Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support

["Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>]

Hi Jiewen,

I have not heard anything back from UefiCpuPkg maintainer yet, I will
send another gentle ping on Monday again and hope maintainer get to it.

-Brijesh

On 10/29/21 7:26 AM, Yao, Jiewen wrote:
> Hi Brijesh
> Have you got R-B from UefiCpuPkg maintainer?
>
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> Sent: Monday, October 25, 2021 7:54 AM
>> To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
>> Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com; James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M
>> <min.m.xu@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>; Justen,
>> Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>; Ard Biesheuvel
>> <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>;
>> Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>; Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
>> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging
>> (SEV-SNP) support
>>
>> Thank Jiewen,
>>
>> I have ping'ed UefiCpuPkg maintainer (Ray and Rahul) on every patch
>> which touches the UefiCpuPkg. If maintainer wants me to rework on
>> something then I will work accordingly. If they are okay with v11 then
>> now the merge will create a conflict (due to the TDX patches merge
>> commit). I have rebased my series to the recent master and have pushed
>> it here: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsnp-v12&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C9f8b4428d098453ff93308d99ad7586b%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637711071975243180%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=vF9b44WpM45fiDCF4%2BdwvKCcoPHr0bj6xzTCi4%2BlR2s%3D&amp;reserved=0. I can post the
>> series if you prefer it.
>>
>> thanks
>>
>> On 10/23/21 8:46 PM, Yao, Jiewen via groups.io wrote:
>>> Yes. I will try my best to merge.
>>>
>>> I checked the patch set but I did not find the "R-B" from UefiCpuPkg
>> maintainer. Neither from email nor from you v11.
>>> Did I miss something?
>>>
>>> Thank you
>>> Yao Jiewen
>>>
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>> Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2021 12:13 PM
>>>> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
>>>> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M
>> <min.m.xu@intel.com>;
>>>> Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky
>>>> <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>;
>>>> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas
>>>> <erdemaktas@google.com>; Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>; Gerd
>>>> Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>; Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>> Subject: [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP)
>> support
>>>> Hi Gerd and Jiewen,
>>>>
>>>> CI was a bit unstable during my v10 submission, so, I was not able to
>>>> run it to the completion. Finally, I managed to get the CI going,
>>>> and it reported few Windows 32-bit build errors. The v11 fixes those build
>>>> errors. Please consider this for the merge.
>>>>
>>>> Thank you so much for all your support in reviewing the series.
>>>>
>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> BZ:
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.
>> tianocore.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D3275&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.
>> singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe488
>> 4e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7
>> CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJ
>> XVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=L41krO6G221HaIsG92FloIzgCDqMLAAsU26
>> jaEMF7yw%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
>>>> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
>>>> integrity
>>>> protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
>>>> replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
>>>> encryption environment.
>>>>
>>>> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP
>>>> VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-
>> SNP
>>>> such as interrupt protection.
>>>>
>>>> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
>>>> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP
>>>> VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the
>>>> guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to
>>>> guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE
>>>> instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request
>>>> NAE"
>>>> defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page
>>>> from the RMP table.
>>>>
>>>> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated,
>>>> as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two
>>>> approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and
>>>> Lazy Validation.
>>>>
>>>> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under
>>>> lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a
>>>> unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception
>>>> handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of
>>>> the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The
>>>> recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate
>>>> the
>>>> unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS.
>>>>
>>>> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the
>> available
>>>> system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is
>> validated
>>>> before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
>>>>
>>>> Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP
>>>> guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the
>>>> SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted.
>>>>
>>>> Additional resources
>>>> ---------------------
>>>> SEV-SNP whitepaper
>>>>
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C9f8b4428d098453ff93308d99ad7586b%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637711071975243180%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=9sOcgACg2M6QuveVuAf8FZFv5rb9i36svspZsudpkdM%3D&amp;reserved=0
>> md.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2FSEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-
>> &amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da
>> 08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C63770
>> 6369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQ
>> IjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=nVMSG%
>> 2FvSS2Wa21lu1lGrHr9OYX8hL7FoAcQXBBiCztc%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>> isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
>>>>
>>>> APM 2:
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C9f8b4428d098453ff93308d99ad7586b%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637711071975243180%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=9sOcgACg2M6QuveVuAf8FZFv5rb9i36svspZsudpkdM%3D&amp;reserved=0
>> md.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F24593.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7
>> Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8
>> 961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnk
>> nown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1h
>> aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=G8Xg2glOGY2EjHpeQ3WM4gZCh
>> uI0k8QcLDTbpJiTplg%3D&amp;reserved=0 (section 15.36)
>>>> The complete source is available at
>>>>
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.c%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C9f8b4428d098453ff93308d99ad7586b%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637711071975243180%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=fjvSca7meCrd6%2FDBlefYmRIqYS8GEcwbR6819yb7rdw%3D&amp;reserved=0
>> om%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsnp-
>> v11&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d
>> 0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C63
>> 7706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiL
>> CJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=HMH
>> Fq8G%2FPqdhzNW3Ashmc4%2Bmv1RcDULD4vniofhiS54%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>> GHCB spec:
>>>>
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdevelop
>> er.amd.com%2Fwp-
>> content%2Fresources%2F56421.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40a
>> md.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11
>> a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZ
>> sb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0
>> %3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=YiPgZU87fdnl5rJpD0E2ue9aTKbqUwizuBrKxom0FiU%
>> 3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>> SEV-SNP firmware specification:
>>>>
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C9f8b4428d098453ff93308d99ad7586b%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637711071975243180%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=9sOcgACg2M6QuveVuAf8FZFv5rb9i36svspZsudpkdM%3D&amp;reserved=0
>> md.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F56860.pdf&amp;data=04%7C01%7
>> Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8
>> 961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnk
>> nown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1h
>> aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=bfQsY4%2BRnlFGuD3Bg%2BFPb3l
>> RgSGgpomNocXswHqkm%2F4%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>>> Change since v10:
>>>>  * fix 'unresolved external symbol __allshl' link error when building I32 for
>>>> VS2017.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>>  * Move CCAttrs Pcd define in MdePkg
