Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule verification with secure boot keys

["Michael D Kinney" <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>]

Hi Liming Sun,

Thank you for providing the additional details.

The use case description is very brief and appears that it 
may not follow some of the UEFI Specification requirements.
I want to make sure we have a clear understanding of the use
cases with some of the UEFI Secure Boot and Firmware Updates
experts.

We have a TianoCore design meeting that is hosted by Ray Ni.

Can you please work with Ray to get onto the agenda for 
that meeting where you can present your ideas?

Thanks,

Mike

> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On
> Behalf Of Liming Sun
> Sent: Monday, July 6, 2020 1:59 PM
> To: Kinney, Michael D <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>;
> devel@edk2.groups.io; Jiang, Guomin
> <guomin.jiang@intel.com>; Xu, Wei6 <wei6.xu@intel.com>;
> Gao, Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance
> capsule verification with secure boot keys
> 
> Thanks Michael. Below is the use case:
> 
> - Device vendor provides devices with UEFI preinstalled;
> - Customer gets the device in non-secure-boot mode by
> default, and would like to enroll the secure boot keys
> themselves in some automatic way (such as using
> capsule).
> 
> PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr is not used for two
> reasons for this use case:
> 1. Simplicity. So vendor doesn't need to be involved in
> the key management, and customer could create and sign
> the capsule themselves.
> 2. Secure reasons. Once customer fully own the device
> and put it into secure-boot mode, even the capsule from
> the device vendor couldn't be applied without being
> signed by customer. (The hardcoded
> PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr couldn't achieve this
> goal).
> 
> Thanks,
> Liming
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Kinney, Michael D <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> > Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2020 1:43 PM
> > To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Liming Sun
> <lsun@mellanox.com>; Jiang, Guomin
> <guomin.jiang@intel.com>; Xu, Wei6
> > <wei6.xu@intel.com>; Gao, Liming
> <liming.gao@intel.com>; Kinney, Michael D
> <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> > Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
> > Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg:
> Enhance capsule verification with secure boot keys
> >
> > Liming Sun,
> >
> > Can you explain why you cannot use
> PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr
> > for your use case?  I want to understand the use case
> to see if
> > that feature can be applied or if a minor enhancement
> to this
> > feature can work.
> >
> > Using the UEFI Secure Boot DB for anything other than
> authentication
> > of UEFI boot loaders is not recommended.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Mike
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On
> > > Behalf Of Liming Sun
> > > Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2020 9:27 AM
> > > To: Jiang, Guomin <guomin.jiang@intel.com>;
> > > devel@edk2.groups.io; Xu, Wei6 <wei6.xu@intel.com>;
> Gao,
> > > Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>; Kinney, Michael D
> > > <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> > > Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
> > > Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg:
> Enhance
> > > capsule verification with secure boot keys
> > >
> > > >> But if your customer indeed want it, you can add
> it
> > > to your customization code.
> > > Thanks. Yes, this is a behavior customer expects.
> This
> > > change just tries to provide a handy way to enroll
> > > initial keys.
> > > So the initial keys could be carried in the capsule
> > > itself.
> > > It also has "PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootKeys"
> disabled
> > > by default, so it behaves the same as before.
> > >
> > > We'll try to use customization code instead as
> > > suggested.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Liming
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Jiang, Guomin <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
> > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 8:56 PM
> > > > To: Liming Sun <lsun@mellanox.com>;
> > > devel@edk2.groups.io; Xu, Wei6 <wei6.xu@intel.com>;
> Gao,
> > > Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>;
> > > > Kinney, Michael D <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> > > > Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
> > > > Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg:
> > > Enhance capsule verification with secure boot keys
> > > >
> > > > I want to ask your one question: are you sure that
> > > every mother board which deliver to customer will
> enable
> > > the secure boot mode?
> > > >
> > > > I just emphasize that I want to make sure that the
> > > device firmware come from the device vendor.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for your effort, the patch is good, I just
> > > think it is not suitable for common solution.
> > > >
> > > > But if your customer indeed want it, you can add
> it to
> > > your customization code.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks
> > > > Guomin
> > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: Liming Sun <lsun@mellanox.com>
> > > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 8:47 PM
> > > > > To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Jiang, Guomin
> > > <guomin.jiang@intel.com>; Xu,
> > > > > Wei6 <wei6.xu@intel.com>; Gao, Liming
> > > <liming.gao@intel.com>; Kinney,
> > > > > Michael D <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> > > > > Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
> > > > > Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg:
> > > Enhance capsule
> > > > > verification with secure boot keys
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks Guomin.
> > > > >
> > > > > I still have one question. Let's assume we're
> the
> > > device vendor and we let
> > > > > customer to enroll their keys. Once the keys are
> > > enrolled, the device will be
> > > > > in secure boot mode. Are you saying that the end
> > > user could "have the ability
> > > > > to enroll their DB without too many effort" even
> > > after the secure boot has
> > > > > been enabled already?
> > > > >
> > > > > Please correct me if I misunderstood it.
> > > > >
> > > > > - Liming
> > > > >
> > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > From: devel@edk2.groups.io
> <devel@edk2.groups.io>
> > > On Behalf Of
> > > > > Guomin
> > > > > > Jiang via groups.io
> > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 3:33 AM
> > > > > > To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Liming Sun
> > > <lsun@mellanox.com>; Xu, Wei6
> > > > > > <wei6.xu@intel.com>; Gao, Liming
> > > <liming.gao@intel.com>; Kinney,
> > > > > > Michael D <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> > > > > > Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
> > > > > > Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH]
> FmpDevicePkg:
> > > Enhance capsule
> > > > > > verification with secure boot keys
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Liming,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The end user have the ability to enroll their
> DB
> > > without too many effort.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > And I think some end user also have the
> ability to
> > > get insecure firmware
> > > > > which not from the device vendor.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I suggest that tell the device vendor that it
> is
> > > critical that set the
> > > > > PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr rather than
> decrease
> > > the security.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Best Regards
> > > > > > Guomin
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > > From: devel@edk2.groups.io
> > > <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of
> > > > > > > Liming Sun
> > > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 11:33 AM
> > > > > > > To: Jiang, Guomin <guomin.jiang@intel.com>;
> > > devel@edk2.groups.io;
> > > > > > > Xu,
> > > > > > > Wei6 <wei6.xu@intel.com>; Gao, Liming
> > > <liming.gao@intel.com>;
> > > > > > > Kinney, Michael D
> <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> > > > > > > Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
> > > > > > > Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH]
> FmpDevicePkg:
> > > Enhance capsule
> > > > > > > verification with secure boot keys
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Thanks Guomin for the comments!
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Below is the main scenario for the proposed
> > > change:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > - Device Manufacturer provides the devices
> with
> > > UEFI preinstalled in
> > > > > > > non- secure state and no hard-coded keys (
> > > > > PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > - Customer (not End-User) enrolls their own
> keys
> > > in trusted
> > > > > > > environment before delivering to End User.
> > > > > > > This capsule approach can be used for large
> > > deployment without
> > > > > > > involving any private keys.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Yes, I do agree that once it's delivered to
> End
> > > User it won't be
> > > > > > > considered secure.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > > > Liming
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > > > From: Jiang, Guomin
> <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
> > > > > > > > Sent: Sunday, June 28, 2020 11:18 PM
> > > > > > > > To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Liming Sun
> > > <lsun@mellanox.com>; Xu, Wei6
> > > > > > > > <wei6.xu@intel.com>; Gao, Liming
> > > <liming.gao@intel.com>; Kinney,
> > > > > > > > Michael D <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> > > > > > > > Cc: Sean Brogan
> <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
> > > > > > > > Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH]
> > > FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule
> > > > > > > > verification with secure boot keys
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I think it have some vulnerability, the
> case
> > > as below.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > 1. Untrusted End User enroll the new DB
> key ->
> > > sign the untrusted
> > > > > > > > device firmware -> flash the untrusted
> device
> > > firmware -> the
> > > > > > > > system will
