From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=209.132.183.28; helo=mx1.redhat.com; envelope-from=lersek@redhat.com; receiver=edk2-devel@lists.01.org Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx1.redhat.com [209.132.183.28]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7979D2095B070 for ; Tue, 10 Oct 2017 04:25:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.15]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D24D581DF4; Tue, 10 Oct 2017 11:28:29 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com D24D581DF4 Authentication-Results: ext-mx01.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx01.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=lersek@redhat.com Received: from lacos-laptop-7.usersys.redhat.com (ovpn-120-87.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.120.87]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 00B8162460; Tue, 10 Oct 2017 11:28:27 +0000 (UTC) To: Qin Long , Jiewen Yao Cc: Brijesh Singh , edk2-devel@lists.01.org, Jordan Justen , Tom Lendacky , Chao Zhang References: <20171005201642.122619-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> From: Laszlo Ersek Message-ID: Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 13:28:26 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.3.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20171005201642.122619-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.15 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.25]); Tue, 10 Oct 2017 11:28:30 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] SecurityPkg: make PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy dynamic X-BeenThere: edk2-devel@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: EDK II Development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 11:25:02 -0000 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Jiewen, Qin, can you guys perhaps help with reviewing this patch? (The second patch in the series is for OvmfPkg, and it depends on this one.) Thanks! Laszlo On 10/05/17 22:16, Brijesh Singh wrote: > By default the image verification policy for option ROM images is 0x4 > (DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) but the following OvmfPkg commit: > > 1fea9ddb4e3f OvmfPkg: execute option ROM images regardless of Secure Boot > > set it to 0x0 (ALWAYS_EXECUTE). This is fine because typically option > ROMs comes from host-side and most of the time cloud provider (i.e > hypervisor) have full access over a guest anyway. But when secure boot > is enabled, we would like to deny the execution of option ROM when > SEV is active. Having dynamic Pcd will give us flexibility to set the > security policy at the runtime. > > Fixes: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=728 > Cc: Chao Zhang > Cc: Jordan Justen > Cc: Laszlo Ersek > Cc: Tom Lendacky > Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh > --- > > Changes since v1: > * Add Contributed-under tag > > SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 24 ++++++++++---------- > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec > index 01bff01ed50a..4e32d172d7d9 100644 > --- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec > +++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec > @@ -230,18 +230,6 @@ [Ppis] > # > > [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule] > - ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:

> - # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
> - # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.
> - # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.
> - # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.
> - # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.
> - # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.
> - # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.
> - # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom. > - # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005 > - gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001 > - > ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network. > # Only following values are valid:

> # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
> @@ -304,6 +292,18 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule] > gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007 > > [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx] > + ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:

> + # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
> + # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.
> + # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.
> + # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.
> + # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.
> + # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.
> + # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.
> + # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom. > + # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005 > + gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001 > + > ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting. > # If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands > # that required operator physical presence can not run.

>