Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v13 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support

["Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>]

Thanks to remind me.

Yes, I am waiting for hard freeze extend finish last week.

I will merge soon.



> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of Brijesh
> Singh via groups.io
> Sent: Monday, December 6, 2021 11:12 PM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com; James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M
> <min.m.xu@intel.com>; Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky
> <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>;
> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas
> <erdemaktas@google.com>; Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>; Gerd
> Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>; Kinney, Michael D
> <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>; Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>; Liu,
> Zhiguang <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>; Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com>; Kumar, Rahul1
> <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>; Dong, Eric <eric.dong@intel.com>
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v13 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging
> (SEV-SNP) support
> 
> Hi Gerd and Jiewen,
> 
> Now that all the patches are ack'ed by Ray, can we plan to merge this
> series ?
> 
> -Brijesh
> 
> 
> On 11/12/21 11:39 AM, Brijesh Singh via groups.io wrote:
> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Hi Ray,
> >
> > Thanks for your reviews and continuous support; I have updated a couple of
> patches
> > to address your comment. As I said in my previous reply, I will working on a
> > follow-up series to group some of those Sev specific variables in CpuData.
> >
> > I hope that is okay with you.
> >
> > thanks
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
> >
> > SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
> > new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
> integrity
> > protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
> > replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
> > encryption environment.
> >
> > This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP
> > VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-
> SNP
> > such as interrupt protection.
> >
> > Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
> > structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP
> > VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the
> > guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to
> > guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE
> > instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request
> NAE"
> > defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page
> > from the RMP table.
> >
> > Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated,
> > as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two
> > approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and
> > Lazy Validation.
> >
> > Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under
> > lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a
> > unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception
> > handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of
> > the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The
> > recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate
> the
> > unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS.
> >
> > At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the available
> > system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is
> validated
> > before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
> >
> > Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP
> > guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the
> > SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted.
> >
> > Additional resources
> > ---------------------
> > SEV-SNP whitepaper
> > https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-
> isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
> >
> > APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section
> 15.36)
> >
> > The complete source is available at
> > https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/snp-v13
> >
> > GHCB spec:
> > https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
> >
> > SEV-SNP firmware specification:
> > https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
> >
> > Change since v12:
> >   * MpLib: Add comment to clarify that SEV-SNP enabled implicitly means SEV
> and SEV-ES are active.
> >   * MpLib: Move the extended topology initialization in AmdSev.c
> >
> > Change since v11:
> >   * rebase to the latest
> >   * fix the UefiCpuPkg PCD definition patch header.
> >
> > Change since v10:
> >   * fix 'unresolved external symbol __allshl' link error when building I32 for
> VS2017.
> >
> > Changes since v9:
> >   * Move CCAttrs Pcd define in MdePkg
> >   * Add comment to indicate that allocating the identity map PT is temporary
> until we get lazy validation
> >
> > Changes since v8:
> >   * drop the generic metadata and make it specific to SEV.
> >
> > Changes since v7:
> >   * Move SEV specific changes in MpLib in AmdSev file
> >   * Update the GHCB register function to not restore the GHCB MSR because
> >     we were already in the MSR protocol mode.
> >   * Drop the SNP name from PcdSnpSecPreValidate.
> >   * Add new section for GHCB memory in the OVMF metadata.
> >
> > Change since v6:
> >   * Drop the SNP boot block GUID and switch to using the Metadata guided
> structure
> >     proposed by Min in TDX series.
> >   * Exclude the GHCB page from the pre-validated region. It simplifies the reset
> >     vector code where we do not need to unvalidate the GHCB page.
> >   * Now that GHCB page is not validated so move the VMPL check from reset
> vector
> >     code to the MemEncryptSevLib on the first page validation.
> >   * Introduce the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD to communicate which
> >     memory encryption is active so that MpInitLib can make use of it.
> >   * Drop the SEVES specific PCD as the information can be communicated via
> >     the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.
> >   * Move the SNP specific AP creation function in AmdSev.c.
> >   * Define the SNP Blob GUID in a new file.
> >
> > Change since v5:
> >   * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page
> >   * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c
> >   * Rebase to the latest code
> >   * Add the review feedback from Yao.
> >
> > Change since v4:
> >   * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS
> >   * Add VMPL-0 check
> >
> > Change since v3:
> >   * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to
> keep
> >     the code readable.
> >   * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state.
> >   * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB GPA.
> >   * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the
> >     AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it.
> >   * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets.
> >
> > Changes since v2:
> >   * Add support for the AP creation.
> >   * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for
> PCI reads.
> >   * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
> >   *
> > Changes since v1:
> >   * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
> >   * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
> >   * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is
> supported.
> >   * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from
> MMIO ranges.
> >   * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
> >   * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location
> through
> >     EFI configuration table.
> >
> > Brijesh Singh (28):
> >    OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
> >    UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
> >    OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain
> >    OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use
> >    OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page
> >    OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page
> >    OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase
> >    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
> >    OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
> >    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
> >    OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
> >    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
> >    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0
> >    OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
> >    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
> >      phase
> >    OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
> >    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
> >    MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr
> >    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is
> >      active
> >    UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV
> >      status
> >    UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures
> >    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD
> >    MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
> >    UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
> >      enabled
> >    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table
> >    OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
> >    OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
> >    OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
> >      table
> >
> > Michael Roth (3):
> >    OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
> >    OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
> >    UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check
> >
> > Tom Lendacky (1):
> >    UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
> >
> >   MdePkg/MdePkg.dec                             |   4 +
> >   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |  19 +
> >   UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec                     |   5 +
> >   OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc                  |   8 +-
> >   OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc                    |   5 +-
> >   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc                       |   4 +
> >   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc                    |   9 +-
> >   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |   8 +-
> >   OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc                           |   5 +-
> >   OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                        |   6 +
> >   OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf               |   7 +
> >   .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
> >   .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   7 +
> >   .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
> >   OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf  |   2 +
> >   OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf     |   3 +
> >   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf           |   7 +
> >   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf           |   5 +
> >   OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf                       |   4 +
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
> >   .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h  |  25 +
> >   MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h            |   2 +-
> >   .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h    |  33 ++
> >   OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h    |  26 +
> >   .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h                  |  36 ++
> >   .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h  |  24 +
> >   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h                |   5 +
> >   OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h                          |  95 ++++
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h          | 103 ++++
> >   OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c                 |  23 +
> >   .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
> >   .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c                   |  17 +
> >   .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
> >   .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  19 +
> >   .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  40 ++
> >   .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c                 | 167 ++++++-
> >   .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c             | 127 +++++
> >   .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  82 ++++
> >   .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c          | 294 ++++++++++++
> >   OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444 ++++++++++++++++-
> -
> >   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c                  | 231 +++++++++
> >   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c               |   2 +
> >   OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c                          | 298 ++++++++++++
> >   OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c                         | 158 +------
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c         | 260 ++++++++++
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c       |  16 +-
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c    |  70 +++
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c          | 347 +++++---------
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c       |   4 +-
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c     | 261 ++++++++++
> >   OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc       |   5 +
> >   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm  |  14 +
> >   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm           |  86 +++-
> >   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb         |  18 +
> >   OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm   |  74 +++
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc        |   2 +
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm  | 200 ++++++++
> >   UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 100 +---
> >   59 files changed, 3360 insertions(+), 528 deletions(-)
> >   create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h
> >   create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h
> >   create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
> >   create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
> >   create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
> >   create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
> >   create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
> >   create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
> >   create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
> >   create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c
> >   create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c
> >   create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c
> >   create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
> >   create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm
> >
> 
> 
> 
>