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From: "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, dandan.bi@intel.com
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 12:27:18 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a8a5e0ad-d415-d53c-78f0-bd00624cf01e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190918030557.55256-2-dandan.bi@intel.com>

On 9/18/19 5:05 AM, Dandan Bi wrote:
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
> 
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
> the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> 
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for the callers in EmbeddedPkg which don't have the policy to defer the
> execution of the image.
> 
> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> ---
>  .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c         |  9 +++++++++
>  .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
> index 591afbe7cc..fe05878b4b 100644
> --- a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
> +++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
> @@ -71,10 +71,19 @@ StartEfiApplication (
>  
>    // Load the image from the device path with Boot Services function
>    Status = gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, ParentImageHandle, DevicePath, NULL, 0,
>                    &ImageHandle);
>    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +    //
> +    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
> +    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> +    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
> +    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +    //
> +    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +      gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +    }
>      return Status;
>    }
>  
>    // Passed LoadOptions to the EFI Application
>    if (LoadOptionsSize != 0) {
> diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
> index d9e7aa7d2b..e1036954ee 100644
> --- a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
> +++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
> @@ -439,10 +439,22 @@ AndroidBootImgBoot (
>                                             + KernelSize;
>  
>    Status = gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, gImageHandle,
>                             (EFI_DEVICE_PATH *)&KernelDevicePath,
>                             (VOID*)(UINTN)Kernel, KernelSize, &ImageHandle);
> +  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +    //
> +    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
> +    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> +    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
> +    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +    //
> +    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +      gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +    }
> +    return Status;
> +  }
>  
>    // Set kernel arguments
>    Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid,
>                                  (VOID **) &ImageInfo);
>    ImageInfo->LoadOptions = NewKernelArg;
> 

Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-24 10:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-18  3:05 [patch v2 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:27   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé [this message]
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:23   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:35   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  5:28   ` [edk2-devel] " Gao, Zhichao
2019-09-24 10:34   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:49   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:37   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 5/5] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:30   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
     [not found] ` <15C569713949E871.11658@groups.io>
2019-09-24  1:28   ` [edk2-devel] [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi

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