Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH 0/4] SEV Encrypted Boot for Ovmf

["Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>]

Hi James,

On 11/12/20 01:13, James Bottomley wrote:
> From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> 
> This patch series is modelled on the structure of the Bhyve patches
> for Ovmf, since it does somewhat similar things.  This patch series
> creates a separate build for an AmdSev OVMF.fd that does nothing
> except combine with grub and boot straight through the internal grub
> to try to mount an encrypted volume.

I've opened a feture request BZ at
<https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077>.

Can you please register in the TianoCore Bugzilla, and assign the bug to
yourself?

I'll post more comments under the individual patches.

Thanks,
Laszlo

> 
> Concept: SEV Secure Encrypted Images
> ====================================
> 
> The SEV patches in Linux and OVMF allow for the booting of SEV VMs in
> an encrypted state, but don't really show how this could be done with
> an encrypted image.  Since the key used to decrypt the image must be
> maintained within the SEV encryption envelope, encrypted QCOW is not
> an option because the key would then have to be known to QEMU which is
> outside the encryption envelope.  The proposal here is that an
> encrypted image should be a QCOW image consisting of two partitions,
> the normal unencrypted EFI partition (Identifying it as an OVMF
> bootable image) and a luks encrypted root partition.  The kernel would
> be inside the encrypted root in the /boot directory.  The secret
> injected securely through QEMU is extracted by OVMF and passed to grub
> which uses it to mount the encrypted root and boot the kernel
> normally.  The creator of the secret bundle must be satisfied with the
> SEV attestation before the secret is constructed.  Unfortunately, the
> SEV attestation can only be on the first QEMU firmware volume and
> nothing else, so this patch series builds grub itself into a firmware
> volume and places it inside OVMF so that the entire boot system can be
> attested.  In a normal OVMF KVM system, the variable store is on the
> second flash volume (which is read/write).  Unfortunately, this
> mutable configuration provided by the variables is outside the
> attestation envelope and can significantly alter the boot path,
> possibly leading to secret leak, so encrypted image boot should only
> be done with the OVMF.fd that combines both the code and variables.
> the OVMF.fd is constructed so that it becomes impossible to interrupt
> the boot sequence after attestation and the system will either boot
> the image or fail. The boot sequence runs the grub.efi embedded in the
> OVMF firmware volume so the encrypted image owner knows their own
> version of grub is the only one that will boot before injecting the
> secret.  Note this boot path actually ignores the unencrypted EFI
> partition.  However, as part of this design, the encrypted image may be
> booted by a standard OVMF KVM boot and in that case, the user will
> have to type the encryption password.  This standard boot will be
> insecure but it might be used by the constructor of the encrypted
> images on their own private laptop, for instance.  The standard boot
> path will use the unencrypted EFI partition.
> 
> Patches Required Outside of OVMF
> ================================
> 
> There is a patch set to grub which allows it to extract the SEV secret
> area from the configuration table and use the secret as a password to
> do a luks crypto mount of root (this is the sevsecret grub module).
> 
> There is also a patch to qemu which allows it to search through the
> OVMF.fd and find the SEV secret area which is now described inside the
> Reset Vector using the existing SEV_ES reset block.  This area is the
> place QEMU will inject the encrypted SEV secret bundle.
> 
> Security of the System
> ======================
> 
> Since Grub is now part of the attested OVMF.fd bundle, the VM owner
> knows absolutely that it will proceed straight to partition decryption
> inside the attested code and boot the kernel off the encrypted
> partition.  Even if a different QCOW image is substituted, the boot
> will fail without revealing the secret because the system is designed
> to fail hard in that case and because the secret is always contained
> within the encrypted envelope it should be impossible for the cloud
> operator to obtain it even if they can pause the boot and examine the
> machine memory.
> 
> Putting it All Together
> =======================
> 
> This is somewhat hard.  You must first understand how to boot a QEMU
> system so as to have the VM pause after firmware loading (-S option)
> and use the qmp port to request an attestation.  Only if the
> attestation corresponds to the expected sha256sum of OVMF.fd should
> the secret bundle be constructed and injected using qmp.  The tools
> for constructing the secret bundle are in
> 
> https://github.com/AMDESE/sev-tool/
> 
> James
> 
> ---
> 
> James Bottomley (4):
>   OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF
>   OvmfPkg/AmdSev: add Grub Firmware Volume Package
>   OvmfPkg: create a SEV secret area in the AmdSev memfd
>   OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table
> 
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |    6 +
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc                  | 1035 +++++++++++
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf                  |  515 ++++++
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/Grub.inf                  |   37 +
>  .../SevLaunchSecret/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf   |   38 +
>  .../SevLaunchSecret/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf   |   46 +
>  .../PlatformBootManagerLibGrub.inf            |   84 +
>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf           |    4 +
>  .../PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/BdsPlatform.h  |  179 ++
>  .../SevLaunchSecret/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c     |   29 +
>  .../SevLaunchSecret/SecretPei/SecretPei.c     |   26 +
>  .../PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/BdsPlatform.c  | 1538 +++++++++++++++++
>  .../PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/PlatformData.c |  213 +++
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/.gitignore                |    1 +
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/grub.cfg                  |   35 +
>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/grub.sh                   |   54 +
>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm  |    4 +
>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb         |    2 +
>  18 files changed, 3846 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/Grub.inf
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SevLaunchSecret/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SevLaunchSecret/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub.inf
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/BdsPlatform.h
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SevLaunchSecret/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SevLaunchSecret/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/BdsPlatform.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/PlatformData.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/.gitignore
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/grub.cfg
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/grub.sh
>