From: "Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
To: "devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
"jejb@linux.ibm.com" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: "Xu, Min M" <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
"Justen, Jordan L" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH V3 15/29] OvmfPkg: Update SecEntry.nasm to support Tdx
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 14:59:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <MW4PR11MB587200F24A8FE043D47CA0E68C619@MW4PR11MB5872.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a25cc4f359abe727a30e1f3316db4ed032ce925f.camel@linux.ibm.com>
OK. Got it.
Let me explain it in more detail.
Let's assume PEI phase include 3 major classes {PEI Core, PEI Arch PEM*, Feature X*}. * means 0~multiple.
To all of us what really matter is Feature X, the existence of PEI Core + PEI Arch PEIM* is to support Feature X*.
From architecture perspective, if a platform is complex (e.g. there are lots of Feature X*) and feature X* have lots of inter-dependency, then PEI is a good place to coordinate the Feature X*. (Example, Feature X* are memory init and silicon init)
But if a platform simple (e.g. there is only few Feature X*) and feature X* have no much dependency, the including PEI does not bring too much value. That is why you see multiple platforms in EDKII does not include PEI.
From security perspective, Feature X* shall always perform check, no matter where the feature X sits in SEC, PEI or DXE. The risk of Feature X always exists, no matter where the feature X sits in SEC, PEI or DXE. I completely agree.
At same time, the PEI Core + PEI Arch PEIM* also bring unknown security risk. That was TRUE in history. It did happen. So my motivation to remove PEI phase is to reduce the risk introduced by PEI Core + PEI Arch PEIM*. Again, I do not mean to reduce the risk introduced by Feature X.
Now it seems we are really debating two things: (please correct me if I am wrong)
1) What is risk introduced by PEI Core + PEI Arch PEIM* ?
2) What is the delta of risk by moving Feature X from PEI to other place (SEC or DXE) ?
For 1), my answer is that the risk is definitely bigger than zero, based upon history data. (This is an objective answer.) That is the main of my motivation to make it become zero by removing PEI.
For 2), my answer is that the delta is almost 0, based upon my experience. (I admit this is a subjective answer, because I cannot prove.). We are trying our best to reduce the risk of the Feature A* as well. Assuming delta of risk <= risk, then it will become very smaller.
So, my judgement is by removing PEI, we can reduce the risk introduce by PEI Core + PEI Arch PEIM*. Reducing code == Reducing Security Risk.
Also, this gives us a chance to focus on reviewing Feature X itself, instead of the complex interaction with PEI Core + PEI Arch PEIM*. Reducing complexity == Reducing Security Risk.
(In history, we got lots of complain on the complexity of the non-deterministic flow by CALLBACK and NOTIFY function in Core. A feature developer might not have idea on when the code will be called, and what the system status is at that moment.)
Thank you
Yao Jiewen
> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of James
> Bottomley
> Sent: Wednesday, November 24, 2021 10:07 PM
> To: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io; Gerd
> Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
> Cc: Xu, Min M <min.m.xu@intel.com>; Ard Biesheuvel
> <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>;
> Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>; Erdem Aktas
> <erdemaktas@google.com>; Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH V3 15/29] OvmfPkg: Update SecEntry.nasm to
> support Tdx
>
> On Wed, 2021-11-24 at 14:03 +0000, Yao, Jiewen wrote:
> > James
> > I am sorry that it is hard for me to understand your point.
> >
> > To be honest, I am not sure what is objective on the discussion.
> > Are you question the general threat model analysis on UEFI PI
> > architecture?
>
> The object is for me to understand why you think eliminating PEI
> improves security because I think it moves it in the opposite
> direction.
>
> > Or are you trying to persuade me we should include PEI in TDVF,
> > because you think it is safer to add code in PEI ?
> > Or something else?
> >
> > Please enlighten me that.
>
> Somewhere a decision was taken to remove PEI from the OVMF that is used
> to bring up TDX on the grounds of "improving security". I'm struggling
> to understand the rationale for this.