> > > > > > > become unsafe.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I think the end user is untrusted and we
> need
> > > to make sure only
> > > > > > > > few person
> > > > > > > can have the privilege.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Best Regards
> > > > > > > > Guomin
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > > > > From: devel@edk2.groups.io
> > > <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of
> > > > > > > > > Liming Sun
> > > > > > > > > Sent: Saturday, June 20, 2020 1:48 AM
> > > > > > > > > To: Xu, Wei6 <wei6.xu@intel.com>; Gao,
> > > Liming
> > > > > > > > > <liming.gao@intel.com>; Kinney, Michael
> D
> > > > > > > > > <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> > > > > > > > > Cc: Liming Sun <lsun@mellanox.com>;
> > > devel@edk2.groups.io; Sean
> > > > > > > > > Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
> > > > > > > > > Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH]
> FmpDevicePkg:
> > > Enhance capsule
> > > > > > > > > verification with secure boot keys
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > This commit enhances the FmpDevicePkg
> > > package to optionally
> > > > > > > > > verify capsule with the secure boot keys
> > > when
> > > > > > > > > PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr is not
> set
> > > and the new PCD
> > > > > > > > > variable PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootKeys
> is
> > > configured. Below is
> > > > > > > > > the check
> > > > > > > logic:
> > > > > > > > >   - Pass if verified with PK key, or PK
> key
> > > not set yet;
> > > > > > > > >   - Deny if verified with the DBX keys;
> > > > > > > > >   - Verified it against the DB keys;
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > One purpose for this change is to auto-
> > > deploy the UEFI secure
> > > > > > > > > boot keys with UEFI capsule. Initially
> it's
> > > done in trusted environment.
> > > > > > > > > Once secure boot is enabled, the same
> keys
> > > will be used to
> > > > > > > > > verify the signed capsules as well for
> > > further updates.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Liming Sun
> > > <lsun@mellanox.com>
> > > > > > > > > ---
> > > > > > > > >  FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec     |   6
> +++
> > > > > > > > >  FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c      | 109
> > > > > > > > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > > > > > > > >  FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h      |   1
> +
> > > > > > > > >  FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf    |   3
> ++
> > > > > > > > >  FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf |   1
> +
> > > > > > > > >  5 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 3
> > > deletions(-)
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > diff --git
> a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec
> > > > > > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec index
> > > cab63f5..3aeb89c 100644
> > > > > > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec
> > > > > > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec
> > > > > > > > > @@ -126,6 +126,12 @@
> > > > > > > > >    # @Prompt Firmware Device Image Type
> ID
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceImageTypeIdGuid|
> > > {0}|VOID
> > > > > > > > > *|0x40000010
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > +  ## This option is used to verify the
> > > capsule using secure
> > > > > > > > > + boot keys if the  #
> > > PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr is not
> > > > > configured.
> > > > > > > > > + In such case, the check  # will pass
> if
> > > secure boot hasn't
> > > > > > > > > + been enabled
> > > > > > > yet.
> > > > > > > > > +  # @A flag to tell whether to use
> secure
> > > boot keys when
> > > > > > > > > PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr is not
> set.
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootK
> > > eys|0x0|
> > > > > > > > > UINT8|
> > > > > > > > > + 0x40000012
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > >  [PcdsFixedAtBuild,
> PcdsPatchableInModule,
> > > PcdsDynamic,
> > > > > > > PcdsDynamicEx]
> > > > > > > > >    ## One or more PKCS7 certificates
> used to
> > > verify a firmware
> > > > > > > > > device
> > > > > > > capsule
> > > > > > > > >    #  update image.  Encoded using the
> > > Variable-Length Opaque
> > > > > > > > > Data format of RFC diff --git
> > > a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c
> > > > > > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c index
> > > 5884177..6f82aee 100644
> > > > > > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c
> > > > > > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c
> > > > > > > > > @@ -682,6 +682,102 @@ GetAllHeaderSize (
> > > > > > > > >    return CalculatedSize;
> > > > > > > > >  }
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > +EFI_STATUS
> > > > > > > > > +CheckTheImageWithSecureBootVariable (
> > > > > > > > > +  IN CONST CHAR16    *Name,
> > > > > > > > > +  IN CONST EFI_GUID  *Guid,
> > > > > > > > > +  IN CONST VOID      *Image,
> > > > > > > > > +  IN UINTN           ImageSize
> > > > > > > > > +  )
> > > > > > > > > +{
> > > > > > > > > +  EFI_STATUS          Status;
> > > > > > > > > +  VOID                *Data;