>>>>  * Add comment to indicate that allocating the identity map PT is temporary
>> until
>>>> we get lazy validation
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>>  * drop the generic metadata and make it specific to SEV.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>>  * Move SEV specific changes in MpLib in AmdSev file
>>>>  * Update the GHCB register function to not restore the GHCB MSR because
>>>>    we were already in the MSR protocol mode.
>>>>  * Drop the SNP name from PcdSnpSecPreValidate.
>>>>  * Add new section for GHCB memory in the OVMF metadata.
>>>>
>>>> Change since v6:
>>>>  * Drop the SNP boot block GUID and switch to using the Metadata guided
>>>> structure
>>>>    proposed by Min in TDX series.
>>>>  * Exclude the GHCB page from the pre-validated region. It simplifies the
>> reset
>>>>    vector code where we do not need to unvalidate the GHCB page.
>>>>  * Now that GHCB page is not validated so move the VMPL check from reset
>>>> vector
>>>>    code to the MemEncryptSevLib on the first page validation.
>>>>  * Introduce the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD to communicate which
>>>>    memory encryption is active so that MpInitLib can make use of it.
>>>>  * Drop the SEVES specific PCD as the information can be communicated via
>>>>    the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.
>>>>  * Move the SNP specific AP creation function in AmdSev.c.
>>>>  * Define the SNP Blob GUID in a new file.
>>>>
>>>> Change since v5:
>>>>  * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page
>>>>  * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c
>>>>  * Rebase to the latest code
>>>>  * Add the review feedback from Yao.
>>>>
>>>> Change since v4:
>>>>  * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS
>>>>  * Add VMPL-0 check
>>>>
>>>> Change since v3:
>>>>  * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to
>>>> keep
>>>>    the code readable.
>>>>  * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state.
>>>>  * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB
>> GPA.
>>>>  * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the
>>>>    AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it.
>>>>  * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v2:
>>>>  * Add support for the AP creation.
>>>>  * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for
>> PCI
>>>> reads.
>>>>  * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
>>>>  *
>>>> Changes since v1:
>>>>  * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
>>>>  * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
>>>>  * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is
>>>> supported.
>>>>  * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit
>> from
>>>> MMIO ranges.
>>>>  * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
>>>>  * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location
>>>> through
>>>>    EFI configuration table.
>>>>
>>>> Brijesh Singh (28):
>>>>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
>>>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain
>>>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use
>>>>   OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page
>>>>   OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page
>>>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase
>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
>>>>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>>>>   OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0
>>>>   OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
>>>>     phase
>>>>   OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
>>>>   UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr
>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is
>>>>     active
>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV
>>>>     status
>>>>   UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures
>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD
>>>>   MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
>>>>     enabled
>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table
>>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
>>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
>>>>   OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
>>>>     table
>>>>
>>>> Michael Roth (3):
>>>>   OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
>>>>   OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check
>>>>
>>>> Tom Lendacky (1):
>>>>   UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
>>>>
>>>>  MdePkg/MdePkg.dec                             |   4 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |  18 +
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec                     |   5 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc                  |   8 +-
>>>>  OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc                    |   5 +-
>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc                       |   4 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc                    |   9 +-
>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |   8 +-
>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc                           |   5 +-
>>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                        |   6 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf               |   7 +
>>>>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>>>>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   7 +
>>>>  .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf  |   2 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf     |   3 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf           |   7 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf           |   5 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf                       |   4 +
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
>>>>  .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h  |  25 +
>>>>  MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h            |   2 +-
>>>>  .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h    |  33 ++
>>>>  OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h    |  26 +
>>>>  .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h                  |  36 ++
>>>>  .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h  |  24 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h                |   5 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h                          |  95 ++++
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h          |  93 ++++
>>>>  OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c                 |  23 +
>>>>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>>>>  .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c                   |  17 +
>>>>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
>>>>  .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  19 +
>>>>  .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  40 ++
>>>>  .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c                 | 167 ++++++-
>>>>  .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c             | 127 +++++
>>>>  .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  82 ++++
>>>>  .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c          | 294 ++++++++++++
>>>>  OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444
>> ++++++++++++++++--
>>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c                  | 231 +++++++++
>>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c               |   2 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c                          | 298 ++++++++++++
>>>>  OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c                         | 158 +------
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c         | 239 ++++++++++
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c       |  16 +-
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c    |  70 +++
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c          | 345 +++++---------
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c       |   4 +-
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c     | 261 ++++++++++
>>>>  OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc       |   5 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm  |  17 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm           |  86 +++-
>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb         |  18 +
>>>>  OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm   |  74 +++
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc        |   2 +
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm  | 200 ++++++++
>>>>  UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 100 +---
>>>>  59 files changed, 3329 insertions(+), 528 deletions(-)
>>>>  create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h
>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h
>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
>>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>>>  create mode 100644
>>>>
>> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
>>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
>>>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c
>>>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c
>>>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c
>>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
>>>>  create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> 2.25.1
>>>
>>> 
>>>
>>>