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From: "Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
To: "devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
	"brijesh.singh@amd.com" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Xu, Min M" <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Justen, Jordan L" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v6 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2021 11:55:47 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <PH0PR11MB488551A495DF9C12C7F516D58CD59@PH0PR11MB4885.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a3df611a-79db-cd07-996d-d15ae51afaad@amd.com>

I do not see any conflict here.

You can use below definition
 enum {
   CC_ATTR_AMD_SEV = 0x0001,
   CC_ATTR_AMD_SEV_ES =  0x0101,
   CC_ATTR_AMD_SEV_SNP =  0x0201,
   CC_ATTR_INTEL_TDX =  0x0002,
 } ConfidentialComputingAttr;

BTW: Please remove SGX, we don’t need it here.

Thank you
Yao Jiewen

> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of Brijesh
> Singh via groups.io
> Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2021 6:51 PM
> To: Xu, Min M <min.m.xu@intel.com>; Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>;
> devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Tom Lendacky
> <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>;
> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas
> <erdemaktas@google.com>; Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>; Gerd
> Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v6 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging
> (SEV-SNP) support
> 
> Hi Min,
> 
> On 9/8/21 7:31 PM, Xu, Min M wrote:
> > On September 9, 2021 3:46 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> >> Thank you so much Yao for reviewing the patches. Based on some comments
> >> from Gerd I may update code around the reset vector area (mainly use the
> >> metadata format etc). For your comments regarding the introducing a new
> >> PcdConfidentialComputingCategory I will look to see what I can come up
> with
> >> and in UefiCpuPkg I will try to move all the SEV specific functions in new files
> >> (where applicable).
> >>
> > Hi, Brijesh
> > if you are considering to introduce a new PcdConfidentialComputingCategory
> > as Jiewen suggested below:
> >>> 0008-UefiCpuPkg-Define-the-SEV-SNP-specific-dynamic-PCDs
> >>> I really don't like the idea to use BOOL PcdSevEsIsEnabled and
> >> PcdSevSnpIsEnabled.
> >>> Can we define *one* PCD - such as PcdConfidentialComputingCategory?
> >>> We can assign range 0x0000~0xFFFF to AMD SEV, 0x10000~0x1FFFF to Intel
> >> TDX.
> >>> Then SEV=0x0000, SEV-ES=0x0001, SEV-SNP=0x0002, and TDX=0x10000
> >> later.
> >>> I really don't want to keep adding PCD endlessly in the future, like
> >> PcdSevXXXIsEnabled, PcdSevYYYIsEnabled, PcdTdxIsEnabled,
> >> PcdTdx20Enabled, PcdTdx30Enabled, ......
> > I also have some suggestions.
> >
> > As we have below definition in WorkArea.h
> >   typedef struct _CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER {
> >     UINT8                   GuestType;
> >     UINT8                   Reserved1[3];
> >   } CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER;
> >
> > Can we update above CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER to
> below:
> >   typedef struct _CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER {
> >     UINT8                   GuestType;
> >     UINT8                   SubType;               // subtype which indicates SEV-ES, SEV-NP,
> or TDX 1.0, TDX 2.0 etc.
> >     UINT8                   Reserved1[2];
> >   } CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER;
> >
> > The PcdConfidentialComputingCategory can be defined as UINT32, like below:
> >   ## This dynamic PCD indicates the Confidential Computing Category
> >   #  [7:0]   Confidential Computing Category  (0 - Non-Cc, 1 - AmdSev, 2 -
> IntelTdx)
> >   #  [15:8]  Sub-Category (defined by each vendor, SEV-ES, SEV-SNP, or TDX-1.0,
> TDX-2.0, etc)
> >   #  [31:16] Reserved
> >   # @Prompt Confidential Computing Category
> >
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdConfidentialComputingCategory|0|UINT32|0x
> 60000018
> >
> > So that we simply copy the
> CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER to
> PcdConfidentialComputingCategory.
> > What's your thought?
> 
> I am not sure if its a good idea to pack a header like above in a 32-bit
> PCD. The caller need to unpack the 32-bit number and perform a bitshit
> etc. Additionally we also need to check for reserved bits being set to
> zero etc. I am more inclined toward something like this:
> 
> enum {
> 
>    /* The guest is running with memory encryption disabled. */
> 
>     CC_ATTR_UNDEF,
> 
>   /* The guest is running with active AMD SEV memory encryption. */
> 
>    CC_ATTR_AMD_SEV,
> 
>   /* The guest is running with active AMD SEV-ES memory encryption. */
> 
>   CC_ATTR_AMD_SEV_ES,
> 
>   /* The guest is running with active AMD SEV-SNP memory encryption. */
> 
>   CC_ATTR_AMD_SEV_SNP,
> 
>  /* The guest is running with active Intel TDX memory encryption. */
> 
>  CC_ATTR_INTEL_TDX,
> 
>  /* The guest is running with active Intel SGX memory encryption. */
> 
>  CC_ATTR_INTEL_SGX,
> 
> } ConfidentialComputingAttr;
> 
> The PcdConfidentialComputingAttr will be set to zero. The OVMF will set
> this dynamic PCD in PEI phase. The UefiCpuPkg will provide a new
> function that can be used by anyone to check the CC guest type.
> 
> BOOLEAN
> 
> CcPlatformHas(enum ConfidentialComputingAttr attr)
> 
> {
> 
>     UINT32 Val;
> 
>     Val = PcdGet32 (PcdConfidentialComputingAttr);
> 
>     return val == attr;
> 
> }
> 
> 
> > Thanks!
> > Min
> 
> 
> 
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-09-09 11:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-01 16:16 [PATCH v6 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 01/29] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 02/29] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02  8:04   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-02 12:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02 21:17       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-03  6:28         ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-03 11:56           ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 03/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV-SNP boot block GUID Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 04/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 05/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 06/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02  8:20   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-06  1:10     ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-09-06 12:16       ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-06 13:19         ` Min Xu
2021-09-07  7:07           ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-07 13:27             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-08  6:36               ` Min Xu
2021-09-14  3:49             ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-16  7:42               ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 07/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 08/29] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 09/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 10/29] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 11/29] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 12/29] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 13/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 14/29] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 15/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02  9:50   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-02 13:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-03  7:04       ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 16/29] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 17/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 18/29] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 19/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 20/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the SEV-SNP enabled PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 21/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 22/29] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 23/29] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 24/29] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 25/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 26/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 27/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 28/29] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 29/29] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-09-07  2:36 ` [PATCH v6 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-08  2:29   ` Min Xu
2021-09-08  6:03     ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-08 19:45   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09  0:31     ` Min Xu
2021-09-09 10:51       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 11:22         ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-09 11:40           ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 11:45             ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-09-09 11:55         ` Yao, Jiewen [this message]
2021-09-12 22:55   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13  0:33     ` Yao, Jiewen

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