>
> James
>
>
>
>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-24 15:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-01 13:15 [PATCH V3 00/29] Enable Intel TDX in OvmfPkg (Config-A) Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 01/29] MdePkg: Add Tdx.h Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 02/29] MdePkg: Add TdxLib to wrap Tdx operations Min Xu
2021-11-02 14:06 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-10 4:58 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-11-10 10:38 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-11-12 2:38 ` Min Xu
2021-11-12 2:42 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-12 5:29 ` Min Xu
2021-11-12 5:33 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 03/29] UefiCpuPkg: Extend VmgExitLibNull to handle #VE exception Min Xu
2021-11-02 14:11 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 04/29] OvmfPkg: Extend VmgExitLib " Min Xu
2021-11-02 14:23 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-10 6:46 ` Min Xu
2021-11-17 0:32 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 05/29] UefiCpuPkg/CpuExceptionHandler: Add base support for the " Min Xu
2021-11-02 14:24 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 06/29] MdePkg: Add helper functions for Tdx guest in BaseIoLibIntrinsic Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 07/29] MdePkg: Support mmio " Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 08/29] MdePkg: Support IoFifo " Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 09/29] MdePkg: Support IoRead/IoWrite " Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:15 ` [PATCH V3 10/29] UefiPayloadPkg: PreparePrepare UefiPayloadPkg to use TdxLib Min Xu
2021-11-01 15:31 ` Guo Dong
2021-11-01 15:58 ` Ma, Maurice
2021-11-02 0:07 ` Min Xu
2021-11-02 14:32 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 11/29] UefiCpuPkg: Support TDX in BaseXApicX2ApicLib Min Xu
2021-11-02 14:33 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 12/29] UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Min Xu
2021-11-02 14:36 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-03 8:32 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 13/29] MdePkg: Add macro to check SEV/TDX guest Min Xu
2021-11-02 14:36 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 14/29] UefiCpuPkg: Enable Tdx support in MpInitLib Min Xu
2021-11-03 6:09 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-03 12:57 ` Min Xu
2021-11-04 8:10 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-04 15:21 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-11-04 23:24 ` Min Xu
2021-11-05 6:46 ` [edk2-devel] " Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-05 6:53 ` Min Xu
2021-11-09 2:44 ` Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 15/29] OvmfPkg: Update SecEntry.nasm to support Tdx Min Xu
2021-11-03 6:30 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-16 12:11 ` Min Xu
2021-11-17 15:19 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-18 9:59 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-19 15:11 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-20 3:18 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-23 12:38 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-23 13:07 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-23 14:26 ` James Bottomley
2021-11-23 14:36 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-23 14:51 ` James Bottomley
2021-11-23 15:10 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-23 15:37 ` [edk2-devel] " James Bottomley
2021-11-24 3:15 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-24 8:12 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-24 11:08 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-24 13:35 ` James Bottomley
2021-11-24 14:03 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-24 14:07 ` James Bottomley
2021-11-24 14:59 ` Yao, Jiewen [this message]
2021-11-25 8:32 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-26 6:29 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-12-01 13:55 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-12-02 13:22 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-12-06 14:57 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-12-07 2:28 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-12-07 8:04 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-12-08 5:13 ` Min Xu
[not found] ` <16BA8381113E7B1B.22735@groups.io>
2021-11-24 15:30 ` Yao, Jiewen
[not found] ` <16BA5D1709524394.9880@groups.io>
2021-11-24 3:21 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 16/29] OvmfPkg: Add IntelTdx.h in OvmfPkg/Include/IndustryStandard Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 17/29] OvmfPkg: Add TdxMailboxLib Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 18/29] MdePkg: Add EFI_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTE_ENCRYPTED in PiHob.h Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 19/29] OvmfPkg: Enable Tdx in SecMain.c Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 20/29] OvmfPkg: Check Tdx in QemuFwCfgPei to avoid DMA operation Min Xu
2021-11-03 6:50 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-03 13:07 ` Min Xu
2021-11-03 13:35 ` Min Xu
2021-11-04 14:36 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 21/29] MdeModulePkg: EFER should not be changed in TDX Min Xu
2021-11-03 6:51 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 22/29] MdeModulePkg: Set shared bit in Mmio region for Tdx guest Min Xu
2021-11-03 6:57 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-04 7:03 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 23/29] UefiCpuPkg: Update AddressEncMask in CpuPageTable Min Xu
2021-11-03 7:00 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-22 3:09 ` [edk2-devel] " Ni, Ray
2021-12-07 3:50 ` Min Xu
2021-12-07 7:15 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 24/29] OvmfPkg: Update PlatformPei to support TDX Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 25/29] OvmfPkg: Update AcpiPlatformDxe to alter MADT table Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 26/29] OvmfPkg: Add TdxDxe driver Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 27/29] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptTdxLib: Add TDX helper library Min Xu
2021-11-03 7:10 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-12-08 8:37 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 28/29] OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: Support Tdx in QemuFwCfgDxe Min Xu
2021-11-03 7:12 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-12-13 2:06 ` Min Xu
2021-11-01 13:16 ` [PATCH V3 29/29] OvmfPkg: Update IoMmuDxe to support TDX Min Xu
2021-11-03 7:17 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-12-13 2:39 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-12-13 6:42 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-12-13 7:33 ` Min Xu
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