Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support

["Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>]

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Ok, then we have to wait.
Please aware that we are in the code freeze state. We may have to check in after WW50.

I would prefer to submit small patch set if possible. It is easy to get it reviewed and merged.
A large patch set is hard to review. Usually it takes longer time (not linear).

Thank you
Yao Jiewen

From: Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Sent: Monday, November 8, 2021 10:50 AM
To: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M <min.m.xu@intel.com>; Lendacky, Thomas <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>; Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>; Roth, Michael <Michael.Roth@amd.com>; Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>; Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com>; Kumar, Rahul1 <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support


[AMD Official Use Only]

Without UefiCpuPkg we will have a broken SNP support and I would prefer not to commit a broken SEV-SNP support. The UefiCpuPkg is required for the multiple CPU boot and based all the feedback we have added a new ConfidentialCompting PCD that is set and used for OVMF. Splitting all that support is much more work for no reason.

I will wait couple of more days to see if UefiCpuPkg maintainer reply otherwise I will go ahead and send v12 with the rebased.

thanks,
Brijesh
________________________________
From: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com<mailto:jiewen.yao@intel.com>>
Sent: Sunday, November 7, 2021 8:14 PM
To: Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com<mailto:brijesh.singh@amd.com>>; devel@edk2.groups.io<mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io> <devel@edk2.groups.io<mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io>>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com<mailto:jejb@linux.ibm.com>>; Xu, Min M <min.m.xu@intel.com<mailto:min.m.xu@intel.com>>; Lendacky, Thomas <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com<mailto:Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com<mailto:jordan.l.justen@intel.com>>; Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org<mailto:ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>>; Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com<mailto:erdemaktas@google.com>>; Roth, Michael <Michael.Roth@amd.com<mailto:Michael.Roth@amd.com>>; Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com<mailto:kraxel@redhat.com>>; Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com<mailto:ray.ni@intel.com>>; Kumar, Rahul1 <rahul1.kumar@intel.com<mailto:rahul1.kumar@intel.com>>; Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com<mailto:jiewen.yao@intel.com>>
Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support


[AMD Official Use Only]


I recommend you split the patch set to OvmfPkg update and UefiPkg update, unless there is strong reason that you have to mix them together.



With that, I can merge the OvmfPkg at first and we can move forward there, while waiting UefiPkg review.



If you agree, please rebase and resubmit.



Thank you

Yao Jiewen



From: Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com<mailto:brijesh.singh@amd.com>>
Sent: Monday, November 8, 2021 10:11 AM
To: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com<mailto:jiewen.yao@intel.com>>; devel@edk2.groups.io<mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io>; Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com<mailto:brijesh.singh@amd.com>>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com<mailto:jejb@linux.ibm.com>>; Xu, Min M <min.m.xu@intel.com<mailto:min.m.xu@intel.com>>; Lendacky, Thomas <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com<mailto:Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com<mailto:jordan.l.justen@intel.com>>; Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org<mailto:ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>>; Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com<mailto:erdemaktas@google.com>>; Roth, Michael <Michael.Roth@amd.com<mailto:Michael.Roth@amd.com>>; Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com<mailto:kraxel@redhat.com>>; Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com<mailto:ray.ni@intel.com>>; Kumar, Rahul1 <rahul1.kumar@intel.com<mailto:rahul1.kumar@intel.com>>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support



[AMD Official Use Only]



Hi,



I am not getting any response from the UefiCpuPkg maintainers,  I am not sure if the Ray/Rahul are on vacation or need more information.



Jiewen and Gerd,



Any recommendations how we proceed further ? I can send the rebased version and we can go ahead and commit it. If UefiCpuPkg maintainer does not like something, then I am always happy to rework the stuff after the commit. I would like to send some cleanup patches post SNP series that will simplify some of the MemEncryptIs{Sev,Es,Snp}Enabled() based on our recent workarea patches. It will also help/align with the TDX series.



-Brijesh

________________________________

From: devel@edk2.groups.io<mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io> <devel@edk2.groups.io<mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io>> on behalf of Brijesh Singh via groups.io <brijesh.singh=amd.com@groups.io<mailto:brijesh.singh=amd.com@groups.io>>
Sent: Sunday, October 31, 2021 4:40 PM
To: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com<mailto:jiewen.yao@intel.com>>; devel@edk2.groups.io<mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io> <devel@edk2.groups.io<mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io>>
Cc: Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com<mailto:brijesh.singh@amd.com>>; James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com<mailto:jejb@linux.ibm.com>>; Xu, Min M <min.m.xu@intel.com<mailto:min.m.xu@intel.com>>; Lendacky, Thomas <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com<mailto:Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com<mailto:jordan.l.justen@intel.com>>; Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org<mailto:ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>>; Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com<mailto:erdemaktas@google.com>>; Roth, Michael <Michael.Roth@amd.com<mailto:Michael.Roth@amd.com>>; Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com<mailto:kraxel@redhat.com>>; Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com<mailto:ray.ni@intel.com>>; Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com<mailto:rahul1.kumar@intel.com>>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support



Hi Ray and Rahul,

Gentle ping. Could you please Ack or R-b the files touched in UefiCpuPkg?