> > > > > > > > > +  UINTN               Length;
> > > > > > > > > +  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *CertList;
> > > > > > > > > +  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA  *CertData;
> > > > > > > > > +  UINTN               CertCount;
> > > > > > > > > +  UINTN               Index;
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +  Status = GetVariable2 (Name, Guid,
> &Data,
> > > &Length);  if
> > > > > > > > > + (EFI_ERROR
> > > > > > > > > + (Status)) {
> > > > > > > > > +    return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
> > > > > > > > > +  }
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +  CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)
> Data;
> > > while ((Length > 0)
> > > > > > > > > + && (Length >= CertList-
> > > >SignatureListSize)) {
> > > > > > > > > +    if (CompareGuid (&CertList-
> > > >SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid))
> > > > > {
> > > > > > > > > +      CertData  = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
> *)
> > > ((UINT8 *) CertList +
> > > > > > > > > +        sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) +
> > > CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
> > > > > > > > > +      CertCount = (CertList-
> > > >SignatureListSize - sizeof
> > > > > > > > > + (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
> > > > > > > -
> > > > > > > > > +        CertList->SignatureHeaderSize)
> /
> > > > > > > > > + CertList->SignatureSize;
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +      for (Index = 0; Index <
> CertCount;
> > > Index++) {
> > > > > > > > > +        Status = AuthenticateFmpImage (
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > (EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_AUTHENTICATION *)Image,
> > > > > > > > > +                   ImageSize,
> > > > > > > > > +                   CertData-
> >SignatureData,
> > > > > > > > > +                   CertList-
> >SignatureSize
> > > - sizeof (EFI_GUID)
> > > > > > > > > +                   );
> > > > > > > > > +        if (!EFI_ERROR (Status))
> > > > > > > > > +          goto Done;
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +        CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
> *)
> > > ((UINT8 *) CertData +
> > > > > > > > > + CertList-
> > > > > > > > > >SignatureSize);
> > > > > > > > > +      }
> > > > > > > > > +    }
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +    Length -= CertList-
> >SignatureListSize;
> > > > > > > > > +    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)
> > > ((UINT8 *) CertList +
> > > > > > > > > + CertList->SignatureListSize);  }
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +Done:
> > > > > > > > > +  FreePool (Data);
> > > > > > > > > +  return Status;
> > > > > > > > > +}
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +EFI_STATUS
> > > > > > > > > +CheckTheImageWithSecureBootKeys (
> > > > > > > > > +  IN  CONST VOID  *Image,
> > > > > > > > > +  IN  UINTN       ImageSize
> > > > > > > > > +  )
> > > > > > > > > +{
> > > > > > > > > +  EFI_STATUS  Status;
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +  // PK check.
> > > > > > > > > +  Status =
> > > CheckTheImageWithSecureBootVariable(
> > > > > > > > > +             EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
> > > > > > > > > +             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
> > > > > > > > > +             Image,
> > > > > > > > > +             ImageSize
> > > > > > > > > +             );
> > > > > > > > > +  if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) || Status ==
> > > EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
> > > > > > > > > +    // Return SUCCESS if verified by PK
> key
> > > or PK key not configured.
> > > > > > > > > +    DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpDxe:
> Verified
> > > capsule with PK
> > > > > key.\n"));
> > > > > > > > > +    return EFI_SUCCESS;
> > > > > > > > > +  }
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +  // DBX check.
> > > > > > > > > +  Status =
> > > CheckTheImageWithSecureBootVariable(
> > > > > > > > > +
> EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
> > > > > > > > > +             Image,
> > > > > > > > > +             ImageSize
> > > > > > > > > +             );
> > > > > > > > > +  if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > > > > > > > > +    DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpDxe: Reject
> > > capsule with DBX
> > > > > key.\n"));
> > > > > > > > > +    return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;  }
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +  // DB check.
> > > > > > > > > +  DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpDxe: Verify
> > > capsule with DB
> > > > > > > > > +key.\n"));
> > > > > > > > > +  Status =
> > > CheckTheImageWithSecureBootVariable(
> > > > > > > > > +
> EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
> > > > > > > > > +             Image,
> > > > > > > > > +             ImageSize
> > > > > > > > > +             );
> > > > > > > > > +  return Status;
> > > > > > > > > +}
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > >  /**
> > > > > > > > >    Checks if the firmware image is valid
> for
> > > the device.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > @@ -728,6 +824,7 @@ CheckTheImage (
