuAbsent Protocol GUID Brijesh Singh
2017-05-29 9:07 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 08/17] OvmfPkg: Add PlatformHasIoMmuLib Brijesh Singh
2017-05-29 9:19 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 09/17] OvmfPkg: Add IoMmuDxe driver Brijesh Singh
2017-05-29 9:28 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 10/17] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Provide Pei and Dxe specific library Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 21:49 ` Jordan Justen
2017-05-26 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 11/17] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Prepare for SEV support Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 12/17] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Implement SEV internal function for SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 13/17] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Implement SEV internal functions for PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 14/17] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Implement SEV internal function for Dxe phase Brijesh Singh
2017-05-29 9:40 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-26 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 15/17] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Add option to dynamic alloc FW_CFG_DMA Access Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 16/17] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Add SEV support Brijesh Singh
2017-05-26 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 17/17] OvmfPkg: update PciHostBridgeDxe to use PlatformHasIoMmuLib Brijesh Singh
2017-05-29 9:47 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-29 12:13 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-26 21:05 ` [PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Jordan Justen
2017-05-29 11:16 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-05-29 20:38 ` Jordan Justen
2017-05-29 21:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-06-01 7:40 ` Jordan Justen
2017-06-01 9:10 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-06-01 13:48 ` Andrew Fish
2017-06-01 14:56 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-06-01 15:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-06-01 15:37 ` Andrew Fish
2017-06-05 21:56 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-06-06 1:12 ` Jordan Justen
2017-06-06 2:08 ` Zeng, Star
2017-06-06 3:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-06-06 14:54 ` Yao, Jiewen
2017-06-06 15:24 ` Andrew Fish
2017-06-06 15:43 ` Yao, Jiewen
2017-06-06 15:54 ` Duran, Leo
2017-06-06 18:39 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-06-06 18:38 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-06-06 18:29 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-06-06 18:57 ` Duran, Leo
2017-07-05 22:31 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-05 23:38 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-06 13:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-06 16:45 ` Jordan Justen
2017-07-06 20:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-06 20:40 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-07-06 21:42 ` Jordan Justen
2017-07-06 21:44 ` Duran, Leo [this message]
2017-07-06 21:46 ` Andrew Fish
2017-07-06 21:49 ` Duran, Leo
2017-07-07 5:28 ` Jordan Justen
2017-07-07 18:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-07 23:10 ` Jordan Justen
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