-Brijesh

On 10/29/21 9:52 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Hi Jiewen,
>
> I have not heard anything back from UefiCpuPkg maintainer yet, I will
> send another gentle ping on Monday again and hope maintainer get to it.
>
> -Brijesh
>
> On 10/29/21 7:26 AM, Yao, Jiewen wrote:
>> Hi Brijesh
>> Have you got R-B from UefiCpuPkg maintainer?
>>
>>
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com<mailto:brijesh.singh@amd.com>>
>>> Sent: Monday, October 25, 2021 7:54 AM
>>> To: devel@edk2.groups.io<mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io>; Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com<mailto:jiewen.yao@intel.com>>
>>> Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com<mailto:brijesh.singh@amd.com>; James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com<mailto:jejb@linux.ibm.com>>; Xu, Min M
>>> <min.m.xu@intel.com<mailto:min.m.xu@intel.com>>; Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com<mailto:thomas.lendacky@amd.com>>; Justen,
>>> Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com<mailto:jordan.l.justen@intel.com>>; Ard Biesheuvel
>>> <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org<mailto:ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>>; Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com<mailto:erdemaktas@google.com>>;
>>> Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com<mailto:Michael.Roth@amd.com>>; Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com<mailto:kraxel@redhat.com>>
>>> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging
>>> (SEV-SNP) support
>>>
>>> Thank Jiewen,
>>>
>>> I have ping'ed UefiCpuPkg maintainer (Ray and Rahul) on every patch
>>> which touches the UefiCpuPkg. If maintainer wants me to rework on
>>> something then I will work accordingly. If they are okay with v11 then
>>> now the merge will create a conflict (due to the TDX patches merge
>>> commit). I have rebased my series to the recent master and have pushed
>>> it here: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsnp-v12&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C400c84b654c6423f739e08d99cb72382%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637713132658929026%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=loCp%2FptHiWgvAtdp6zjDH5jDeq9mKLYBwedNU%2FT0IzM%3D&amp;reserved=0<https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsnp-v12&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C121a81b63d67432f4f4308d9a25d7196%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637719344491939561%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=7A8wWodTpqzhAkuY4CX0azGn1iFwBhBWGq7OGXONE2s%3D&reserved=0>. I can post the
>>> series if you prefer it.
>>>
>>> thanks
>>>
>>> On 10/23/21 8:46 PM, Yao, Jiewen via groups.io wrote:
>>>> Yes. I will try my best to merge.
>>>>
>>>> I checked the patch set but I did not find the "R-B" from UefiCpuPkg
>>> maintainer. Neither from email nor from you v11.
>>>> Did I miss something?
>>>>
>>>> Thank you
>>>> Yao Jiewen
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com<mailto:brijesh.singh@amd.com>>
>>>>> Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2021 12:13 PM
>>>>> To: devel@edk2.groups.io<mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io>
>>>>> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com<mailto:jejb@linux.ibm.com>>; Xu, Min M
>>> <min.m.xu@intel.com<mailto:min.m.xu@intel.com>>;
>>>>> Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com<mailto:jiewen.yao@intel.com>>; Tom Lendacky
>>>>> <thomas.lendacky@amd.com<mailto:thomas.lendacky@amd.com>>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com<mailto:jordan.l.justen@intel.com>>;
>>>>> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org<mailto:ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>>; Erdem Aktas
>>>>> <erdemaktas@google.com<mailto:erdemaktas@google.com>>; Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com<mailto:Michael.Roth@amd.com>>; Gerd
>>>>> Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com<mailto:kraxel@redhat.com>>; Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com<mailto:brijesh.singh@amd.com>>
>>>>> Subject: [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP)
>>> support
>>>>> Hi Gerd and Jiewen,
>>>>>
>>>>> CI was a bit unstable during my v10 submission, so, I was not able to
>>>>> run it to the completion. Finally, I managed to get the CI going,
>>>>> and it reported few Windows 32-bit build errors. The v11 fixes those build
>>>>> errors. Please consider this for the merge.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thank you so much for all your support in reviewing the series.
>>>>>
>>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> BZ:
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.
>>> tianocore.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D3275&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.
>>> singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe488
>>> 4e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7
>>> CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJ
>>> XVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=L41krO6G221HaIsG92FloIzgCDqMLAAsU26
>>> jaEMF7yw%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>>> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
>>>>> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
>>>>> integrity
>>>>> protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
>>>>> replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
>>>>> encryption environment.
>>>>>
>>>>> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP
>>>>> VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-
>>> SNP
>>>>> such as interrupt protection.
>>>>>
>>>>> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
>>>>> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP
>>>>> VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the
>>>>> guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to
>>>>> guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE
>>>>> instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request
>>>>> NAE"
>>>>> defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page
>>>>> from the RMP table.
>>>>>
>>>>> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated,
>>>>> as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two
>>>>> approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and
>>>>> Lazy Validation.
>>>>>
>>>>> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under
>>>>> lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a
>>>>> unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception
>>>>> handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of
>>>>> the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The
>>>>> recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate
>>>>> the
>>>>> unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS.
>>>>>
>>>>> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the
>>> available
>>>>> system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is
>>> validated
>>>>> before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP
>>>>> guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the
>>>>> SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted.
