public inbox for devel@edk2.groups.io
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>, Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	"tobin@ibm.com" <tobin@ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 11/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 08:11:34 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a02058d4-21b0-7df7-3fda-31981dcff9b2@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8b46fe32-beda-0195-8c67-c7ef19194f85@linux.vnet.ibm.com>


On 5/5/21 1:42 AM, Dov Murik wrote:
> [+cc: Tobin]
>
> Hi Brijesh,
>
> On 30/04/2021 14:51, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> BZ: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.tianocore.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D3275&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C93168c94eb6d44ed08e608d90f910426%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637557937779907471%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=nLpmk3G%2BmXcZrzXxCmO3M9EDPiLRnP1IUmPqRQNbBuU%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>
>> When AMD SEV is enabled in the guest VM, a hypervisor need to insert a
>> secrets page.
>>
>> When SEV-SNP is enabled, the secrets page contains the VM platform
>> communication keys. The guest BIOS and OS can use this key to communicate
>> with the SEV firmware to get attesation report. See the SEV-SNP firmware
>> spec for more details for the content of the secrets page.
>>
>> When SEV and SEV-ES is enabled, the secrets page contains the information
>> provided by the guest owner after the attestation. See the SEV
>> LAUNCH_SECRET command for more details.
>>
>> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
>> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
>> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
>> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
>> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c   | 16 +++++++++++++++-
>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf |  1 +
>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                 |  2 ++
>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                 |  5 +++++
>>  4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
>> index ad491515dd..92836c562c 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
>> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
>>  #include <PiPei.h>
>>  #include <Library/HobLib.h>
>>  #include <Library/PcdLib.h>
>> +#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
>>
>>  EFI_STATUS
>>  EFIAPI
>> @@ -15,10 +16,23 @@ InitializeSecretPei (
>>    IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES     **PeiServices
>>    )
>>  {
>> +  UINTN   Type;
>> +
>> +  //
>> +  // The secret page should be mapped encrypted by the guest OS and must not
>> +  // be treated as a system RAM. Mark it as ACPI NVS so that guest OS maps it
>> +  // encrypted.
>> +  //
>> +  if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
>> +    Type = EfiACPIMemoryNVS;
>> +  } else {
>> +    Type = EfiBootServicesData;
>> +  }
>> +
> Would it make sense to always use EfiACPIMemoryNVS for the injected secret area, even for regular SEV (non-SNP)?

Ideally yes. Maybe James had some reasons for choosing the
EfiBootServicesData. If I had to guess, it was mainly because there no
guest kernel support which consumes the SEV secrets page. Since the
memory is not marked ACPI NVS, so it can be used as a system RAM after
the ExitBootServices is called in the kernel.

I am fine with using ACPI NVS for both SEV and SEV-SNP. I was not able
to build and run AmdSev package in my setup, can you submit a prepatch
to change the memory type and verify that it works ?

>
> -Dov
>
>
>
>>    BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
>>      PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase),
>>      PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize),
>> -    EfiBootServicesData
>> +    Type
>>      );
>>
>>    return EFI_SUCCESS;
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>> index 08be156c4b..9265f8adee 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
>>    HobLib
>>    PeimEntryPoint
>>    PcdLib
>> +  MemEncryptSevLib
>>
>>  [FixedPcd]
>>    gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
>> index a7d747f6b4..593c0e69f6 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
>> @@ -716,6 +716,7 @@
>>    OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.inf
>>  !endif
>>    UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
>> +  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>>
>>  !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE
>>    OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf
>> @@ -965,6 +966,7 @@
>>    OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
>>    OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
>>    OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf
>> +  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
>>
>>  !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
>>    OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccess2Dxe.inf
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
>> index d519f85328..b04175f77c 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
>> @@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase|gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevE
>>  0x00C000|0x001000
>>  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
>>
>> +0x00D000|0x001000
>> +gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
>> +
>>  0x010000|0x010000
>>  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
>>
>> @@ -178,6 +181,7 @@ INF  OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf
>>  INF  SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf
>>  INF  SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf
>>  !endif
>> +INF  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>>
>>  ################################################################################
>>
>> @@ -313,6 +317,7 @@ INF  OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf
>>  INF  ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf
>>
>>  INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf
>> +INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
>>
>>  #
>>  # Network modules
>>

  reply	other threads:[~2021-05-05 13:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-30 11:51 [PATCH RFC v2 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 01/28] MdePkg: Expand the SEV MSR to include the SNP definition Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03  8:39   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 11:42     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 02/28] MdePkg: Define the GHCB Hypervisor features Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 10:10   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:40       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 03/28] MdePkg: Define the GHCB GPA structure Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 10:24   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:19     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:55       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:50         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 13:55           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 04/28] MdePkg: Define the Page State Change VMGEXIT structures Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 12:33   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 13:59     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 14:48       ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-05-04 18:07         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 18:53     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 18:24       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-05 19:27         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 05/28] MdePkg: Add AsmPvalidate() support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 13:58   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 14:09     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 19:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 18:56       ` Laszlo Ersek
     [not found]     ` <167BF2A01FA60569.6407@groups.io>
2021-05-04 19:55       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:10         ` Laszlo Ersek
     [not found]       ` <167BF53DA09B327E.22277@groups.io>
2021-05-04 20:28         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 23:03           ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:19             ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-05 19:17           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 06/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 10:39   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 19:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 07/28] OvmfPkg: Use MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear EncMask from Mmio Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 10:50   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 19:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 08/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Remove CacheFlush parameter Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 11:08   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 09/28] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Allow PMBASE register access in Dxe phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 14:08   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 14:12     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-07 13:29     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-07 15:10       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-07 15:19         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-07 15:47           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 10/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 11/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05  6:42   ` [edk2-devel] " Dov Murik
2021-05-05 13:11     ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-05-05 19:33       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 10:57         ` Dov Murik
2021-05-06 15:06           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 16:12           ` James Bottomley
2021-05-06 16:02         ` James Bottomley
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 12/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 13/28] OvmfPkg: Validate the data pages used in the Reset vector and SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 14/28] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 15/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 16/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 17/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:05   ` Erdem Aktas
2021-05-03 14:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 18/28] OvmfPkg: Add a library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 19/28] OvmfPkg: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 20/28] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 21/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 14:04   ` Erdem Aktas
2021-05-03 18:56     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 22/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 23/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 24/28] OvmfPkg/SecMain: Pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 25/28] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 26/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 27/28] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05  7:10   ` [edk2-devel] " Dov Murik
2021-05-05 19:37     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 28/28] MdePkg/GHCB: Increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 16:49 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-list from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=a02058d4-21b0-7df7-3fda-31981dcff9b2@amd.com \
    --to=devel@edk2.groups.io \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox