From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, devel@edk2.groups.io,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v3 04/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 09:50:14 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <acbb4c3e-394f-c1c7-49af-206a1231a64a@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0744c84d-ca70-1fe6-a1c0-b97bb87affc5@redhat.com>
On 6/8/21 3:49 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> On 06/07/21 15:37, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>
>> Also, I was trying to avoid the cases where the malicious hypervisor
>> changing the feature value after the GHCB negotiation is completed.
>> e.g, during the reset vector they give us one feature value and change
>> them during SEC or PEI or DXE instances run. They can't break the
>> security of SNP by doing so, but I thought its good to avoid querying
>> the features on every phase.
> If there is *feasible* security problem (attack), then my "information
> flow purity" criteria are irrelevant. Security trumps all.
>
> My understanding is though (per your explanation above) that there is no
> real security problem here.
>
> Furthermore, we're not going to query the feature set in every phase.
> We're going to set the PCDs in the PEI phase; there shouldn't be
> hardware querying in the DXE phase. That's quite standard business in OVMF.
>
>
>>> Instead, we should have a new MemEncryptSevLib function that outputs the FEATURES bitmask. It should be similar to MemEncryptSevGetEncryptionMask(), but it should return a RETURN_STATUS, and produce the FEATURES bitmask through an output parameter.
>> This is one of thing which I noticed last week, we are actually creating
>> a circular dependency. The MemEncryptSevLib provides the routines which
>> are used by the VmgExitLib. The MemEncryptSevLib should *not* depend on
>> the VmgExitLib. If we extend the MemEncryptSevLib to provide a routine
>> to query the features then we will be required to include the
>> VmgExitLib. The patch #13 extends the MemEncryptSevLib to provide
>> functions for the page validation and it requires the VmgExitLib. I am
>> trying to see what I can do to not create this circular dependency and
>> still keep code reuse.
> As far as I remember, a circular dependency is only a problem if both
> library instances in question have constructors. If a library instance
> needs no construction (has no constructor), then it does not partake in
> the topological sorting (for initialization) performed by BaseTools.
>
> In this case, at the end of your RFCv3 series (minus patch#21), no INF
> file in either "OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib" or
> "OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib" seems to specify a CONSTRUCTOR, so purely
> from the build perspective, there should be no issue.
I have to debug it, but it did appear that this circular dependency
caused problem for the SEV guest when SMM is enabled. If SMM is enabled,
then I get a random #UD as soon as I link the VmgExit to
MemEncryptSevLib. I will see what I find.
>
> But, I have another idea here:
>
>>> The SEC instance of the function should return RETURN_UNSUPPORTED.
>>>
>>> The PEI instance should use the GHCB MSR protocol, with the help of the AsmCpuId(), AsmWriteMsr64(), AsmReadMsr64() and AsmVmgExit() BaseLib functions.
>>>
>>> The DXE instance should read back the PCD.
> the above basically tells us that this library API would be a single-use
> interface. It wouldn't work in SEC, it would do actual work in PEI
> (namely, in PlatformPei), and it wouldn't do any "real work" in DXE.
>
> To me, the boundary is not crystal clear, but the above struggles
> *suggest* that we might not want this API to be a MemEncryptSevLib
> function (or any library function) at all. If abstracting out the API
> causes more pain than it does good, then let's just not abstract it.
>
> Meaning, you could open-code the fetching of features (using VmgExitLib)
> in PlatormPei, set the PCD, and be done with it. The only place where
> the PCD (PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures) is actually used (as far as I can
> see) is patch#21, in UefiCpuPkg. We could reasonably say that the "real
> API", namely the declaration of the PCD, *already exists*, namely in the
> "UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec" file, from your commit e6994b1d5226
> ("UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs", 2021-06-04).
>
> There are other examples where a cross-package PCD is set once and for
> all in OvmfPkg/PlatformPei (random example:
> "PcdCpuBootLogicalProcessorNumber"). We don't have to turn everything
> into a lib class API, especially if it causes more pain than help.
This is much ideal, I would prefer to avoid creating a new library or
add a function into the existing library if this function is only going
to be used once during the PEI to query the feature.
> ... But maybe I just need to accept that we have to repurpose
> SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA, considering it a super-early "HOB list" of sorts.
> Same as the PEI phase is considered the "HOB producer phase", outputting
> a bunch of disparate bits of info, we could consider the SEV-ES parts of
> the Reset Vector such an "early info bits" producer phase. I think this
> is a very big conceptual step away from the original purpose of
> SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA (note the *name* of the structure: "work area"!
> HOBs are not "work areas", they are effectively read-only, once
> produced). But perhaps this is what we need (and then with proper
> documentation).
>
> NB however that HOBs have types, GUIDed HOBs have GUIDs, the HOB types
> are specified in PI, and GUIDs are expressly declared to stand for
> various purposes at least in edk2 DEC files. All that helps with
> discerning the information flow. So... I'd still prefer keeping
> SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA as minimal as possible.
>
> Tom, any comments?
>
> Thank you Brijesh for raising great points!
> Laszlo
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-08 14:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-26 23:10 [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 01/22] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 8:15 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 12:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:07 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 13:38 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 02/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:43 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 03/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 14:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 11:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 8:17 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 16:42 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 04/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 11:54 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 8:49 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 14:50 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-06-08 21:36 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-09 10:50 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 05/22] OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 12:26 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:48 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 17:33 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 9:22 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 15:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 9:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 15:43 ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 18:01 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 06/22] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 07/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 08/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 09/22] OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 10/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 11/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 12/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 13/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 14/22] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 15/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 16/22] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 17/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 18/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 19/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 20/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 21/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 22/22] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:08 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 1:17 ` 回复: " gaoliming
2021-05-27 9:42 ` [edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-02 17:09 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04 9:32 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04 11:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:09 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:04 ` Laszlo Ersek
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