>>>>>
>>>>> Additional resources
>>>>> ---------------------
>>>>> SEV-SNP whitepaper
>>>>>
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C400c84b654c6423f739e08d99cb72382%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637713132658929026%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=WznkScyKwwPKfde08y%2Fb1KTmUgVt2al9%2Bupz%2FATGOHE%3D&amp;reserved=0<https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C121a81b63d67432f4f4308d9a25d7196%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637719344491939561%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=h1CiKDel8H6ano%2FVrlAZ9WEhkCm0BUCPoCkveTzb79U%3D&reserved=0>
>>> md.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2FSEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-
>>> &amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da
>>> 08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C63770
>>> 6369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQ
>>> IjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=nVMSG%
>>> 2FvSS2Wa21lu1lGrHr9OYX8hL7FoAcQXBBiCztc%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>>> isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
>>>>>
>>>>> APM 2:
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C400c84b654c6423f739e08d99cb72382%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637713132658929026%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=WznkScyKwwPKfde08y%2Fb1KTmUgVt2al9%2Bupz%2FATGOHE%3D&amp;reserved=0<https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C121a81b63d67432f4f4308d9a25d7196%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637719344491949556%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=8ytCyaqJ2c0tiAztzR2%2FtxRdiB%2BfbYgl0fIGRxR8vrE%3D&reserved=0>
>>> md.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F24593.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7
>>> Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8
>>> 961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnk
>>> nown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1h
>>> aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=G8Xg2glOGY2EjHpeQ3WM4gZCh
>>> uI0k8QcLDTbpJiTplg%3D&amp;reserved=0 (section 15.36)
>>>>> The complete source is available at
>>>>>
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.c%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C400c84b654c6423f739e08d99cb72382%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637713132658929026%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=Wx6h8FQ0289ZBQJa3iTk3Sb7zkmQO6D6VZFvRX5lEeM%3D&amp;reserved=0<https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.c%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C121a81b63d67432f4f4308d9a25d7196%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637719344491949556%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=2ytmfyZiLeGysAdi6jrTcGjDUGnINBJ8oBkOBrPHue0%3D&reserved=0>
>>> om%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsnp-
>>> v11&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d
>>> 0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C63
>>> 7706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiL
>>> CJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=HMH
>>> Fq8G%2FPqdhzNW3Ashmc4%2Bmv1RcDULD4vniofhiS54%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>>> GHCB spec:
>>>>>
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdevelop
>>> er.amd.com%2Fwp-
>>> content%2Fresources%2F56421.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40a
>>> md.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11
>>> a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZ
>>> sb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0
>>> %3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=YiPgZU87fdnl5rJpD0E2ue9aTKbqUwizuBrKxom0FiU%
>>> 3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>>> SEV-SNP firmware specification:
>>>>>
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C400c84b654c6423f739e08d99cb72382%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637713132658939021%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=Hs%2BB9e%2FrZ0aYV3XPtJ9ZegaaIAMURuH1Dc9C1CeBauU%3D&amp;reserved=0<https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C121a81b63d67432f4f4308d9a25d7196%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637719344491959546%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=KnpZBr%2Brj5rqDntY4KYxOeZFWBUeiOVytKkWbi6epuc%3D&reserved=0>
>>> md.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F56860.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7
>>> Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8
>>> 961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnk
>>> nown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1h
>>> aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=bfQsY4%2BRnlFGuD3Bg%2BFPb3l
>>> RgSGgpomNocXswHqkm%2F4%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>>> Change since v10:
>>>>>  * fix 'unresolved external symbol __allshl' link error when building I32 for
>>>>> VS2017.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>>>  * Move CCAttrs Pcd define in MdePkg
>>>>>  * Add comment to indicate that allocating the identity map PT is temporary
>>> until
>>>>> we get lazy validation
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>>>  * drop the generic metadata and make it specific to SEV.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>>>  * Move SEV specific changes in MpLib in AmdSev file
>>>>>  * Update the GHCB register function to not restore the GHCB MSR because
>>>>>    we were already in the MSR protocol mode.
>>>>>  * Drop the SNP name from PcdSnpSecPreValidate.
>>>>>  * Add new section for GHCB memory in the OVMF metadata.
>>>>>
>>>>> Change since v6:
>>>>>  * Drop the SNP boot block GUID and switch to using the Metadata guided
>>>>> structure
>>>>>    proposed by Min in TDX series.
>>>>>  * Exclude the GHCB page from the pre-validated region. It simplifies the
>>> reset
>>>>>    vector code where we do not need to unvalidate the GHCB page.
>>>>>  * Now that GHCB page is not validated so move the VMPL check from reset
>>>>> vector
>>>>>    code to the MemEncryptSevLib on the first page validation.
>>>>>  * Introduce the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD to communicate which
>>>>>    memory encryption is active so that MpInitLib can make use of it.
>>>>>  * Drop the SEVES specific PCD as the information can be communicated via
>>>>>    the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.
>>>>>  * Move the SNP specific AP creation function in AmdSev.c.
>>>>>  * Define the SNP Blob GUID in a new file.
>>>>>
>>>>> Change since v5:
>>>>>  * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page
>>>>>  * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c
>>>>>  * Rebase to the latest code
>>>>>  * Add the review feedback from Yao.
>>>>>
>>>>> Change since v4:
>>>>>  * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS
>>>>>  * Add VMPL-0 check
>>>>>
>>>>> Change since v3:
>>>>>  * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to
>>>>> keep
>>>>>    the code readable.
>>>>>  * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state.