> > > > > > > > >    UINT8
> > > *PublicKeyDataXdrEnd;
> > > > > > > > >    EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_DEP
> > > *Dependencies;
> > > > > > > > >    UINT32
> > > DependenciesSize;
> > > > > > > > > +  UINT8
> > > AllowSecureBootKeys;
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >    Status           = EFI_SUCCESS;
> > > > > > > > >    RawSize          = 0;
> > > > > > > > > @@ -782,9 +879,15 @@ CheckTheImage (
> > > > > > > > >    PublicKeyDataXdr    = PcdGetPtr
> > > > > (PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr);
> > > > > > > > >    PublicKeyDataXdrEnd =
> PublicKeyDataXdr +
> > > PcdGetSize
> > > > > > > > > (PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr);
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > -  if (PublicKeyDataXdr == NULL ||
> > > (PublicKeyDataXdr ==
> > > > > > > > > PublicKeyDataXdrEnd)) {
> > > > > > > > > -    DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FmpDxe(%s):
> > > Invalid certificate, skipping
> > > > > it.\n",
> > > > > > > > > mImageIdName));
> > > > > > > > > -    Status = EFI_ABORTED;
> > > > > > > > > +  if (PublicKeyDataXdr == NULL ||
> > > (PublicKeyDataXdrEnd -
> > > > > > > > > + PublicKeyDataXdr
> > > > > > > > > < sizeof (UINT32))) {
> > > > > > > > > +    AllowSecureBootKeys = PcdGet8
> > > > > > > (PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootKeys);
> > > > > > > > > +    if (AllowSecureBootKeys) {
> > > > > > > > > +      DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpDxe: Use
> > > secure boot certs.\n"));
> > > > > > > > > +      Status =
> > > CheckTheImageWithSecureBootKeys (Image,
> > > > > ImageSize);
> > > > > > > > > +    } else {
> > > > > > > > > +      DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FmpDxe(%s):
> > > Invalid certificate,
> > > > > > > > > + skipping
> > > > > > > > > it.\n", mImageIdName));
> > > > > > > > > +      Status = EFI_ABORTED;
> > > > > > > > > +    }
> > > > > > > > >    } else {
> > > > > > > > >      //
> > > > > > > > >      // Try each key from
> > > PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr diff
> > > > > > > > > --git a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h
> > > > > > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h
> > > > > > > index
> > > > > > > > > 30754de..72a6ce6 100644
> > > > > > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h
> > > > > > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h
> > > > > > > > > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> > > > > > > > >  #include
> <Protocol/FirmwareManagement.h>
> > > #include
> > > > > > > > > <Protocol/FirmwareManagementProgress.h>
> > > > > > > > >  #include <Protocol/VariableLock.h>
> > > > > > > > > +#include <Guid/ImageAuthentication.h>
> > > > > > > > >  #include <Guid/SystemResourceTable.h>
> > > #include
> > > > > > > > > <Guid/EventGroup.h>
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > diff --git
> a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf
> > > > > > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf index
> > > eeb904a..60b02d4
> > > > > 100644
> > > > > > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf
> > > > > > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf
> > > > > > > > > @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >  [Guids]
> > > > > > > > >    gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid
> > > > > > > > > +  gEfiCertX509Guid
> > > > > > > > > +  gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >  [Protocols]
> > > > > > > > >    gEdkiiVariableLockProtocolGuid
> > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > > > > > @@ -74,6 +76,7 @@
> > > > > > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferX
> > > dr
> > > > > > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceTestKeySha256Dig
> > > est
> > > > > > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceImageTypeIdGuid
> > > > > > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootK
> > > eys
> > > > > > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > > > > >
> > > gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTestKeyUsed
> > > > > ##
> > > > > > > > > SOMETIMES_PRODUCES
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >  [Depex]
> > > > > > > > > diff --git
> > > a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf
> > > > > > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf
> > > > > > > > > index 9a93b5e..1308cae 100644
> > > > > > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf
> > > > > > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf
> > > > > > > > > @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
> > > > > > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferX
> > > dr
> > > > > > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceTestKeySha256Dig
> > > est
> > > > > > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceImageTypeIdGuid
> > > > > > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootK
> > > eys
> > > > > > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > > > > >
> > > gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTestKeyUsed
> > > > > ##
> > > > > > > > > SOMETIMES_PRODUCES
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >  [Depex]
> > > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > > > 1.8.3.1
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> 
> 
>