>>>>>  * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB
>>> GPA.
>>>>>  * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the
>>>>>    AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it.
>>>>>  * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v2:
>>>>>  * Add support for the AP creation.
>>>>>  * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for
>>> PCI
>>>>> reads.
>>>>>  * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
>>>>>  *
>>>>> Changes since v1:
>>>>>  * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
>>>>>  * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
>>>>>  * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is
>>>>> supported.
>>>>>  * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit
>>> from
>>>>> MMIO ranges.
>>>>>  * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
>>>>>  * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location
>>>>> through
>>>>>    EFI configuration table.
>>>>>
>>>>> Brijesh Singh (28):
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
>>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use
>>>>>   OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page
>>>>>   OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
>>>>>     phase
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
>>>>>   UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is
>>>>>     active
>>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV
>>>>>     status
>>>>>   UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD
>>>>>   MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
>>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
>>>>>     enabled
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
>>>>>     table
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael Roth (3):
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
>>>>>   OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
>>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check
>>>>>
>>>>> Tom Lendacky (1):
>>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
>>>>>
>>>>>  MdePkg/MdePkg.dec                             |   4 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |  18 +
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec                     |   5 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc                  |   8 +-
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc                    |   5 +-
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc                       |   4 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc                    |   9 +-
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |   8 +-
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc                           |   5 +-
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                        |   6 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf               |   7 +
>>>>>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>>>>>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   7 +
>>>>>  .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf  |   2 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf     |   3 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf           |   7 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf           |   5 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf                       |   4 +
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
>>>>>  .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h  |  25 +
>>>>>  MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h            |   2 +-
>>>>>  .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h    |  33 ++
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h    |  26 +
>>>>>  .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h                  |  36 ++
>>>>>  .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h  |  24 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h                |   5 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h                          |  95 ++++
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h          |  93 ++++
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c                 |  23 +
>>>>>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>>>>>  .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c                   |  17 +
>>>>>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>>>>>  .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  19 +
>>>>>  .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  40 ++
>>>>>  .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c                 | 167 ++++++-
>>>>>  .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c             | 127 +++++
>>>>>  .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  82 ++++
>>>>>  .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c          | 294 ++++++++++++
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444
>>> ++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c                  | 231 +++++++++
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c               |   2 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c                          | 298 ++++++++++++
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c                         | 158 +------
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c         | 239 ++++++++++
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c       |  16 +-
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c    |  70 +++
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c          | 345 +++++---------
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c       |   4 +-
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c     | 261 ++++++++++
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc       |   5 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm  |  17 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm           |  86 +++-
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb         |  18 +
>>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm   |  74 +++
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc        |   2 +
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm  | 200 ++++++++
>>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 100 +---
>>>>>  59 files changed, 3329 insertions(+), 528 deletions(-)
>>>>>  create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h
>>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>>> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h
>>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
>>>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
>>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>>>
>>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
>>>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
>>>>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c
>>>>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c
>>>>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c
>>>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
>>>>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> 2.25.1
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>




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